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INTRODUCTION 
Wisdom does not burst forth fully 
developed like Athena out of Zeus' 
head. 
--Bruno Bettelheim 
The sun shone while we were on the lake. The light breeze 
helped keep us cool. When we docked it was just two in the afternoon. 
There was plenty of time to have a bite to eat and to catch the number 
six bus home--the last bus runs at 7:00 P.M. from State Street. As I 
came to the bridge on the Chicago River at Michigan and Wacker, a young 
man, beating drums·, with a sign before him which read "unemployed," 
looked me straight in the eyes. I had a handful of loose change in my 
pocket, the day's collection. I put the coins in the box and kept 
going, quickly. I crossed the bridge going south, and reached the 
Public Library, on Michigan Avenue. There I met a second man, this time 
old. He simply shouted his needs. "Spare some change. I have no bed 
for the night." I deftly moved to the right of the sidewalk and then 
~eyes squarely met mine. She was an old scrawny woman, with grey 
thinning hair and her hand out. This was too much. I could find my 
anger rising. My shame and guilt were engaged. Gruffly, I edged my way 
passed her. The evening had turned suddenly chilly, and I shivered a 
little. I no longer noticed people on the street, and I muttered my 
depression to myself: "what do these people expect me to do for them?" 
"What have I ever done to them, that they should make me this upset." 
l 
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This self-talk became more accusatory. I began to repeat "there must be 
something I can do. I must do something. I must do something." It was 
as clear as dish-water to me what I must do, and I could feel my anger 
escalating, each time I repeated"! must do something." All this was 
going on as I rounded the corner into Washington Street, and then into 
State Street, where I stood, numbed, at the bus stop. After a few 
minutes, I began to look around. I could not believe it! Right there 
across the street, sitting on the cement casing of a flower bed was a 
fourth--again an old man--just staring, staring, staring, vacantly into 
space. Behind him a fifth trudged by. This time, an old woman carrying 
two carrier-bags. The words of a song from the seventies, "The Streets 
of London," came to mind and I began to hum the words 
. so how can you tell me your are lon-o-n-ly 
and say for you, that the sun don't shine ... 
This reverie was suddenly sundered by a shout from behind me. And, My 
God!, here was a sixth! This time, a young man again. He hopped along, 
I suppose one could call it, in the most grotesque manner, for he bent 
his knees and consequently moved along in a manner reminiscent of a 
monkey. His arms were rigid, fingers extended, he moved his head 
jerkily from side to side. He literally was in peoples' faces. He 
jumped at them as he passed by, and shouted something at them, not six 
inches from their nose. I could feel my numbness deepening, I began to 
stare in front of me--not unlike the man on the opposite side of the 
street. To relieve the depression, the shame, the guilt, the 
helplessness, and the boredom that I felt creeping all over me, I 
reached into the bag I was carrying, and pulled out a book I had bought 
earlier in the day, by Bruno Bettelheim. I began to read the first 
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paragraph. This is how Bettelheim began his introduction to The Uses of 
Enchantment, "If we hope to live, not just from moment to moment, but in 
true consciousness of our existence, then our greatest need and most 
difficult achievement is to find meaning in our lives" (1989, p. 3). I 
stopped reading. I thought for a new moments, stunned at the 
coincidence, and I reread the passage. I was having one of these "ah-
a" moments people speak about. My own depression, my sense of 
uselessness, and isolation, had its roots in the utter meaninglessness 
that I felt, as I failed to relate to these six people-who had crossed 
my path, in a time-lapse of less than five minutes. Meaning for me, is 
that sense of connectedness that I feel at times, when I recognize, 
more, when I know, in my heart of hearts, how I am related to the 
important people, events and circumstances of my life. Meaning goes 
hand in hand with a·sense of "wholeness" of my life, each part, like a 
piece of a jig-saw puzzle, fitting, with precision, into the next part. 
As I put words on what I felt happening deep within me, some of the 
awfulness, and the boredom lifted. I began to think a little more 
clearly, reflecting on how important connection with other people is to 
me, how vital it is for me to see and feel meaning in my relationships 
with other people. I remembered how humiliated I feel on those 
occasions when I respond to people out of shame or guilt. As I 
meditated in this way, I began to think of the weeks and weeks of work 
that has gone into this essay. I realized it was that I had chosen to 
work with the theology of John Shea and the psychological discipline of 
Object Relations Theory. Shea explicitly sets out to uncover the depth 
dimension to all our relating, whether it be to human beings or to the 
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cosmos and all the things it contains .. Object Relations is a powerful 
tool with which to uncover the psychological byways and highways we 
travel, on the journey to a cohesive self, and hence to meaning--for 
those of us who are lucky, that is--and the psychological detours, cul-
de-sacs, and the landmined-highways that those who are less fortunate 
take, all the time. None of us, maybe, escape hitting a landmine, from 
time to time. As a result of my six encounters, on that Saturday 
evening, I know I have a powerful existential interest in working with 
this theology and psychology. They may help me to cope with the effects 
of the landmines I may have wittingly or unwittingly set off in my own 
life, assist in undoing some of the damage that has occurred, and 
improve my skill at mapping that part of my journey that still remains 
to be navigated. On that Saturday evening, on State Street, 
Bettelheim's further reflections were truly music to my ears. 
It is well known how many have lost the will to live, and have 
stopped trying, because such meaning has evaded them. An 
understanding of the meaning of one's life is not suddenly acquired 
at a particular age, not even when one has reached chronological 
maturity. On the contrary, gaining a secure understanding of what 
the meaning of what one's life may or ought to be--this is what 
constitutes having attained psychological maturity. And this 
achievement is the result of a long development: at each age we 
seek and must be able to find, some modicum of meaning congruent 
with how our minds and understanding have already developed ... 
Contrary to the ancient myth, wisdom does not burst forth fully 
developed like Athena from Zeus' head; it is built up, small step by 
small step from most irrational beginnings. (Bettelheim, 1989, p. 
3) 
I am not sure that I would want to say that the beginning of wisdom has 
any irrational roots--my reading of Piaget, and Mahler, as we shall see, 
makes me think otherwise. Perhaps, non-rational is a preferable term. 
But I do agree wholeheartedly that meaning and wisdom have to.be 
created, 
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small step by small step, over and over again, throughout our life 
cycle. 
Chapter I begins with an effort to uncover how a human being may 
know the Ultimate, or God, which Shea refers to as Mystery. The purpose 
of this chapter is, first, to present the way in which John Shea 
conceptualized the human encounter with Mystery, who is ground of all 
being, the foundation of valuing and the inspiration of all concrete 
action. Mystery's gracious approach to the two-legged, upright being, 
that the human person is, might be described in a spatial metaphor, as 
directed downward. This meets the upward, transcending movement of the 
human being. The fundamental characteristic of the human being, is his 
or her ability to know in a sacramental manner. Human beings can raise 
questions, and as we discover, at the end of Chapter II, the question 
which lies behind every other question is "what is real?" The first 
part of Chapter I, is an effort to illustrate the potential 
meaningfullness and worthwhile nature of human existence. 
How do human beings penetrate the Mystery-human relation, which, 
at its most intense moments, is entirely a pre-thematized, preconscious 
~vent? This is where myth, myth-making activity, and story-telling 
(which is one form of myth) take center-stage in a person's life. The 
second purpose of Chapter I, is to outline the nature and function of 
myth or story-telling. We need to know how it relates to consciousness, 
to the shaping of attitudes and how it might give direction to patterns 
of behavior. We need to ask the question of how traditional Judeo-
Christian theological stories, first woven, as long ago as the year 2000 
B.C.E., can still make sense in our twentieth century. Hence we will 
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review the processes of interpretation that are current among scholars 
nowadays, which augment our skills in the task of creating meaning. 
The third goal of this theological chapter is to describe the 
experience that is possible, if we choose to inhabit a world, whose 
contours are shaped by the Judeo-Christian stories. We need to know 
more about Mystery's graciousness towards us, and the nature of our 
response; we want to know what we will be like, as a result of our 
relationship with Mystery. Then, of course, meaninglessness, and the 
threat of anxiety and fear, are never far away--where do they fit in? 
We fulfill the fourth goal of the first chapter by reviewing two 
stories which John Shea weaves--stories of "Hope and Justice" and of 
"Trust and Freedom." In these stories, he takes our current twentieth-
century conditions seriously, and brings them into dialogue with some of 
the major metaphors of the Judeo-Christian tradition. In this 
conversation, we see how the biblical images give birth to healthy 
attitudes for contemporary living, which in turn, suggest the concrete 
patterns of behavior one should take. 
A final section of this chapter answers the question of where 
exactly to locate John Shea in the whole of the Christian tradition, and 
helps us find the basic question Shea and his tradition ask: "What is 
real?"--a question that offers us the bridge, so to speak, that will 
span the distance between the theology we work with in this essay, and 
the psychology we turn to, in Chapter II. 
In Chapter II, as we acknowledge the achievements of Freud, we 
achieve our first goal. Passing onto a detailed examination of one of 
the strands of psychodynamic theory and practice, that has sprung from 
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his seminal work, Object Relations Theory, we discover the importance of 
the framework of Margaret Mahler and her collaborators. They furnish 
the paradigm which enables us to order the variety and the richness of 
insight, not only of the Object Relations tradition itself, but of 
psychologist Jean Piaget, of attachment theorist, like John Bowlby, and 
of psychodynamic theoreticians/clinicians such as Selma Fraiberg and 
Ana-Marie Rizzuto. Our second goal for this chapter is to present that 
paradigm. The third aim is to attend to the special contribution of D. 
w. Winnicott. His reflections on the.first "not-me" possessions of a 
child--the so-called "transitional objects"--form a crucial link in 
understanding the bridge that we can deduce between the theology of John 
Shea and the work of these Object Relations Theorists. Fourthly, the 
fundamental aim of this chapter is to understand how meaning becomes a 
quality of experience that blossoms, as it were, when a person's self 
attains a satisfactory level of cohesiveness and integration. 
Chapter III presents Ana-Marie Rizzuto's splendid study of the 
formation and function of God-representations. Building on the work of 
Freud, who was the first to speak of God representation as a 
transformation of paternal imagos, she offers us a way of understanding 
the psychological resources we bring to the life-project of faith. 
She eschews Freud's negative view of religion and religious experience. 
Thanks to her creative use of the work of Winnicott, she corrects and 
reinterprets his findings. Especially important, as we shall see, is 
her rehabilitation of illusion and imagination. Like Selma Fraiberg, 
Rizzuto thinks that the fictive creations of the human imagination are a 
storehouse of creative energy and humanizing potential. 
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Chapter IV is really the heart of this study and is in two 
sections. In the first section, using a methodology that John McDargh 
calls the "constructional-relational model" (McDargh, 1983, p. 69), a 
conversation between our theologian and Object Relations Theory is set 
up. Faith, a human dynamic of knowing, which empowers a person to 
construct a meaningful world and which finds its fulfillment in 
compassionate living, stands at the interface between theology and 
psychology. The first effort in this chapter is to establish the nature 
of faith as a knowing activity. Once this is done, the task is to 
uncover the various dimensions of meaning that a person uncovers through 
faith: one develops a sense of oneself as real; one's relationship to a 
real and meaningful world becomes consolidated; one can enjoy solitude; 
and the final aspect of enjoying a meaningful world centers on one's 
ability to tolerate dependence. Funded by the resources that are rooted 
in a meaningful world, the individual is then in position to enjoy a 
sense of cohesiveness and integration and move out towards others in 
radical self-giving and compassion. 
In the second section, the dialogue between the theology of John 
Shea, and the psychological perspective of the Object Relations 
Theorists, continues. This time we allow the theologian to critique the 
fundamental and world-creating metaphors of the Object Relations 
Theorists. The purpose of this is to remind ourselves that "pure" 
scientific activity is often impossible to sustain, and that the 
scientist, whether she be a psychologist or not, may, consciously or 
unconsciously, slip into prescriptive and world-creating mythic 
activity. Our question to Mahler, Winnicott, and the other Object 
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Relations Theorists is "What is the nature of your fundamental metaphors 
and what is the nature of the obligation that they imply?" 
The fifth chapter, drawing not only on the published work of 
John Shea, but also on a series of interviews, which this author 
conducted with him, attempts to provide a tentative account of some of 
the more prominent characteristics of the God representations with which 
he works. In this chapter, we will use the theory elaborated in Chapter 
III. 
When we reach the Conclusion, the hope is that we will be 
equipped with compatible, and mutually enriching, theological and 
psychological perspectives, to help us undertake and navigate what is 
often referred to as the "hero's or the heroine's journey"--a journey 
which always includes awesome perils and surprising joys. 
CHAPTER I 
STORIES OF DWELLING IN EXCEEDING DARKNESS 
AND UNDESERVED LIGHT 
Introduction 
In this chapter we are in search of John Shea's theological 
anthropology. The terms theological anthropology indicate my interest 
in discerning what his vision of being human is, a vision that is rooted 
in, and shaped by, his theological concerns and commitments. 
There are two kinds of issues in recent Western hemisphere 
cultural history that are of special interest to this professor of 
theology at Mundelein seminary. The first group of issues center on 
such experiences as disenchantment, contingency, temporality, autonomous 
freedom and the pursuit of science--the list is not exhaustive. The 
second group of concerns focus on the place and function of myth in 
human existence. The list of experiences we have just met, names some 
of the powerful and typical experiences of secular scientific people of 
the twentieth century. Shea, and his mentor before him, Langdon Gilkey, 
have at least two reasons for focusing on these experiences. Grounded 
in such experiences, many people of our century have adopted attitudes, 
and made choices, that threaten the very ecological survival of the 
planet. Second, these same subjects, in the name of such experiences, 
exclude any religious language as meaningless and condemn the truth 
10 
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claims of religious symbols, as mystifying hocus-pocus. 
John Shea's work is an effort to illustrate not only the 
meaningfulness of religious language, but to ground the truth claims of 
religious symbols, in a way that dialogues with people rooted in the 
scientific secular community. His work helps those Christians who, 
while remaining within a religious faith vision of the world, would like 
to integrate what they can of the undoubted goodness of scientific 
advances. 
I would like to approach John Shea's work with two questions: 
1. What are the contours of a meaningful human existence? 
2. How does a person create a meaningful world? 
By means of these two questions, I hope to allow John Shea to 
speak as clearly for himself as possible, .so that we have a solid 
statement of his positions and enough material to facilitate a fair 
dialogue with Object Relations Theory. 
I. The Birth of a Meaningful World 
The Breakthrough of Mystery 
We start with the question of the nature of God's relationship 
to the human person. Shea refrains from using the word God, and instead 
speaks of "the graciousness of immanent-transcendent Mystery." "This is 
not meant as a replacement for the word 'God.' It is rather an attempt 
to disclose the experiential base of God language and so rehabilitate 
the word" (1980, p. 92). We all participate, Shea says, in "a common 
set of environments. The self, family and friends, society and 
institution, and universe are relationships that no human life escapes" 
(1978, p. 12). 
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The Self. We have the amazing ability to be self-reflective, to 
comment on what we think and feel; "to remove ourselves from ourselves 
to see how we are doing with ourselves" (1978, p. 13). This ability 
means that we can never have "a simple animal reaction to stimuli." 
Family and Friends. We are born into this second environment. 
We are introduced to intimacy and personal contact, by and with them. 
Our development within the bosom of a healthy family and of friends 
fosters the seeds of hope that will flourish throughout our lifetime, 
and scatters the chaff that will yield its harvest of anxiety and 
persistent fears. "Intimacy or isolation, love or loneliness are the 
qualities which are generated in the environment of interpersonal 
relationships" (1978, p. 14). 
The Third environment which shapes us, is that of society and 
its institutions. While not as personal as that of family, the 
relationships at this level are powerfully influential. 
Society and institution assign roles, grant legitimacy or 
illegitimacy to certain behavior, control the means of production 
and provide sanctions, as Michael has said, "from raised eyebrows to 
death penalties." (1978, p. 14) 
The fourth environment is that of the non-buman universe. Shea 
reflects on how closely we are linked to the whole of creation; on how 
the weather's moods affect our own; on how the very landscape where a 
person is born and grows up in, contributes to growth. A careless or 
wasteful attitude toward the resources of the earth begets an ecological 
crisis, and humankind's dangerous interaction with the non-human 
universe has left us all in a precarious position. 
Having described these four environments within which we live, 
Shea goes on to describe the dimension of experience that is so often 
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neglected in secular times: that of Mystery. He begins Stories of 
Faith by illustrating how the revelation of Mystery is anchored in "the 
ordinary process of human perception and feeling" (1980, p. 33). These 
illustrations center on three developmentally significant experiences: 
the experience of generativity in the case of the late-middle-aged 
businessman, who exclaims "that's what life is about" as he reflects on 
how his friend welcomes his grandchildren to his retirement home each 
semester holiday; of the young adult who reflects on the impact of 
meeting Mother Theresa, and who understands that identity achievement 
lies in a life spent selflessly, rather than egotistically; of the 
younger middle-aged man whose father lies dying, who is prompted to say, 
"Let it go dad," and who thereby surrenders to the mystery of life and 
death. Each of these people come to a recognition of "the Mystery which 
we dwell within." They are in touch with a dimension of experience that 
is variably referred to as "the transcendent, the Ultimate, the Sacred, 
the More, the Whole, the Inexhaustible, the Encompassing ... [and 
which we] call the dimension of Mystery" (p. 17). 
Shea insists on the reality of this experience of Mystery and 
its reality. One of the clearest expressions of his convictions occurs 
in An Experience of Spirit (1983, p. 97). 
We may be able to blot out other relationships by banishing them 
from our minds; but this is an ontological constant. Two of the 
metaphors of divine presence from the Hebrew Scriptures are breath 
and blood. Divine influence is as subtle and as influential as the 
inhalation and exhalation of air and the rush of blood. The words 
on the wall at Delphi are eternally true: "invoked or not, God is 
present." 
The heart of Shea's contention is, that Mystery addresses the 
human person. This is what he understands is conveyed by the,notion of 
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Revelation. In Stories of Faith (1980, pp. lSff.) he conceptualizes the 
process of Mystery's address, and the human response to it, that is 
faith, as having five moments. 
1. There is a relationship to mystery. 
2. Mystery communicates meanings about the nature of the 
relationship. 
3. This meaning is initially formulated, then pondered, acted on, 
rephrased, reopened, reacted on, etc. 
4. The meaning that is received is related to the conflicts, 
questions and needs of the people involved. 
5. Although there is an enshrined religious vocabulary to talk 
about these experiences, it is seldom used. 
I proceed now to consider the first four of these ideas and 
leave aside the fifth since it is not directly useful for our purposes 
here. 
The Relationship to Myster:y 
Mystery is not a "thing" that is given to us directly in 
experience, nor does it ever enter our awareness directly. We become 
aware that we are related to mystery as we operate within the four 
environments of self, family, society and universe. It is a matter of 
discovering how all data are tinged with mystery. Shea cla~ms that a 
special way of knowing, or better, of acknowledging, ultimate reality--
he calls it the "Sacramental way"--is involved here. In Stories of God 
(1978, pp. 17-18) he contrasts it with mysticism and rationalism. In 
mystical experience, a person has a sense of merger with Mystery, and 
"the everyday environments of the self are leapt over and left behind" 
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(p. 17) since they are hindrances rather than helps to contact 
with the Divine. A Rationalist approach, on the other hand, begins with 
a datum of sense experience, and then through a process of logical 
inference, it reaches out to transcendence. Rationalism and Mysticism 
share the common characteristic of moving away from ordinary experience. 
A sacramental understanding of awareness is much richer. His own words 
on this are: 
Everyday awareness has two points. For example, I [l] see a bird 
[2]. Sacramental awareness has three points--(1] see a bird (2] and 
in and through this interaction become (3] aware of the dimension of 
mystery. Gerard Manly Hopkins sees a windhover fighting the 
currents of the wind and in his struggle he is plunged into the 
mystery of human redemption .... This is sacramental awareness. 
Unlike Mysticism it does not bypass our immediate environments but 
goes through them. Unlike rational awareness it does not engage in 
an extensive logical process. Mystery enters into consciousness as 
the premise of life and not as the conclusion of logic. (1978, p. 
18) 
Elsewhere Shea calls this the "in and through approach" to awareness 
(1980, p. 17). Talk of knowing of this kind has affinity with the 
language that Heidegger uses when he speaks of 
all reality as constructed of Being-beings. Beings are all objects 
which are available to the procedures of practical and theoretical 
approaches. Being is the "to be" of whatever is, the power which 
makes beings possible. Being and beings are distinct but never 
separable. A being is never without Being for Being makes beings 
possible. On the other hand Being is never without beings, for 
being only reveals itself, if it does at all, through beings. 
Therefore an awareness of b~ings, the surface of reality, can bring 
with it an awareness of Being, the depth of reality. (quoted, 1978, 
p. 19) 
Shea himself talks about this kind of perceiving as perception through 
feeling, a mode of acknowledgment that is both cognitive and affective: 
[Feeling] is the way in which the total person appropriates Whole or 
Mystery or Encompassing. Since the dimension of mystery in Gilky's 
phrase "is not so much seen but the basis of seeing; not what is 
known as an object so much as the basis of knowing; not an object of 
value, but the ground of valuing; not the thing before us, but the 
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source of things; not the particular meanings that generate our life 
in the world, but the ultimate context within which these meanings 
necessarily subsist," it is not observed and detected like 
individual objects. Feeling perceives by participation. (1978, p. 
19) 
This is the kind of "knowing" that i.s typical of the artist or 
the musician. It is the "knowing" that grounds myth-making and ritual 
behavior, two of Shea's major points of interest. 
The core myth (the death-resurrection of Jesus) and ritual 
(Eucharist) of Christianity reflect the artistic dimension of the 
human person. . . . The artist in each person appropriates reality 
by feeling its fullness .... Feeling responses to divine-human 
interaction are usually expressed in imaginative forms. (1983, p. 
64) 
In Stories of Faith (1980, p. 92) Shea sharpens his account of 
the developing divine-human interaction by contrasting supernaturalistic 
and sacramental imagination. For a person who operates with a 
supernaturalistic imagination, "God" is a flat, descriptive word, 
referring to a Supreme Being whose relationship to us is understood 
through the use of analogy. But analogical knowledge of God is 
unsatisfactory. That is not the only way in which use of the 
supernaturalistic imagination is inadequate: it leads to our addressing 
God as if He were simply another being; it leads to our expecting God to 
intervene in the gaps that our own activity cannot fill; and finally it 
reduces the possibilities of contact with God to those special times and 
places, where an ordinarily absent God, mysteriously makes Himself 
available for contact. In this mode, the human imagination is utterly 
trapped. It recognizes the poverty of its contents and resorts to the 
use of reason to compensate for its deficits. Reason becomes the pawn 
of supernaturalistic imagination, and is pressed into the defense of its 
cause. Thus, reason develops treatises on the limitations of analogy, 
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combines negative and positive language in God-talk, and develops 
theories of secondary and primary causality to account for divine 
activity. Then he adds 
imagination is an orientation toward reality more fundamental than 
thinking. It has tendencies which pull us in a certain direction; 
and although the mind might pinpoint the problems and try to solve 
them, it cannot change the direction. In another image, if the 
imagination has a gaping hole, thinking will not patch it for long. 
In a final image, imagination is the room and thinking is the 
furniture. (1980, p. ??) 
Having dismissed supernaturalistic imagination as an adequate 
mode for receiving Mystery's address, Shea now must give his own account 
of how there is a proportion between Mystery and the human being's 
capacity to receive It. To attune us to a completely different form of 
human imagining, Shea invites us to turn to our experience for a moment. 
He recalls for us the reaction of a father who sees his newborn baby for 
the first time: "God." Again, the word that is on the lips of a dying 
person frequently is "God." These people are echoing the cry of the 
slaves in Egypt who address the heavens in their suffering by exclaiming 
"God." Or again, says Shea, take the example of the girl who has been 
blind from birth. Now, thanks to some surgical intervention, she can 
see for the first time. She looks around at the beauty and color of the 
room she is in, and she exclaims "Oh My God! Oh My God!" Her 
exclamation expresses not only her intense gratification at being able 
to see, but her sense of overwhelming amazement at the beauty she sees, 
as well. She does not see God. See sees color and form, but in the 
interaction between her and color or form, she is triggered into an 
awareness of the greater Mystery she lives within. She indicates this 
awareness by calling out "God" (1980, p. 96). In all these cases, the 
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exclamation of the word "God" indicates the movement of the imagination 
into the mode that Shea calls "sacramental imagination." 
Rooted within this mode, we do not restrict the word "God" to an 
exclamatory use only. We use God in the nominative case as well. The 
reason for this arises from a quality, which Mystery has, as it 
discloses Itself to our awareness. We do not experience Mystery in a 
continuous way, nor is our ability to experience it dependent on our 
willing it. It comes and goes, and we do not control it. We are graced 
with it. 
In order to communicate this felt perception (that the initiative 
rests with Mystery) we make God the subject of the sentence .... 
To start a sentence with "God" is simply to state the fundamental 
dynamic of the relationship. The referent in experience for "God" 
as subject is completely different than the referent in an 
experience for "Joan" as subject. At this moment we are not engaged 
in analogy, but in linguistically expressing the felt perception 
that the Mystery instigates all interaction. (1980, p. 97) 
With God in the nominative case we soon use verbs and objects. 
We say God is love. In the context of sacramental imagination, we are 
not ascribing qualities to God. "We mean our relationship to God is 
loving" (1978, p. 97). The person who says God is love, and speaks out 
of a sacramental imagination is not someone who betakes himself or 
herself to an uninhabited island and cuts connection with every living 
soul, in order to enjoy God's love. Rath~r, this person is someone who 
has loved another and in and through that love has discovered that a 
greater love, which supports and encourages the interpersonal love, has 
been disclosed. 
In sacramental imagination God, self and others are permanently 
bound together. We cannot talk of our relationship to God without 
talking of our finite relationships; and we cannot talk about our 
finite relationships at any depth without talking of our 
relationship to God. (1980, p. 98) 
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Sacramental imagination takes the universal presence of Mystery for 
granted, so it is never a question of making the absent God present. 
The question is how does the ubiquitous God enter the heart and mind. 
The answer to that question is by responding in the mind, heart and 
action to what has been disclosed. This is what faith is: "responding 
in mind, heart and action to what cannot be escaped" (p. 98). 
Among the consequences of being able to perceive sacramentally 
which Shea considers worth noting let us attend to two. The first is 
that what we are brought in moments of sacramental awareness, is not an 
awareness of ourselves in ourselves, or of Mystery in Itself. "What is 
revealed and responded to is not the fact that there is a Mystery, but 
the fact that we are bonded to that Mystery" (1980, p. 19). Second, 
this relationship is perceived as very real. The Mystery we have 
encountered is truly other than the person encountering it. It is not a 
projection of fantasy, nor a concept, but a reality which invites us to 
become engaged with Itself. Having said all that Shea drives home his 
thesis: "Therefore the first element of revelation faith experiences 
is, that in and through our concrete interactions we are involved in a 
real relationship with Mystery" (p. 19). 
In this section I have tried to present the way John Shea 
perceives the human person as being adequately equipped to acknowledge 
and receive the address of Mystery. It is thanks to the ability to use 
imagination in a sacramental way that the connection between Mystery and 
the human person enters awareness. Reason functions within the "room," 
to use his own metaphor, that sacramental imagination provides, in the 
process of explicating that awareness. We now turn to the task of 
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forming an initial understanding of what is communicated in the divine-
human encounter. 
Mystery Communicates Meanin&s About 
the Relationship 
It is not enough to say that "I'm in a relationship with 
Mystery." A meaning is also given in the encounter concerning the way 
that the relationship is to be lived. In Stories of Faith, Shea returns 
to his senior middle-aged businessman, his young adult and young middle-
aged· son, to illustrate just how the flow of their relationship is 
indicated, in their encounter with Mystery. It "hit" the first man that 
he should have contact with his grandchildren "It 'jumped out of' his 
experience, appearing as an invitation he had very little to do with" 
(1980, p. 20). The girl listening to Mother Theresa knew that 
"something came to her." She did not deliberately set out to find some 
kind of meaning for herself in the lecture. "She received it more than 
she manufactured it" (p. 20). The man at his father's death bed, who 
whispered to his father that it was time to let go, was expressing a 
meaning that came to him as a response to his father's situation. "This 
was the truth of the situation and I responded. I didn't take it on my 
own, but only spoke what was already there" (p. 20). These incidents 
illustrate how we do not have to be Sherlock Holmes-like types questing 
frenetically for Mystery. Rather Mystery is "on the make," ready to 
surprise us everywhere. It is this sensitivity on the part of Mystery--
constantly moving towards us--"which is the experiential base for all 
talk of grace" (p. 21). This talk of grace might seem to leave us all 
sitting on our oars with nothing to do, but Mystery's communications are 
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not sedatives, they "also have the quality of an imperative" (p. 21). 
The meaning which we perceive in our encounters with Mystery are 
pointers to how our life is to be lived in such a way that there is 
compatibility between Mystery and the unfolding of our life story. "As 
such the meanings do not appear as options but as truths that must be 
conformed to" (p. 21). 
To avoid getting the impression that John Shea is preaching some 
kind of illuminism it is necessary to hear him tell us that 
the felt perception that the meaning is given and therefore 
imperative does not mean that it appears in awareness untouched by 
the person who receives it. The given never actually appears as 
given, but only transformed by its reception. (1980, p. 22) 
Part of this transformation is effected by the very fact that we 
exclaim "God," or whatever word carries the affective response to the 
disclosure of mystery. The reception of the disclosure is further 
transformed by what happens next: the experience evokes images, which 
have both an affective and cognitive power. 
Through the images we know something about the relationship to God, 
but we also have "some feel" for what it is like to live in that 
relationship. This rounded ability makes images an appropriate 
first form to convey the experience of God" (1980, p. 99). 
Use has been made of a multitude of images, in the Christian 
tradition, to convey this God experience, though the reality of God is 
never fully captured in one or in all of them. Yet, on the other hand, 
we can both establish and deepen our contact with Mystery through them. 
"This paradox, an imageless God, available through images, is at the 
heart of sacramental imagination" (1980, p. 100). 
The images a person uses may come from diverse sources. 
Sometimes they may reflect the medium through which Mystery has been 
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disclosed in hisjher life. For example, one may look at a beautiful sky 
at sunset, have intimations of Mystery and exclaim "Heavenly God!" The 
disclosure came through interaction with the sky and sky is used to 
convey the meaning of transcendence. Another common example is that of 
interpersonal love. A man loves his wife and becomes aware of a 
transpersonal source, which encourages and authorizes his feelings and 
behaviors. Thus he says "God is a lover." "To focus on the illusive 
presence he linguistically 'separates it out' and names it with the 
feelings, attitudes and values through which it entered awareness" 
(1980, p. 100). Parental imagery, rooted in the human experiences of 
fathering and mothering, has frequently been used to express the Mystery 
of Ultimate Reality, as generative loving. A person may choose imagery, 
not because it has been associated with experiences which have mediated 
Mystery in the person's own life, but for the simple reason that they 
accurately convey the felt perception of the relationship. 
The experience of the relationship is logically prior to the images. 
So various images are tried out to see if they capture the nuances 
of the relationship. In the book of Kings, Elijah is ordered 
outside the cave to watch the Lord pass by. The writer then uses 
the images of a mighty wind, an earthquake and a fire; but God is in 
none of these images. Finally, a whispering sound carried the 
presence of God. (1980, p. 101) 
Once the divine-human encounter breaks into consciousness, 
images are born. The process does not end there however. The images 
are explored so that the felt perceptions of the relationship between 
the person and Mystery can be further appropriated. It is to that 
exploration that we now turn. 
Meaning Is Initially Formulated. 
Pondered. Acted On 
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As we have seen, since Mystery suffuses the totality of our 
lives, we are able to receive and express Its intentions towards us. 
But at the same time Mystery is transcendent to us and therefore every 
formulation of Mystery's intentions will be incomplete and inadequate. 
Quoting Schillebeeckx, Shea describes Mystery as the "Ultimate-
Intimate." 
As Intimate we receive and articulate our relationship to it. 
As Ultimate, the meaning of our relationship eludes full expression. 
(1980, p. 23) 
Since our formulations are always partial, we constantly return to the 
experience, to "remember, rehash," and slowly clarify the meanings. As 
this happens, the original experience yields what Shea calls "a 
distilled meaning." "This meaning, now detached from life-giving 
dialogue with experience, accompanies the person through life. It often 
takes the form of a proverb, slogan or one-line truism" (p. 23). And 
so, his friends will hear the businessman say: "You've got to get to 
know your grandchildren." The young adult will appreciate or criticize 
her friends on the basis of whether she perceives them as self-centered 
or not. And the son will often repeat "When it's your time, it's your 
time. You've got to go with it." The danger with these distilled gems 
is that they can appear arbitrary to anyone who is unacquain~ed with the 
process which gave rise to them. 
Shea takes pains to point out the misunderstanding that can 
occur when he talks of "faith formulations." This can be taken to mean 
that his concern is with an intellectual response to a revelatory event. 
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But faith-revelation experience engulfs the whole person. It 
affects the centred self, addressing the heart mind and behaviour. 
In a similar way the faith formulation process is an activity of the 
whole person, unfolding the convictions, feelings and behaviours 
which are suggested in the experience. (1980, p. 24) 
In An Experience Named Spirit, Shea returns to this topic and 
clearly describes how a person negotiates the process of translating the 
ineffable experience of Mystery into "faith formulations." He speaks 
here of Mystery stirring the "soul," "the ultimate source of human 
activity ... the hidden, unifying centre of the person" (1983, p. 68). 
Once an experience of Mystery occurs in a person's life, there is an 
immediate bubbling forth of image after image--theologians assign the 
term "first order language of religious experience" to this outpouring. 
However, as soon as this prayerful explosion of expressive and evocative 
language.subsides, the mind wants to get a clearer grasp of what has 
happened in the Mystery-human interaction. And so it "inhabits anew the 
first order language of religio~s experience" and thus explores the 
relationship with Mystery. 
Through this activity it comes to some touchstone truths and states 
them in a first order language of its own: . . . the first order 
language of cognitive appropriation (the first order language of 
theology) .... Some biblical candidates (of which) might be: "God 
was in Ghrist reconciling the world to himself" (2 Gar. 5:19) or "It 
is precisely in this that God proves his love for us: that while we 
were sinners, Ghrist died for us" (Rm 5:8). (1983, p. 69) 
In expressions such as these, we have a cognitive expression of our 
experience and a statement of the basic tenets of our faith. They 
express the experience in a summary phrase, in order to clarify it. The 
distilled truth becomes permanently available. Once these touchstone 
truths are in place, the mind begins another task: that of 
investigating these truths: "This is the second order language of 
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theology" (p. 70). In this task of exploring the meaning of the basic 
affirmations of faith, theology takes into account the findings of the 
various human sciences and sets up a dialogue between them and the 
faith-expressions. "This mental activity is a drive toward 
intelligibility and coherence" (p. 71). That still is not the end of 
the story. The next move the mind makes is that of trying to extend the 
influence of the basic beliefs to every area of human functioning. 
So the mind works to construct an appreciation of everything within 
life, from its foundational convictions about the mystery of life. 
What does our relationship to God have to say about: joining the 
military, sexual love, the distribution of wealth .... This 
theological activity constructs a world in which we see properly, 
the dynamics of every area of life. (p. 72) 
There is yet a third moment in this mental activity, which 
focuses on the "personal and social ecology of beliefs" (1983, p. 73). 
That is to say that theological reflection has a self-critical moment. 
"It is deeply suspicious and attempts to unmask false processes that may 
be operative in the espousal of belief and the construction of theology" 
(p. 73). If, for example, I choose "the poor sh<lll inherit the earth" 
as the hermeneutical key to the New Testament, then engaging in 
theological reflection of this third kind, I will ask myself: "Am I 
involved in some reaction formation here? Is it because I am convinced 
I can never be rich, that I adopt this perspective as central?" On the 
social level, this kind of reflection looks for the ideological 
mechanism in belief and theology. "After a theology of salvation has 
been elaborated and the Catholic Church is more gloriously reigning than 
ever before, the critical mind becomes suspicious" (p. 74). 
We still have not yet touched on the final item of the heading 
of this section: "action." From Shea's perspective, every Mystery-
26 
human interaction has a "core imperative," a drive to action, going with 
it, inevitably (1983, p. 77). It may well be in many instances, that 
the need to translate the experience into action is much more pressing 
than the need to ritually celebrate it or to cognitively grasp it. "The 
ethical impulse is to pass along what has been experienced .... The 
experience of God catapults the person into the human world with a 
divine agenda" (p. 77). Not that this agenda is spelled out in specific 
strategies, rather the ethical imperative that flows from an experience 
of Mystery "is an overall orientation" (p. 77). They might have the 
form: be just, be loving, be caring, and thus direct our energies in a 
general direction. 
Tbe Meanin~ That Is Received Is 
Related to the Conflicts. Needs. 
and Questions of the Person 
John Shea is concerned lest we attribute a causal power to our 
own needs, conflicts and questions in our talking about our encounters 
with Mystery. Rather these needs, conflicts and questions predispose us 
to a certain kind of openness to, and "gear us to certain 
communications" from Mystery. They "shape the content of revelation" 
(1980, p. 25). He recalls Thomas Fawcett's rendition of the dynamics of 
a faith-revelation experience, which explicitly refers to the conditions 
previous to an encounter with Mystery. 
1. The presence of an existential need. 
2. The moment of disclosure or perception itself. 
3. The embodiment of the experience in symbolic form. 
The connection between the moment of encounter and that of em~odying it 
in language, or symbolic form, is close indeed--so close that in stage 
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two, Fawcett uses both the word disclosure and perception. The former 
expression attends to the movement from Mystery to the subject, while 
the latter points to the person's apprehension of the meaning of the 
encounter. Stage two immediately opens out into stage three. Quoting 
Fawcett, Shea continues "The moment of revelation cannot therefore be 
separated from its symbolic formulation, because the subject can never 
speak of the experience without the use of symbol" (1980, p. 26). While 
there are distinguishable moments in the encounter with Mystery, the 
experience of that encounter, and the formulation of·its meaning is a 
single unified process. 
Lest we come away with the idea that the revelation of Mystery 
is always a positive, affirming perception, Shea reminds us that this 
may not always be the case. Where persons have spent their lives 
systematically opposing Mystery's invitations, "the interchanges are 
often anything but smooth" (1980, p. 26). 
The existential situation is often not one of sincere search but one 
of distortion which is not recognised. A life has so gone against 
the grain of mystery within which it lives, that the revelation-
faith experience is the recognition of its wrong-headedness, and the 
possibility of change. (p. 26) 
In this case there is a striking congruence between a person's . 
existential situation and the demands of Mystery, but this congruence 
brings shock, disbelief or discomfort in its wake. While the person is 
now receptive to what Mystery has to say she or he has lost control, in 
a real sense. 
The Origin and Function of Myth 
We have a first answer to our question: How does a p~rson 
create a meaningful world? It is an answer in broad strokes. Meaning 
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is grounded in the dynamic interrelating that goes on between the self 
and its multiple environments, and which, thanks to our ability to use 
our sacramental imagination, unfolds for us the attractive and 
enrapturing presence of Mystery, whose demands on us are the source of 
our values, behaviors and the object of our affections. It still 
remains for John Shea to spell out in detail, how imagination, engaged 
in its sacramental mode, conducts itself, and how in metaphorical terms, 
the furniture in its room is to be arranged, how, in other words, 
reasoning unfolds under its influence. Let us use Shea's own words to 
map out for us the further horizons we have to explore in our quest for 
the detailed answer to our question: 
We are inescapably related to this Mystery which is immanent and 
transcendent, which issues invitations we must respond to, which is 
ambiguous about its intentions, and which is real and important 
beyond all else. Our dwelling within Mystery is both menacing and 
promising, a relationship of exceeding darkness and undeserved 
light. In this situation we do a distinctively human thing. We 
gather together and tell stories of God to calm our terror and hold 
our hope on high. (1978, p. 39) 
Why is story selected to play this important role? Shea chooses 
"story" to fill such a role because story is one of the two principal 
forms of myth, and myth is the means by which meaning is generated and 
the medium through which our relationship to mystery is expressed (1978, 
pp. 47-52). Though some would lean towards an explanation of myth as an 
escalated idea (e.g., Evolution as a total explanation) Shea himself 
clearly prefers the description of George Whalley: 
(Myth) embodies in an articulated structure of symbol or narrative a 
vision of reality. It is a condensed account of man's Being and 
attempts to represent reality with structural fidelity, to indicate 
at a single stroke the salient and fundamental relations which for a 
man constitute reality. . Myth is an indispensable pri,nciple of 
unity in individual lives and in the life of society. (p. 51) 
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In Stories of Faith, our author elaborates further on the 
characteristics of story. 
(a) Stories are interestin~. They have the power to engross 
both the teller and the listener. The teller is engrossed because when 
one speaks, one is touching the inner core of one's identity. Shea 
shares with his readers, a reflection of Gertrude Stein: 
What is interesting is the way everyone tells their stories. If you 
listen, really listen, you will hear people repeating themselves. 
You will hear their pleading nature or their attacking nature or 
their asserting nature. (1980, p. 87) 
Hearers are engrossed because they become participants in the 
story. Think of Jesus telling the story of the Good Samaritan to the 
Scholar of the Law in Lk: 10:29ff. In my own case, I can still feel the 
hair on my head standing up as I joined my neighbors back home telling 
ghost stories. Shea calls this "entering into the time of its 
happening." When we tell stories in this way we are using the concrete 
narrative form and are willing to 
re-experience in diminished form the feelings and insights of the 
event. In re-experiencing it, we see it differently, and "unpack" 
its meaning further. Storytelling has a power of involvement and 
appreciation that the mere noting of patterns and talking 
analytically about experiences does not have. (1983, p. 104) 
Stories told in this form are indeed interesting because of 
their personal significance. Personal significance gives rise to what 
Shea calls a preference for existential, rather than chronological time, 
in these narratives. 
This means the person creates time units in terms of their personal 
impact with only a nod to the hours, days, weeks, months, and years 
way of counting. An experience may take place in five minutes or 
five years. But however long or short, the time is unified in terms 
of its significance for the person. (1983, p. 104) 
Stories are often engrossing because an image has emerged which 
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"kernalizes" an experience. The image is not a replacement for the 
story, but somehow grasps its core. "As such it functions as a code for 
the experience, anchors it in memory, and is its main linguistic medium 
through which it is shared with others" (1983, p. 106). 
(b) Stories are accessible. They are concrete and their basic 
material is the everyday events in the lives of ordinary people. 
To ask what someone's values are is often to be greeted by silence; 
but to ask them about a time when they "felt on the line" is to 
reach the question of values through the world of story. The 
mystery of story is that everyone is one and everyone has some; and 
in a conducive setting, everyone wants to tell them. (1980, p. 87) 
(c) Narrative is an inherent quality of buman experience and so 
a primal form of buman discourse. 
A person like J. P. Sartre may complain that each moment of 
existence is a separate entity in itself, isolated, unconnected with 
every other moment and therefore meaningless, yet, he can spend page 
after page narrating this meaninglessness and at the end of it all 
"courageously accepting that existence" (1980, p. 88). 
(d) There is a reli~ious or sacred dimension to storytellin~, 
where religious or sacred is defined as the affirmation of ultimate 
meanin~. Shea identifies with the position of Sam Keen on this, where 
he claims that storytelling undoes the randomness of the present moment 
by inserting us in the larger framework. Storytelling allows a sense of 
the sacred to break through. How this happens is elaborated by Charles 
Winquest. He contrasts 
the act and the content of storytelling, "What is absent in many 
modern stories is a content of positive affirmation. What is 
present, even in relating a story of nothingness is a positive act 
of affirmation. . . . The escape from meaninglessness is achievable 
through the transcendence· of act over content. "True exis.tential 
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atheism is not telling a godless story, but having no story to 
tell." (1980, p. 89). 
(e) The stories of the Christian tradition are crucial in the 
process of growth into a religious self-understanding. These stories 
bear a sufficiently strong resemblance to our own story that we can see 
ourselves in them, and yet they are different enough from our life-
story for us to have our conscience pricked and see new possibilities. 
Traditional stories, whether they are historical accounts (David and 
Bathsheba) or fictional ones (the creation story) "reflect concerns and 
conflicts present in our lives and suggest ways of dealing with them" 
(1980, p. 89). 
When we tell traditional stories we are searching to give 
meaning to all that we experience in our relationships with o~r 
proximate environments (through which we engage the dimension of 
mystery). When we succeed in generating such meaning, we end up with "a 
personally shaped world where faith vanquishes fear, freedom wins out 
over slavery and hope vanquishes despair" (1978, p. 42). This meaning 
is functioning for us in an "ultimate way"--it grounds the meanings of 
our proximate environments, gives them vitality and sustains them. Shea 
accounts for the passion with which we quest for ultimate meaning, not 
by an appeal to innate curiosity or need for neatness. Rather we search 
for ultimate meaning in order to have a "perspective which enables us to 
orient ourselves within 'the givens' of any situation" (p. 47). Once we 
have this perspective we can relate to even the harshest and violent of 
realities, such as death in a creative way, without succumbing to panic 
and chaos. 
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The drive for ultimate meaning is for the purposes of salvation, not 
curiosity. This redemptive function is cryptically conveyed in 
Isaac Dinesen's remark "any sorrow can be borne if a story can be 
told about it." (1978, p. 47) 
It is our ability to engage in myth-making that answers our need to 
discover or create ultimate meaning. Our task now becomes that of 
describing the function of myth within human consciousness. 
Ihe Four Functions of Myth 
What does Myth do? It has three functions, says John Shea, 
"Mythic activity creates worlds by structuring consciousness, 
encouraging attitudes and suggesting behaviours" (1978, p. 52). We 
shall add a fourth. 
Myth Structures Consciousness 
We can illustrate what is meant by myth structuring 
consciousness (Shea also calls this the "attention directing" function 
of Myth) by referring to the examples used in Stories of God (1978, p. 
53). In his clinical practice, Freud was struck by the conflict between 
son-mother-father, that frequently emerged in the lives of his clients. 
He named the syndrome of characteristics that emerged in these conflicts 
"The Oedipus Complex" and thereby unwrapped an ancient story which 
provided the psychoanalyst and his clients with a powerful myth by which 
to interpret the conflict which was tearing their nuclear families 
apart. 
What makes this story mythic is that its plot is accepted as 
applicable to every family situation. It creates a world, a 
perspective, an angle of entry into the primordial situation of 
father, son and mother. (1975, p. 53) 
The second example is that of Gilgamesh, an ancient, near-eastern heroic 
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figure. In the story, he has to struggle fiercely against death and 
searches for the secret of immortality. If people today show interest 
in the story, it is not because they are especially interested in the 
man himself, but because in some way his story is everyone's story. 
"The pattern of the story creates a context in which personal death, and 
life lived in the face of death, can be appropriated" (1975, p. 53). 
From these examples we can learn what Shea means when he says 
that myths structure consciousness. Amidst the welter of stimuli which 
hit us from the multiple environments we inhabit, myth focuses our 
attention on certain elements of the incoming reality rather than 
others. It helps a person then, find patterns in these elements and 
"entices the person to relate to that reality through those patterns" 
(1978, p. 52). Whether the myth takes a story or an idea form, it deals 
with individual, concrete cases, but at the same time it transcends its 
concrete reference, and has the power to touch into and cast light on 
the "formless but powerful impulses" of a multitude of circumstances. 
Trivial events can never be the stuff of myth. It grows out of the 
primordial circumstances of human living, and intends to shed light on 
every and all experience of birth and death, awe and reverence, psychic 
and political struggle, natural disaster or beauty, etc. "The ambition 
of myth is not to be one more interesting for forgettable account, but 
to become the structure of consciousness through which human situations 
will be appropriated" (p. 52). 
Myth Uncovers Values and Arouses 
Commitment to the Values 
Mythic activity's second task is to uncover a set of values for 
' I , 
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the subject and to awaken commitment to these values. Shea illustrates 
what is involved here by retelling the Darwinian evolutionary myth 
(where one might expect to find a "scientific facade of distance and 
non-involvement" (1975, p. 54) as it has been recast poetically by the 
Greek poet and novelist, Nikos Kazantzakis: 
Animals appeared--worms--making themselves at home in water and 
nude. "We're just fine here," they said. "We have peace and 
security; we're not budging!" 
But the. terrible Cry hammered itself pitilessly into their 
loins. "Leave the mud, stand up, give birth to your betters!" 
"We don't want to! We can't!" 
"You can't, but I can. Stand up!" 
And lo! after thousands of eons, man emerged, trembling on his 
still unsolid legs. 
The human being is a centaur; his equine hoofs are planted in 
the ground, but his body from breast to head is worked on and 
tormented by the merciless Cry. He has been fighting, even for 
thousands of eons, to draw himself, like a sword, out of his 
animalistic scabbard. He is also fighting--this is his new 
struggle--to draw himself out of his human scabbard. Man calls in 
despair, "Where can I go? I have reached the pinnacle, beyond is 
the abyss." And the Cry answers, "I am beyond. Stand up!" All 
things are centaurs. If this were not the case, the world would rot 
into inertness and sterility. (pp. 54-55) 
Such a story is recounted, not so much to pass on information, 
but to arouse the teller and the listener to a passion for the 
particular rendition of the processes of life that it conveys. 
Referring to Donald Evan's study, Shea says the language of this story, 
and others like it, is "self-involving." "To speak the myth is to adopt 
the attitudes the myth proposes. . . . Myth creates worlds by providing 
patterns of interpretation and urging commitment to the values they 
embody" (1978, p. 55). 
The process of generating different values and insights from a 
story is illustrated with an example from St. Luke's gospel (1980, p. 
115), with the parable of the "Unjust Steward." This story ends with 
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applause from Jesus for the Steward. Luke asks why the steward was 
praised and gives two reasons. The first, a chilling thought for a 
Christian, is that cheating simply is not an option for him or her: 
"Because the worldly take more initiative ·than the other-worldly when it 
comes to dealing with its own kind" (Lk. 16:8). Second, wealth will 
finally fail us. St. Luke has the addendum: "make friends for yourself 
with dishonest wealth, so that when it fails, you will be welcomed into 
eternal dwellings" (Lk. 16:9). But there is a third insight or value, 
which is that intended by the historical Jesus, namely that the way to 
react in a crisis is to exercise ingenuity. Shea goes on then, to speak 
like this: 
If, when Christians gather today, the story is read, it will 
undoubtedly trigger other meanings. They will not be the exact 
insights of either Jesus or Luke. Of course they must be in general 
conformity with scriptural insights, and this is basically assured 
by the fact that the same story instigated them. But they will also 
be different, and this is basically assured by the fact that we are 
neither first century Jews nor Hellenistic Christians. (1980, p. 
117) 
Myth Suggests General Patterns 
of Behavior 
The third function of myth is to suggest general behavior 
patterns. It is less a matter of myth telling us what to do in 
particular circumstances and more the case of its indicating "a broad 
directionality." If we adhere to the myth of the loving God then we 
will develop a lifestyle of caring; if we espouse the myth of the 
liberating God, then we will cherish activity related to the liberation 
of the marginalized. 
This does not really tell us anything and the difficulty Shea 
himself raises in Stories of God, still stands unanswered: 
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But the arena of personal and social interaction is vastly 
complicated. To be dedicated to loving activity does not assure the 
ability to love or the knowledge of what the "loving thing" is in 
any ·situation. To be committed to the causes of justice give no 
indication of what is just or how justice is to be enacted. Myth 
paints activity in broad and generally motivational strokes .... 
The working out of mythic demands in the complexities of concrete 
life is a process of on-going evaluation and mediation. (1978, p. 
SS) 
In Stories of Faith (1980, p. 119) we find Shea dealing again 
with this function of the mythic story under the heading of 
"Implications." There he spells out the steps in the "decision-making-
that-leads-to-action" process, in greater detail. Yes, stories do 
sensitize us to areas of life that we might otherwise neglect. Yes, 
values do flow from the archetypal experiences as these are told in 
story, and values do elicit stable attitudes. Indeed, "they push toward 
concrete embodiment. They unravel into strategies." But the strategies 
are not the product of strict deductive process. Rather when faced with 
a concrete situation we consult the myths, insights and values and out 
of that consultation comes an approach to the situation which is 
genuinely influenced by them. Shea approves of David Tracy's 
formulation of the steps involved in moving from values to action, and 
quotes it, saying while Tracy's specific concern is social ethics, his 
distinction applies to any area of human activity: 
There is a well recognised set of distinctions in contemporary 
social ethics which bears recalling here: the distinction between 
general [and usually fairly abstract] ethical principles [love thy 
neighbor]; middle axioms, or ethical dictates which are still 
relatively abstract but more concrete [racism is in all 
circumstances wrong]; and finally, concrete social ethical policies 
[the debate on bussing as a specific policy to fight against 
racism]. (1980, p. 122) 
Christian mythic stories provide the general, more abstract 
principles but at each "out of God," so to speak, and "into" the world, 
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more and more human initiative is demanded, and more and more ingenuity 
is called upon. Perhaps the account of these strategies that Shea 
gives, as they have flowed from his own ministry is the best commentary 
on this: 
No one is long in ministerial game before they know a big piece of 
it is fidelity to people in the grip of destructive forces ... 
The teenage dropping out of school has to be pursued; the grieving 
widow has to be "sat with"; the divorced have to be patiently helped 
back to trust; the sick have to be visited. What is important is 
the actual .other. The vast abstractions I so easily fall into are a 
falsification of the real. There are no poor students; there is 
only Mary who needs some help. There is no problem of divorce; 
there is only John who is hurting and needs to be put in contact 
with other people .... All that is important is concrete and 
actual. The abstractions are meant to serve that. (1983, p. 110) 
This is John Shea's account of the functions of myth. But there 
would be serious shortcomings about it, were there not another function 
that myth fulfills. The person who uses myth, as he has described him 
up till now, tends to live in isolation and independence, from all round 
him or her. However, Shea knows as well as anyone, that no one is an 
island. Myth does indeed have a fourth function--that of grounding a 
person in his or her cultural world. As he describes this additional 
function, Shea celebrates the primacy of the relational in human 
existence and the bonding of each person to his or her own culture. We 
turn now to a consideration of myth as an initiation into the life of a 
tradition. 
Tradition, Myth and the Person-
in-Community 
Each one of us arrives in a community that existed before us. 
The evolution of this community has occurred on the "rails," so to 
speak, of its own myths with their corresponding worlds of attitudes, 
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values and behavior patterns. John Shea reflects on how a person's 
identity is formed in dialogue with these worlds. Birth into this 
community means a person inherits its legacy: a particular 
imaginativeatmosphere; contact with a special pattern of relationships, 
a pattern that is the embodiment of particular mythic stories. 
As we grow, we are in dialogue with the world-creating tales of our 
people. These stories are encouraging and critiquing us, setting 
boundaries and modelling behavior. It is in the intricate 
interweaving of community myth and personal experience that identity 
is born. (1975, p. 57) 
Let us look at this "intricate interweaving of community myth 
and personal experience" in action. In Stories of Faith (1980, pp. 
76ff.) Shea asks us to consider the person in the process of 
appropriating the tradition. The typical case is that of someone who 
has chosen Scripture as the exemplary expression of the Christian myth 
(liturgy, hagiography, the great church councils: are other examples 
that might be chosen as modes of faith expression). Our Christian might 
sit down and read the bible alone, or pray with it, or talk to another 
or others, about what was striking. But for Shea, the most powerful 
reading of the scriptures occurs, when it is done in a group setting. 
Since they have come together to discern the meaning of these documents, 
in an interactive setting, all with their own preunderstanding and 
insights, Christians generate new vision and possibilities, of which 
independently, they would never have dreamed. "When this happens, and 
the awareness of the group is that they are responding to a reality they 
share, but which is greater than they are, they talk about the movement 
of the Spirit" (p. 81). · 
In a situation like this, the individuality of a person (she 
39 
achieves her identity as "an innovator of insights and attitudes . . . a 
unique embodiment of the human" [1980, p. 81)) and her embeddedness in 
her multiple environments (genetically and culturally she is a "walking 
tradition") are both acknowledged, and the task of living, in Marshal 
McLuhan's phrase, of "driving into the future looking through the 
rearview mirror" is taken care of (p. 81). 
In a group like this, there are those whose primary concern is 
to understand "the convictions, feelings and behaviors of those who 
preceded us" (1980, p. 81). They like to express the link between our 
lives and those of our predecessors--"they are one partner in the 
dialogue" (1980, p. 82). 
Then there are those who spend their times embroiled in the 
turbulence of everyday problems and issues, "trying to celebrate the 
ongoing hopes." "They are one partner in the dialogue" (1980, p. 82). 
Two moves are made in this conversation between tradition and 
experience. First, people search the tradition through the lens of 
their own special interests, in the hope of discovering perspectives and 
values that resonate with their concerns. For example: 
The awareness of social, economic and political injustices 
sensitizes us to the Exodus story of liberation, the political bite 
of Jesus' message, and the ideological mechanism of all our 
doctrines and theologies .. (1980, p. 83) 
If our initial interests are in ecstatic experiences then we 
will turn into very different themes (creation, resurrection and 
pentecost). If we have feminist concerns or liturgical concerns, then 
we will have different readings of this same scripture. But then comes 
what Shea called the second move: The scripture talks back. It can do 
this in either of two ways. First, it may say: "Yes ... but": 
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The tradition affirms the insights and values that are genuinely 
Christian but contextualizes them with other insights and values. 
The tradition offers direct critique when it spots a conviction (we 
have no reason to hope) or a value (hoarding the goods of the earth) 
which is directly contrary to the Christian vision. (1980, p. 83) 
Second, in a more creative kind of critique, it may ask us to 
expand our interest and the scope of our concern, and prods us to 
develop a broader approach to the issues. 
To the affirmation of ecstatic experiences which have the backing of 
creation, resurrection and spirit is added the consideration of 
fall, crucifixion and sin .... Yes we must be actively engaged in 
the political, social and economic spheres, but this involvement 
stems from belief in God; and this belief means we enter the 
struggle in a specific' way: (p. 83) 
I have been faithful·, I Hope, to Shea's description of the 
process of how the personal and the communal are interwoven in the case 
of a person, who is a Christian, and who creates her own meaningful 
world through the appropriation of the myths of her tradition. But 
there are real difficulties standing in the way of such an appropriation 
that must be dealt with. As we saw earlier, once the work of shaping a 
"first order" theological language has been completed, there immediately 
emerges another task--that of formulating a "second order" theological 
discourse. This is the task of making the Christian message 
comprehensible to contemporary hearers. As we have just said this may 
sound easier than it actually is. What are these difficulties and how 
can we overcome them? I hope I can answer this question in the next 
section. 
The Need for Hermeneutics 
When a community has an ancient history--as is the case with the 
Christian community--the people who enter that community have to face 
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the fact that the mythic stories of the Judea-Christian tradition go 
back, in the oldest strata, to the dawn of human history. Even the 
"youngest" writings are at least 1,850 years old! This is a first and 
major obstacle to the process of appropriating the tradition. The 
creative imagination they reflect is light years removed from our own. 
Second, biblical research, which has been spectacularly successful, 
overwhelms us with information about the bible's origin and the process 
of its formation. This flood of information, very often, reduces us to 
silence, because it is not clear how to connect it with the live issues 
of today. John Shea draws the inevitable conclusion for us: "If the 
Christian Stories of God, whose basic shape is given in Scripture, are 
to create worlds and mediate the sacred, they must go through the 
process of interpretation" (1978, p. 68). 
We can begin our process of interpretation with questions 
generated with the method of scientific histography: Did the events 
recounted in this story really happen? What is factual here? When 
questions like these are asked, one is seeking historical support for a 
story, and if it is not forthcoming, then a historian will cast doubt 
upon the truth of the story. On the o~e hand, Shea welcomes the 
application of the Historical Method to Christian sources, since the 
events celebrated in the Christian tradition are rooted in history. On 
the other hand he adds a caution. 
Yet myth, even when based on history, is more than history. 
Historical inquiry can place the story in a context, show its limits 
vis-a-vis the present understanding of historical fact but it cannot 
validate or falsify it with regard to its nature as mythic ... 
rational and historical inquiry does not exhaust the mythic story. 
(1978, p. 69) 
A second kind of historical question takes the form of: "What 
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did it mean for the people who first told the story?" Asking this 
question is a first step in explorin& the meaning of any story. It is 
essential to ask it, since a mythic story has its roots in a particular 
community and is rooted in its life. If a modern reader can understand 
how they understood it, then she or he can begin to construct a 
contemporary meaning for it. 
When the work of the preceding two types of inquiry is completed 
a third type of question awaits an attempted answer: "What picture of 
self, others, nature, history and God does this story convey?" (1978, p. 
70). With this question on our lips, we set about exploring the mythic 
meaning of the story and the emphasis is on finding out how the myth 
functions as a world-making reality. To link up with the preceding two 
paragraphs, let us imagine a court scene. Myth is on trial. The 
prosecutor is not History or Science. The prosecutor is The Quality of 
Life of people who want to see if the world that the myth holds out as 
possible is fit for human habitation. 
Shea is drawing on the work of Paul Ricour at this point. 
Ricoeur's concern centers around determining the sense of a text. Do we 
have to ~et behind, or beneath the words to an existing reality in order 
to get to its sense. Ricoeur denies this. He says on the contrary, as 
Shea quotes him. 
The sense of a text is not behind the text . . . not something 
hidden, but something disclosed. What has to be understood is not 
the initial situation of discourse, but what points towards a 
possible world, thanks to the non-ostensive reference of the text. 
Understanding has less than ever to do with the author and his 
situation. It wants to grasp the world propositions opened by the 
reference of the text. To understand a text is to follow its 
movement from sense to reference; from what it says to wh~t it talks 
about. (1978, pp. 70-71) 
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Shea spells out for us the process that is involved in moving 
towards the "non-ostensive reference" of the biblical mythic 
narratives. We approach the text with the question "what are the 
enduring religious situations that give rise to these symbolic stories?" 
This is a different question from that raised by the scientific 
historian or the form or redaction critic. It is a question that tries 
to touch into the primordial experiences of birth, death, fate, love, 
fear, anxiety or hope, etc., that ground these mythic stories. What 
this gives rise to is the phenomenon of the birth of a possible world, 
engendered by the religious foundation which stands as the source as the 
mythic narrative. The reader who approached the traditional myths with 
this question is setting up the possibility of a collaboration between 
biblical and contemporary religious situations, and actively pursuing 
the task of creating a world that is meaningful, and yet drawing 
nourishment from the sources of his/her community's genius. Shea now 
can comment 
Through the process of interpretation the contemporary person's 
relationship to the Christian symbolic stories changes (in the 
language of Ricour) from a primitive to a second naivete. For the 
pre-modern person there existed an immediacy of belief, a flush-
tight relationship to religious symbols, a primitive naivete. But 
the modern person, precisely because she is modern, is a critical 
creature. She is informed by philology, exegesis, history and the 
phenomenology of religion. . . . Consequently she does not have an 
immediate and undifferentiated rapport with the symbolic stories. 
. . . For the modern person, primitive naivete has been irrevocably 
lost. 
Yet . the modern person is able to inhabit them in a second 
naivete. The second naivete is achieved . . . in and through 
criticism. The story is critically assessed in such a way that its 
power is restored rather than destroyed. (1978, p. 72) 
This helps us appreciate the struggle we have to make as human beings to 
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create or uncover meaning and to develop a lifestyle that is congruent 
with it. 
Summary 
At the beginning of this section we set out to answer the 
question: . "How does a person create a meaningful world?" We have a 
rather complete answer at this time. Meaning is first of all rooted in 
the gracious approach that Mystery, without interruption, makes to human 
beings. Tilat is the foundation of everything else. Rather than 
imposing a fixed meaning on human beings, this address from Mystery 
arouses human creativity and responsibility. Tilere is a proportion 
between the revelation of Mystery and the human capacity to know 
Mystery's relationship with us. Each of us is graced with what Shea 
calls a "sacramental imagination." Through the use of sacramental 
imagination, we come up with, first, images which are a first effort to 
enter the meaning of the relationship we unveil as present in our 
experience. Hot on the heels of image, we pour forth words, the words 
of first order theology, then second order and finally of the self-
critical moment of theologizing. None of us is ever entering virgin 
territory when we give birth to the images that try to contact the 
Mystery that reveals Itself so graciously. We are part of a long line 
of a tradition, bursting with images and theological discourse, the 
legacy of our ancestors' attempt to appropriate that same Mystery, in a 
different age and in a different culture. If we approach this tradition 
and see in it a collection of stories, then we can begin to create a 
dialogue between these stories and our own, personal, story. Part of 
that dialogue involves a hermeneutical effort that will allow the 
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tradition to speak to us, in our contemporary setting, in a way that is 
still immediate, attractive and empowering. In the next major section 
of this chapter, we will look at what happens as we engage in the 
dialogue with our tradition. We shall hear Shea tell us of the contours 
he sees as shaping his twentieth-century, American, Christian life. We 
will see his answer to the second question we asked at the beginning: 
"What are the contours of meaningful existence?" 
II. The Contours of Meaningful Existence 
The Varieties of Faith-Revelation Experiences 
Put in its simplest form, John Shea proposes that our bond to 
what is ultimate is the nucleus on which human capacities work in order 
to create world. "Certain events of our lives bring with them the 
awareness that we have a relationship not only to the events themselves 
but also to the mystery of life with which they occur" (1980, p. 16). 
Through everyday events like that of the grandfather on the plane who 
reflects on how his friend welcomes his grandchildren to his retirement 
home, and who can say "that's what life is all about," or like that of 
the young woman, who while listening to Mother Theresa comes to the 
realization that she is called to a life of selflessness or the middle-
aged man, at his father's deathbed who sees the need to surrender to the 
flow of life, the truth about Mystery of life is being discerned and all 
of us are being "enticed to think feel and act in accordance with that 
truth. This everyday way of proceeding, this ordinary and unavoidable 
human process goes by the name of revelation and faith" (1980, p. 15). 
Each of these experiences are Revelatory experiences through 
which Mystery discloses itself. There are two other kinds of 
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experiences which Shea points to: conversion experiences and 
experiences of expansion of consciousness. We shall examine each of 
these in turn. We have to keep in mind that these experiences overlap 
and are not meant to be mutually exclusive. 
Revelatory Experiences Where the Stress 
ls on the Communication of a Message 
The experience of the grandfather on the plane whom we mentioned 
earlier typifies this experience. To Mystery's disclosure, he 
responded: "that's what life is all about." Life may well be about 
other things, for but him it is certainly welcoming his grandchildren to 
his home, after retirement. Though this experience took place on the 
plane to Chicago, what was revealed is true no matter where he goes. 
What the man carries with him is not the solution to a problem. The 
truth he has, is an insight into what constitutes the secret of a full 
life for him, it is the secret to being "fully alive." 
Experiences Which Stress the 
Process of Change 
Rarely does anyone solicit conversion experiences. Sometimes 
they happen. One perceives one's life sharing in what Tillich called 
the structures of destruction. The choice then is to remain within 
these structures, or to freely choose to extricate oneself. The 
conversion process comes· to term, if one chooses to change; it is 
aborted where there is refusal. "The pattern of the experience could be 
laid out as destructiveness, catalytic occurrence, human freedom, 
movement toward new life" (1983, p. 100). 
Mvstery Experiences Which Stress 
E;{pansion of Consciousness 
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All these moments we are brought to consider the wider, more 
encompassing context in which we live. Four possibilities have been 
suggested for the quality that these experiences may take. Sometimes, 
these experiences confirm the beliefs we have held up to that point. We 
simply are aware of God's presence. There are others, where we sense 
there is a mutual recognition between the self and God: God notices me 
and I God. When this mutual recognition is acknowledged as loving, then 
there is an ecstatic experience: that which I notice and in turn 
notices me, loves me. And this expanded awareness experience may 
finally include a revelation, in which Mystery lets me know of Its plan 
and invites my participation. 
Qualities of Our Relationship with Mystery 
Shea emphasizes that what is revealed to us by sacramental 
perception is not truth about ourselves or truth about Mystery itself, 
but rather "the fact that we are bonded to mystery" (1980, p. 19). He 
enumerates some qualities of this relationship: because of it we are 
made people of depth; this relationship has the strong accent of reality 
because the mystery encountered is other than we are; we may be enthused 
by the encounter with Mystery, but Mystery cannot be reduced to this 
enthusiasm: while Mystery is genuinely other than we are, ·11 it is an 
otherness we participate in"; while Mystery has the feel of being 
objectively real, we cannot treat it in a detached manner, because it is 
a reality which always involves us. When he says this Shea is 
protecting the experience of Mystery from any kind of psychological or 
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sociological reductionism. What he says, in this connection, in An 
Experience Named Spirit echoes what he says elsewhere, many times, 
Psychology and Sociology can illuminate what happened, but in the 
last analysis, they cannot determine what happened. The experience 
becomes explicitly religious when it is judged to be a time of 
contact with a transcendent otherness. (1983, p. 101) 
In an earlier book, Shea wrote many pages describing the 
privileged moments when the awareness of Mystery has broken through into 
human consciousness (1978, pp. 25-39). Some have come to an awareness 
of mystery through experiences of contingency, dialogue, communion, 
moral ambiguity and disenchantment. Others have realized relatedness to 
mystery through nature. Experiences of order, play, hope, damnation and 
humor hint at a transcendental dimension for Peter Berger. Michael 
Novak points to freedom, honesty, community and courage as experiences 
that open into the transcendent. 
Yet there is more to this than just the mere fact of our 
relatedness to Mystery. Our relationship to it has definite qualities 
and nuances. Three qualities in particular hold Shea's attention in 
Stories of God (1978, pp. 37-38). 
i. We sense a closeness and yet a distance with Mystery. Mystery 
is within us and yet without. It is in our midst and yet beyond 
us. In traditional language it is both immanent and 
transcendent. 
ii. Our awareness of Mystery is not continuous. Sometimes it is 
there without our willing it, and when we want it, it does not 
come. Mystery comes upon us unsolicited. We are invited to 
awareness. This is not comfortable for anyone who always wants 
to be the initiator. With Mystery, we learn we are not the 
first. 
iii. Our relationship to Mystery is ambiguous. Sometimes it seems to 
be on our side, at others it seems to be our deadliest enemy. 
This ambiguity of the intentions of Mystery is taken up at 
length in Stories of Faith (1980, pp. 36ff.). The question is: "Is the 
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Mystery of life ultimately gracious to all that is within it and in 
particular to this two-legged stand-up that is asking the question?" (p. 
39). 
The Ubiquity of Faith-Revelation Experiences 
Before answering that question, he pauses to clear the ground. 
Shea first turns his attention to the claim that even asking such a 
question is narcissistic, appearing to once more place the human person 
at the center of the universe with everything evolving around her. Such 
an interpretation, he claims distorts the real intention of the 
question. Mystery permeates all the environments we live in. We cannot 
be indifferent to the question, because we are not neutral about the 
answer. We simply need to ask it. But the real answer to the charge of 
narcissism is that people who have lived out of a sense of the 
graciousness of Mystery have shown a great freedom from self-
preoccupation. Such people have been able to lower their defenses and 
risk themselves in the world around them. "The paradox of theistic 
faith, which is exemplified in the life of Jesus, is that living in a 
relationship to a gracious God means living dangerously in an ungracious 
world" (1980, p. 40). Shea's use of "faith" and "religious" gives these 
words a special significance. "Religious" designates the bond that 
exists between each person and that which is perceived as ultimate. 
Faith in conventional use refers to theistic faith, but this language 
neglects the fact that everyone, "believers and unbelievers" work out of 
faith assumptions, based on faith-revelation experiences. 
Faith is as common and as unavoidable as air .... ·Theistic, 
atheistic and agnostic positions are faith assumptions garnered from 
experiences taken to be revelatory of the ultimate meaning of our 
relationship to Mystery. (1980, p. 44) 
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The question is not "Do you have faith?" but "What is your faith?" With 
this understanding of faith then, it is clear that reason is not opposed 
to faith. Faith and reason are not enemies, for all human knowing is 
initiated from fundamental assumptions which are not the product of 
logic, but which mark the point from which logic starts. As we saw 
earlier the starting points for logic are the images provided by the 
imagination. "All efforts of reason are grounded in assumptions derived 
from faith-revelation experiences; all faith assumptions are eventually 
tested in experience and explored by reason" (1980, p. 44). 
The Ultimate Graciousness of Mystery 
Having done that groundwork, Shea now is in a position to tackle 
the question as to whether Mystery is ultimately capricious or gracious. 
To do so, he turns to the literature of Annie Dillard since she, like 
other artists, is in contact "with the springs of creative imagination" 
(1980, p. 45). Theological thinking springs from the imagination's 
contact with Mystery and Annie Dillards's imagination has had that 
contact. Her book, Holy the Firm (1977) is an exploration of the 
experience of being both caressed and violated by Mystery. 
Holy the Firm is the story of three days, November 18th, 19th and 
20th. The first two days reveal life as capricious, at one moment 
thrilling us, at the next terrifying us. The third day is given 
over to the experience that there is a reality that holds us beyond 
thrill and terror. (1980, p. 46). 
On November 18, Dillard is enraptured by the beauty of Puget 
Sound, the setting of the book. "The god of this say is 'child, a baby 
new filling the house'" (1980, p. 46). November 19 is a very different 
day, named "God's tooth." Dillard is terrorized as she witnesses a 
plane crash and sees the face of a seven-year-old burned off. "The god 
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of today is a delinquent, a barn burner, a punk with a pittance of power 
in a match" (p. 46). And hence her question: "Is there anything firm 
or is time on the loose?" In theological jargon this translates into 
"Is there a God beyond the gods, a Lord of History?" 
The answer to this question comes to her as she is walking to a 
communion service on Sunday the 20th, carrying the wine for the liturgy. 
She becomes aware of the wine on her back. She stops to look down from 
the mountain which she is climbing, to view the sea beneath here, and as 
she does, she has a vision of Christ being baptized~ Coming out of the 
water, Christ's body is caressed by beads of water which sparkle in the 
sunlight. 
Each one bead is transparent and each has a world .... I deepened 
into a drop to see all that time contains, all the faces and deeps 
of the world and all the earths contents, every landscape and room, 
everything living or made or fashioned, all past and future stars, 
and especialiy faces, faces like the cells of everything, faces 
pouring past me talking, going and gone. And I am gone. (Quoted 
from Dillard, 1977, p. 67. 1980, p. 47) 
Out of this mystical experience comes her conviction, the sense, of the 
gracious grounding of all her life--"Holy the Firm." Of course Annie 
Dillard will face November 21, and God alone knows the disaster that it 
will bring. God's tooth may well appear as a fang again. But· the 
Sunday experience was not a repetition of the 18th, just another day up 
among the many of up and down days. 
It is an entirely different calibre of encounter with an entirely 
different communication. It generates an assurance beyond the 
capriciousness that continues to characterise human living. As such 
it becomes an "anchor," a touchstone for belief in God. (1980, p. 
47) 
The sense of the ultimate graciousness of Mystery towards "the 
two-legged stand up" that we are, does not thereby make all things 
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understandable. When we have said that the ultimate power in the 
universe is on our side, we still have to make sense of the experience 
of indifference. We have not solved the riddle that tormented Job or 
answered the torturing puzzle of why Christ dies, abandoned on the 
cross. All we have, Shea says, is "a perspective, a stance, a posture, 
an orientation within the continuing ambiguity" (1980, p. 49). So, the 
question of ambiguity survives and so does a host of other questions. 
Once we have contacted the graciousness of Mystery, we are obliged to 
offer an explanation of, and live creatively with, those aspects of the 
relationship that appear capricious: senility, death, sickness and 
moral evil. Once the graciousness of mystery is perceived by us, or 
better is revealed to us, the struggle begins of trying to bring every 
event of our personal and communal life within the sphere of influence 
of the graciousness, but yet at the same time, taking care not to 
violate life's integrity. 
An answer to the question we are asking in this section--what 
are the contours of a meaningful existence?--is beginning to emerge. 
The first horizon that appears is that of the approach of Mystery to us. 
What is rather staggering for us to absorb, is that Mystery's intentiQn 
towards us is gracious. Such is the second horizon. The presence of 
gracious Mystery is not a magic wand that waves away all hopelessness or 
the meaninglessness that we frequently have to cope with. It is rather 
the firm footing we can stand on, in order to begin to creatively deal 
with them. In what follows, John Shea leads us through a process of 
reading the stories of our tradition in such a way that links our 
efforts to live out of graciousness, with those of some of the great 
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heroes of our tradition, especially, with the efforts of Jesus of 
Nazareth. The key metaphor he uses to do this is that of the journey of 
faith, though he also uses four other metaphors, of God as companion,, 
God as path, God as seductive lure, and that of "dangerous exchange," to 
deepen the exploration of the world opened up by the key metaphor. 
Facing the Ambiguity and Celebrating 
the Graciousness 
Through the use of a series of metaphors, drawn from the Judeo-
Christian tradition, John Shea introduces us to the actual process of 
meaning-making and the creation of a world that is congenial to human 
existence and which engenders nurturing, mutual patterns of behavior. 
The ambiguity that he has spoken about is not lost sight of, but he 
invites us to test out the three metaphors: Mystery as Companion, 
Mystery as Path and Mystery as seductive lure. 
Mystery as Companion 
The journey of faith begins with the conviction "of an all 
powerful and faithful presence" (1980, p. 54). Discourse about this 
belief in God is less a statement about the essential structure of 
reality and more a daring statement of the speaker's conviction that she 
or he can overcome anything that enslaves him or her. Contact with 
Mystery brings "an influx of power" (p. 55). The Jesus of Mark's 
gospel, whose experience of gracious contact with Mystery, causes him to 
call out "Abba," becomes an interpreter of this power for us. His image 
for this power is nurturing fathering love. To understand what this 
power is doing in him, Jesus tells the parable of "tieing up the strong 
man" in Mk. 3:27 "No-one can enter into a strong man's house to plunder 
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his property unless he first tie up the strong man." The story is 
autobiographical for Jesus. Through him God is plundering the house of 
Satan, the source of alienation and destruction. The graciousness of 
God is "a matter of superior strength before it is a matter of superior 
knowledge" (p. 56). The resurrection is a celebration of the lengths 
that this power will go to, in order to oppose ugliness, evil and death. 
It is a power, which at the same time, is love. The meeting of love and 
power gives a peculiar twist to the way that power operates in human 
life. 
To illustrate the twist in the story of power with us, Shea 
recalls the story of Elijah (1 kg. 18), a story with two scenes. In the 
first scene, with Yahweh's help (he cracks the match at the right moment 
Elijah triumphs over his rivals, drags them to the river and slits their 
throats. Every believer's fantasy! God's mighty power vindicates 
belief. The people who see it are fervent in their conviction, and 
enthusiastic in their commitment to God. We might be tempted to say 
that miraculous events elicits faith, but there is a wisdom in listening 
to what Claudel puts on Judas' lips in a meditation on the relationship 
betw~en Jesus and Judas. "Claudel has Judas say that he would rather 
watch a cat walk tightrope along a fence than watch Jesus unbend another 
twisted leg" (1980, p. 59). Rather than eliciting faith, miracles are 
much more likely to arouse curiosity which is followed, nearly always, 
by boredom. 
Shea then turns to the second scene of the Elijah story (1 Kg. 
19). In this scene the queen, Jezebel, is in hot pursuit of Elijah, 
through the desert, having ·sworn to do worse to him than he did to her 
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prophets. After a day's journey he is depressed. He lies down under a 
tree and prays for death. In his misery he falls asleep. And then the 
angel arrives, bringing him bread and water. Refreshed, Elijah falls 
asleep again. A second time the angel comes and prods him: "Get up and 
eat, else the journey will be too long for you." He eats and drinks and 
walks "forty days and forty nights into the desert to the mountain of 
God, Horeb." Shea invites us to understand this scene in the light of 
the faith-revelation processes that he had proposed, and then he 
suggests that the meaning of graciousness is brought into focus. Elijah 
wants to give up; but the touch of Yahweh is the power to go on. 
The graciousness that characterizes our relationship to mystery is 
made concrete in the sustenance and encouragement to continue. The 
extended insight of the story is that in every situation of life the 
nurture and the lure of God is present. This is one of the meanings 
the Christian Cross conveys. To look at a broken man on a cross and 
say "Son of God," is to say that there is no situation where the 
divine power to undergo and overcome is not present. If this man 
who is abandoned by friends, church, and state, is the presence of 
God, then no-one will be abandoned by that presence. Graciousness 
is experienced as water and cake in the desert and the unrelenting 
commands, "Get up," "Eat," "Walk." (1980, p. 60) 
With a bond like this linking us to Mystery, we become people with three 
major characteristics: 
1. We become a people of coura&e, ready to risk the unknown, 
unwilling to shrink from new possibilities, and desire to go 
beyond the familiar and secure. We are courageous because 
Mystery trusts us. "Trust is the God-ward-side of human 
courage" (1978, p. 156). 
2. We choose humility as a basic virtue. We become adept at 
distinguishing between "Mystery" and "problem." We are ready to 
fall in love with Mystery, more and more, while embracing our 
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limits to control or understand it. We are ready to recognize 
our problems and to struggle to overcome the limits they impose. 
Humility is not a rejection of the human person, but a 
perspective that gives us truth. A humble person rejoices in 
the power that is in him or her and that he or she channels, but 
neither he or she has the ambition to be all-powerful. Humble 
people recognize the people they are, but do not regret that 
they are not all loving. 
3. We become a people who can laugh at ourselves. In this way, we 
stay in touch with our creaturehood, and remind ourselves of 
God's transcendence, just at the moment we are most likely to 
forget it. 
Our courage, humility and laughter are all rooted in the 
gracious quality of Mystery towards us, in the companionship God extends 
towards us, on a continuous, uninterrupted and intentional basis. 
This metaphor of God as companion is open to abuse. It may lead 
us to image Mystery as "saccharine god"--"me and my best friend God 
approach"--one who becomes anything we want him to be, a chameleon god, 
who is a crutch for the insecure as much as he is a weapon for the 
envious or another angle for the shrewd. Hence, it needs to be 
complemented by at least two other metaphors: God as path and God as 
seductive lure (1980, pp. 63-66). 
Mystery as Path 
When we talk of God relating to us as a path, we are 
acknowledging that Mystery is not indifferent to who we become. If God 
is path, then our lives are "impelled by the perspectives and values of 
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the divine companion" (1980, p. 64). The desire, above every other 
desire that moves us is that expressed in the ancient prayer: "Breathe 
in me, 0 Breath of God." We commit ourselves to bringing everything 
about us into conformity with Mystery. Shea goes on to reflect that if 
our experience of mystery is that it is indifferent, then we will try to 
live out of that indifference. If on the other hand we find mystery is 
gracious, then we will try to go with the flow of graciousness, even 
when we are tempted to prefer indifference. "Religious passion is 
initially blind. It does not specify its content. It is a raw drive to 
think, feel and act out of whatever is the ultimate truth" (1980, p. 
65). 
Jesus, like all of us, was motivated by this passion to be one 
with ultimate reality, as can be seen from the reply to the question of 
why enemies should be loved: "My Father makes the rain to fall on the 
wicked and the good, the sun to shine on the just and the unjust" (Mt: 
5:45). The equality of the sunshine and rain is not a sign of cosmic 
indifference, but one of universal love. Love is grounded, not in an 
astute law, or the necessity to build a just society, but is a command 
flowing from the heart of reality. "'Be you perfect as my heavenly 
father is perfect' is not a plea to become like God, but to live in 
Communion with God" (1980, p. 66). 
Mystery as Seductive Lure 
The metaphor of God as path corrects any tendency we might have 
to create God in our own image, but it takes another metaphor, that of 
God a seductive lure, to help us talk about the passion we ex~erience on 
recognizing ourselves chosen as God's companion, for the journey on his 
58 
path. Shea introduces his reflections on this metaphor by recounting a 
scene from Kazantzakis' Zorba the Greek, which he claims has 
autobiographical truth for the novelist. This is Kazantzakis as Shea 
quotes him: 
I was at an exhibition of Rodin's works, and I had stopped to look 
at enormous bronze hand, "The Hand of God." This hand was half 
closed, and in the palm an ecstatic man and woman were embracing and 
struggling. 
A girl came up and stopped beside me. She looked, .and was moved 
at the disquieting, eternal embrace of the man and woman. She was 
slim, well-dressed; and had a wealth of fair hair, a powerful chin 
and thin lips. There was something determined and virile about her. 
I normally hate inviting a conversation, and I do not know what 
urged me to turn to her and ask: 
"What are you thinking about?" 
"If only we could escape?! she murmured resentfully. 
"And go where? The hand of God is everywhere. There is no 
salvation. Are you sorry?" 
"No. Love may be the most intense joy on earth. It may be. 
But now I see that bronze hand, I want to escape." 
"You prefer freedom?" 
"Yes." 
"But supposing it is only when we obey that bronze hand that we 
are free? Supposing the word 'God' didn't have that convenient 
meaning the masses give it." (1980, p. 67) 
Shea comments on this story: "Religious passion wants to obey the 
'bronze hand.' It does not seek to escape, but to merge, to be in 
communion with the ultimate truth" (1980, p. 67). 
Once we are fired with this passion for merger, for communion, a 
"complex and dangerous" exchange takes place: We hand over, and receive 
back, our life from God, at which point it is utterly focused on God's 
concerns. God receives it and gives it back. Before we look at this 
process of handling over and receiving back, let us look at its result 
as these are seen in Jesus. At the time of Jesus it was unthinkable 
that a decent person would eat with those marginalized people referred 
to in scripture as "tax collectors and sinners." Jesus ate and drank 
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with them? Why? At that time, it was absolutely forbidden to work on 
the Sabbath. Jesus picked ears of corn on the Sabbath and untwisted 
contorted limbs. Why? At that time the class distinction between 
master and servant was rigorously enforced. Jesus washed the feet of 
his servants. Why? "Because Jesus is acting of out the power and 
perspective of the One he had handed himself over to as a carpenter and 
received himself back as the Son. Jesus carries the cause of God" 
(1980, p. 70). 
Now we turn to the task of understanding what is involved in 
"handling oneself over." Shea is at pains to say that there is more 
involved here than "mental moves" or psychological mechanisms. "It is 
an inner act which we perform out of a spiritual centre" (1980, p. 67). 
This is a way of ref erring to the existential and total nature of the 
surrender of "the heart." In An Experience Named Spirit (1983, p. 147) 
he writes 
the heart is hidden in the cage and ribs which is further covered by 
muscle and skin. It cannot be seen; but it pumps blood and is the 
source of life. When the heart is damaged in any way, the entire 
person is affected. It is these physical facts that make it an apt 
metaphor for the relationship with God. The relationship to God is 
the invisible centre of the person . . . the heart is the ultimate 
relationship to God, which is the permeating context of all other 
relationships. 
Everything is surrendered, including those aspects of our life, our 
"extremes" which are hardest to separate from. Instinctively, we cling 
to our achievements and talents, for it is these that give us value, 
maintain our self-worth. The fear of letting them go is "awesome," lest 
we become indistinguishable from the mass of others who surround us. On 
the other hand there is our smallness, the mean, petty, sordid, part of 
self. The terror involved in letting them go is even greater, because 
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in order to let them go, we have to name them for ourselves. Letting 
them go, means knocking down so many of the defenses we have erected to 
stay functioning. Letting go both beauty and wart means that the total 
self is involved in the transaction, and the Mystery whom we approach 
with them, will settle for no less, as we know from the prophets. 
Echoing their words, what God wants is broken hearts (as in Ps. 51:17, 
R.S.V. translation) not burned sacrifices. 
Once our "heart" is surrendered, it is returned, and in the 
traditional language, what arrives is "a new person." "We now possess 
ourselves in and through God's possession of us" (Shea, 1980, p. 69). 
With St. Paul then, we can rejoice in our greatness, even if we would 
not dare boast about it, since the greatness we are and the great things 
we do, are gift. Our meanness is accepted and in the acceptance is 
paradoxically transcended. 
This does not mean that it disappears, but that its destructive hold 
on us is broken. We experience ourselves through a distinction that 
is perhaps Christian theology's greatest contribution to human 
wisdom. We love our finitude and battle our sin. (p. 69) 
We are "loved sinners," and in that awareness comes an outburst of 
energy which many name freedom. This freedom is not so much release 
from all structures and circumstances that alienate us, but an awareness 
that we are "funded from beyond," attached and bonded to ultimate 
graciousness. We cry, not "We can do everything" but "in God all things 
are possible." 
Shea inverts normal Christian language in a reflection on this 
"surrender and receiving back of our heart." In the gift to us of 
ourselves, God entrusts Himself to us, and invests us with the mission 
of looking after His concerns: 
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Our faith in God becomes God's faith in us. Our handing of our life 
over to God is reciprocated by God handing his life over to us. In 
standard Christian theology, God is the saviour of the human race. 
Kazantzakis calls the human race the saviours of God. God is more 
than a faithful and power presence. He is a presence that provokes. 
What he provokes is activity on behalf of his cause. This would be 
reprehensible manipulation except for the fact that his cause is us. 
(p. 70) 
Taking Stock 
Meaning then, is created as we discover how--as others like 
Elijah and Jesus before us--to journey with Mystery as our companion, 
but also as our path, as the lure which draws us on and with whom we 
enter into a surprising exchange. As we have said, all of this does not 
magically wave away a reality that has to be faced, in all places and at 
all times. That reality is sin. One of the tests any map of the 
Christian world must face, is that of showing its value in empowering 
those who use it to negotiate the roadblocks that sin erects on the 
faith-journey. Let us watch John Shea's map prove itself in this 
matter, in the following pages. 
Recognizing the Strategies of the Panicked Heart 
Earlier, we briefly alluded to the ·insight, that though we 
perceive Mystery as gracious towards us, ambiguity still remains. 
Perhaps, we might have come away with the impression that waiting for 
Mystery's approach is a matter of merely being quietly patient. We have 
not really said anything either about the human sinfulness that Mystery 
must grapple with, and has grappled with, throughout the story of the 
Hebrew and Christian testaments. What we need to consider is what 
happens to the human "heart" while it struggles with the ambiguities of 
life, while it tethers on the brink of faith on the one hand and 
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nihilism on the other. These issues are faced in An Experience Named 
Spirit (1983, pp. 155ff.). When the human "heart" is panicked by life's 
ambiguity, Shea suggests it takes, "two different but complementary 
tracks." "The first is to court the attitude of waiting for one who 
does not come and to live in rejection. The second is to try and please 
and not be able and to live in envy" (p. 155). The heart that waits 
anxiously for its love to arrive, begins to spurn itself, and though it 
might like to stop hoping for Mystery's approach, it cannot. Its 
defense then, is to strike back at Mystery by proclaiming that it is 
rejected by Mystery, and plays out this rejection in all it does. In 
answer to the question what the rejected heart "sees," Shea poetically 
answers thus: 
It sees everything in devalued form; it reduces everything to the 
lowest common denominator. Nothing true, good, one or beautiful 
flourishes in its sight. In sexual love it perceives lust, in 
sacrifice and dedication, guilt; in charity, condescension; in 
political skill, manipulation; in the powers of mind, 
rationalizatibn; in peacefulness, ennui; in neighbourliness, self-
interest; in friendship, opportunism. The vitality of the old is 
pathetic; the exuberance of the young is immature; the steadiness of 
middle age is boredom . . . and the rejected heart gloats . . . when 
sex falls to lust, sacrifice is grounded in guilt ... peace sleeps 
and friendship turns ego-centered. . . . (p. 156) 
And as sure as night follow day, as the rejected heart sees, so it acts. 
The behavior that flows from it is like an acid that burns everything 
before it. Dignity is granted to no one and community norms are 
spurned. Anything goes and the more outrageous the behavior the better. 
"Each act that tears down and destroys symbolizes the unloved centre 
which the rejected heart takes as the premier truth" (p. 157). 
There are times when the rejected heart will act out in a much 
more passive way. It is as if it had a radar that surely guides it to 
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those places in life where all there is is wasteland. 
This strategy of the rejected heart attempts to crush all desire 
(for Mystery]. The spurned heart compounds the ignominity of 
poverty by deigning it appropriate for one so unlovable .... It 
bows its head in obedience [to other people] not because it hears 
the author of life, but because a non-assertive self is the natural 
weakness of a heart that is not cherished. It makes a home in 
places where life is perishing. (1983, p. 157) 
On the other hand, the track that the envious heart follows is 
one of self-beautification. It whispers to its panic, "Maybe if I make 
myself attractive enough I can force Mystery's attention, and end this 
waiting" (1983, p. 159). And so this heart undertakes the mammoth task 
of trying to please and persisting in that activity, even when it is 
clear that it cannot succeed. This heart will use whatever is at hand 
in its pursuit of beautification: high grades in school; high 
productivity at work; it will fall back on sex, wealth power or fame and 
the message always is: 'How can you fail to love me, I am so bright, 
personable, wealthy? And yet all that ever greets its frenetic activity 
is silence. 
[This heart] is trying to please, but it is not able. Once our 
panicked heart begins this process of preening and strutting, we are 
on our way to a life of anxious striving, self deception and 
oppression .... We live a life of anxious and hopeless striving. 
(p. 159) 
The envious heart falls a prey to idolatry. A finite reality is 
invited in to fill the place of Mystery and then it is twisted in such a 
way that it is made to promise fulfillment. But talent or wealth, or 
fame, or whatever, is ill-equipped to fill Mystery's place and such a 
person becomes a victim of making their self-worth depend on a part of 
the self--that part that is put on display. "The totality of the person 
is tied to one segment of the person. The mystery of who we are in 
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relation to all there is is restricted to 'the stuff we strut"' (1983, 
p. 160). 
Hot on the heels of idolatry, follows another unwanted, and 
painful reality: self-deception. The envious heart is so intent on 
preening itself, that it dare not take the risk of checking out the 
success or failures of its strategies. It dare not look for, or accept, 
feedback. It an never acknowledge that it may do wrong. 
yet, inevitably we do wrong. Sin runs deep in us and breaks out in 
ways that we do not expect. The generous deed is done for self-
serving motives. We are silent in the face of unjust systems we are 
benefitting from. There are no innocents East of Eden. (1983, p. 
160). 
The coalition of idolatry and self-deception spawns a third 
reality: oppression. The envious heart only knows who it is when it 
can say who it is not. If one had placed one's salvation in knowledge, 
then there is a vested interest in keeping others ignorant; if goodness 
is one's game, then it cannot be recognized or encouraged in others; if 
Paradise is found in prestige, then others must be kept in their-
second-place. "Making ourselves loveable means making other people 
unlovable. All our efforts to build ourselves up mean that other people 
will be automatically put down" (1983, p. 161). 
Such are the strategies that are used by the heart in its raging 
desire to be filled by what it desires. When and if this desire is met 
may be this destructiveness could be redirected. We will see, I hope 
that indeed such an eventuality is possible, as we try to see how 
contact with Jesus of Nazareth, opens up renewed possibilities. 
Looking Back and Plotting Forward 
In this section of the chapter, we have been trying to answer 
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the question of what the contours of meaningful existence are. Faith is 
the basic human activity. No one--theist, agnostic or atheist--can 
escape this basic structuring activity of human existence. "What faith 
have you?" is the question that counts. In the case of the theist, her 
faith is in the ultimate gracious intention of Mystery towards us: 
Mystery's graciousness towards us, funds our lives. The cry on her lips 
is that "in God, all things are possible." And so, she chooses to 
become a courageous, but humble person, a person who can throw back her 
head and laugh at her own foibles and seriousness. Faith of course has 
to take sin and evil as important parts of experience. Coping with them 
is the heart of the creation of a meaningful existence. What we ask 
John Shea to do for us now, is to weave stories from the Christian 
tradition. In these stories we want to see a faith-world open up that 
is credible to us, we want to see faith come face to face with 
contemporary forms of evil, and to point out to us the directions we 
might seriously choose, to create a viable future for ourselves. We 
want to hear these stories in order to be enthralled, attracted, by 
graciousness at work. We are ready to have these stories teach us how 
to live creatively, connected, one to another, in a world that 
frequently is dangerous. 
Stories of God for the Contemporary World 
Shea weaves many tales that shape a world where faith vanquishes 
fear and freedom wins out over slavery. In Stories of God he tells two 
such tales of special interest to us. In the tale of "Hope and Justice" 
he brings together the fundamental Judea-Christian metaphors of rescue 
and covenant, judgment and apocalypse, resurrection and parousia. He 
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summarizes his vision of the world shaped by these metaphors in this 
way: 
The story places us in a world concerned with justice and urges 
compassion. The compassion is neither pity nor condescension. It 
does not imply an inequality, one group suffering and helpless and 
another group neither suffering nor helpless but "compassionate." 
On the contrary, compassion is rooted in the felt perception of 
solidarity. It is the attitude of people who understand that, 
despite all that separates us, the last truth is a common humanity 
within a common mystery. Compassion is the way into the lives of 
others to understand their claims and shape our social and political 
institutions to respond to them. This sense of solidarity is 
grounded in the valuation of life. The story stresses justice 
because life, every life is valuable. We do not struggle for a just 
world for the sake of justice, but as a way of valuing what we have 
received. Justice in the last analysis is an act of respect. To 
tell the story of hope and justice is to live in compassion, 
solidarity and care. (1978, p. 114) 
Then there is the tale of "Trust and Freedom." This time the 
story is told around the metaphors of "Creation, Incarnation and 
Spirit." In this story these great metaphors have to take account of 
another tale that is told while using the metaphors of "Fall, 
Crucifixion and Church." There is a story within a story here. "The 
Story of Creation, Incarnation and Spirit is a skeleton; its heart is 
Fall, Crucifixion and Church. The story within a story does not bring 
contradiction, but explosion" (1978, p. 120). 
As Shea tells the creation story of Genesis 1, its message is 
one that celebrates God's gracious celebration of the goodness of all 
that has been created. The symbol of the Sabbath rest is a statement of 
the purpose of creation which is to delight in its own holiness. We can 
understand the holiness which God's sabbath presence bequeaths to all 
creation through the category of dignity. All people share in the same 
dignity that is conferred through God's presence to creation. -And 
dignity is the basis of meaning, which Shea proposes is found when each 
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person senses and knows how he or she is related to the larger context 
in which he or she moves. Once the meaning of one's life is grasped a 
deeper question emerges: "Do I have worth? Is what I do valuable?" 
God's sabbath presence speaks of that worth, too. 
God goes beyond the presence of the sabbath rest. Looked at 
from Shea's point of view, the sabbath is "the world's aptitude for 
incarnation." 
[Christ became incarnate] because we were made for him and his 
presence makes us holy and we delight in ourselves in him. He came 
primarily becaus~ he wanted to, not because we needed him. This is 
the reason of a friend whose presence brings dignity and worth. 
(1978, p. 128) 
The story of the incarnation delights in telling about our 
dignity and worth, because God is Emmanuel, God-with-us. When we 
recount the Story of Pentecost, we discover we are holy (dignified) not 
merely because God is Emmanuel, but because God is present in us. The 
friendship God had with us in Jesus, has not become an event in the 
past, it is contemporary, for each of us. 
Creation makes way for the Incarnation and Incarnation unfolds in 
the Spirit. All three symbols have a common aim. They wish the 
sanctification of the world through the presence and indwelling of 
God. (1978, p. 129) 
From Shea's reading of the Creation story in Genesis 2, comes a 
vision of human existence that is positive and optimistic. The human 
beings there are of the earth, yet name the animals. There is a balance 
between kinship and stewardship which fosters an ecological balance. 
God's pronouncement that "it is not good for man to be alone" is the 
canonization of the relational nature of human existence. Pride, which 
leads a person to be contemptuous of human relating, and sloth, the 
failure to respond to another's approach, are both anathema to God's 
intention. Sexual union between the man and woman is affirmed as good. 
The molding of the woman from Adam's rib prompts a reading of the text 
that sees Eve and Adam as radically equal. The woman is made, not from 
the earth, as all the animals are, and over which the man is given 
stewardship. The woman is "bone of his bone," his equal. This is the 
key to interpreting the text. The fact that she is made after him is 
not the major point, and should not be taken to mean that the later is 
the least (Brown, 1990, p. 12). 
[The] man and woman live with each other in nakedness. The goal of 
the interdependent sexuality is healthy community. 
The whole account of what it is to be human--to be related to 
God, to be both kin and master of the earth, to live in 
interdependency--is pervaded by a sense of entrustment. Humankind 
is entrusted by God with the Garden ... and with each other. 
This is preeminently the story of trusted creatures, empowered by 
God to live life and care for creation. (1978, p. 132) 
The message of Genesis 2 compliments that of chapter 1. The 
same power of God, in chapter 1, which made human beings holy or 
"dignified" becomes their empowerment in chapter two. 
The world of created dignity unfolds into the world of the trusted 
creature. The world of friendship and celebration unfolds into the 
world of sexuality and communion. The world of reverence and beauty 
unfolds into the world of freedom and solidarity. If people are the 
stories they tell, the people who tell the stories of Creation, 
Incarnation and Spirit, are, most surely, a people of God. (1978, 
p. 141) 
To say that estrangement and alienation of human beings begins 
with the abuse of freedom is to tell only half the story. The question 
of why freedom is abused is the heart of the matter. One traditional 
interpretation is that God gave a command, and human beings transgressed 
it. The source then of alienation is disobedience. A second 
traditional interpretation focuses on the content of God's command. In 
this interpretation, humans want the prerogative of determining for 
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themselves the limits of right and wrong. They want to be "god." Pride 
is their undoing. Shea would deepen these two interpretations and he 
focuses on trust. The root of the problem lies in those moments when we 
attempt to move outside of Mystery by not trusting it, even though we 
are grounded in it. This happens on those occasions when we loose sight 
of creation's goodness. Then we try to control the givens of life, 
rather than relate to them. "We seek to be god because we have lost 
confidence in being a creature .... The heart of the matter is that 
the trusted creature does not trust" (1978, p. 145). 
There is of course evidence which supports the option not to 
trust in the goodness of all there is. We have already pointed out that 
our relationship to Mystery can be ambiguous: we get sick, age, and 
die. Shea reviews some of the answers that the Jewish tradition came up 
with as answers to this ambiguity. 
The first was based on a firm belief in a cause and effect 
structure .... If suffering visited you, you had brought it in 
your own head. . . . A second response . . . was the idea of 
training. God sends suffering, not because of previous sins but 
because they are purgative and pedagogical. (1978, pp. 148-49) 
While there might be a limited validity to both these responses 
to suffering, they cannot be made to bear the burden of being a total 
explanation of death and suffering. Shea then turns to the Cross as a 
response to the question: "How do we trust in a world that is distorted 
by our own betrayals and filled with deliberate sin and arbitrary 
suffering?" (1978, p. 151). 
The Cross is a symbol of the most cruel and outrageous death and 
torture. Yet the person on it is not just anyone, but the Son of God, 
as the centurion at the foot of the cross, in Mark's gospel, confesses. 
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The Cross revolutionizes our understanding of God and presents to us 
new possibilities for life. God is not a heavenly king and the 
question is not how does he reward good and punish evil. God is a 
passionate presence to all human life, never deserting it. The 
Cross is the symbol of the fellow suffering of God. . . . The love 
of God demands that he be wherever his creation is. (1978, p. 151) 
To accept the symbol of the Cross is to commit oneself to 
trusting that God has penetrated to the most unholy of places and 
situations. God is present in loneliness, suffering, self-hate and sin. 
She is there not with a wagging accusing finger, but with open arms. 
The Cross speaks of God's care, God's care as given from the inside, 
from the position of suffering. "The Cross is God loving us from the 
inside" (1978, p. 152). The Cross speaks to us of God's uninterrupted 
presence to us. Even in the experience of alienation and estrangement, 
we are not abandoned. When we have said this, complacency can have no 
part in our lives. Set free from anxiety over our own precariousness, 
or the fear of nonacceptance, or the fear of all kinds of dangers, we 
have solid grounds for caring action. 
When the acceptance symbolized in the Cross, suffuses our lives, we 
are free to be for the other, to love in the same way that we have 
been loved .... In the deep peace that acceptance brings, there is 
an imperative to change, a missiori to share what has been 
experienced. (pp. 153-54) 
Shea asks a question, typical of medieval times, but which can 
be interpreted as a question about the possibility of authentic human 
living: Would we still have to die had Adam not sinned? He answers 
that positively, since death is part of the natural process of reality. 
What would be missing though is the anxiety we bring to death. We would 
be able to trust and get beyond the debilitating effects of anxiety. We 
would face up to our social responsibilities, not shrink from . 
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relationships, sexuality or friendship. This leads him then to suggest 
that fear is trust's real enemy. 
Fear is suspicious of the contours of life. To fear is to 
experience the last covenant curse and to think that both waking and 
dreaming are tricks. For the person who lives with the Cross of 
Christ, trust is the Godward side of human courage. (1978, p. 156) 
The final metaphor in this group is that of Church. Shea 
returns to the Jesus on the Cross, in John's gospel, to begin his 
reflection on the contribution of the church metaphor to human living. 
Devotion is quite sure that the church was born from the blood and water 
that flowed from Jesus' side. How does this image speak to us of what 
the church is? Three things follow, Shea says. "The Cross is the 
grounding of the Christian community, its symbol of realism and its 
ongoing principle of critique" (p. 158). 
The Cross Is the Groundin~ of 
Christian Community 
The Cross clearly reveals God's self-giving love which liberates 
us from egoism. Since we have handed ourselves over to God and received 
ourselves back from Him, entrusted with His cause, we are empowered to 
belong to each other in a life-giving manner. The God in Jesus has 
taken the worst that humans can do into Himself, and has turned it 
toward the good. 
The law of the Cross is not that evil has been eliminated but that 
it has been transformed into possibility. The power of sin and 
suffering which generated the anti-community styles of domination 
and manipulation and deceit have been broken. If we dwell with the 
Cross of Christ, the compulsion to protect ourselves at all costs 
yield to the possibilities of dialogue, respect and integrity. The 
funding experience which makes Christian Community possible is God 
on the Cross. (1978, p. 158) 
The Cross Introduces a Note of 
Realism into Christian Livin~ 
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If, in the process of setting us free, God had to enter into 
suffering, struggle and sin, then anyone who engages in a similar 
presence to others can expect no less. 
To pursue a life of trust, friendship and justice is to follow the 
discipleship of the Cross. In the concrete world in which we live, 
the trusted creature is often the suffering creature; the one who is 
responsible is the one who risks his life. (1978, p. 159) 
The Cross Is the Church's On&oing 
Principle of Critique 
Traditionally we have looked on God as the almighty, the 
powerful one. We see that power hang on the Cross. Jesus got there by 
his opposition to the false power, which eventually crucified him. 
Jesus was God's ambassador on a mission of self-giving love, which 
brought people together in genuine community. His mission, and the 
memory of it, continue to cut through all the machinations of self-
protecting fear. 
The God on the Cross will not sanction our manipulating ways and 
dominating styles. The facile wisdom that power is for control, and 
muscle makes community, is folly before the cross. Vulnerability . 
. . the vulnerability of those who care . . . is what binds 
together, the vulnerability of God on the Cross. Before the God on 
the Cross, our strivings for total control and absolute power are 
unmasked for what they are: fear of life. (1978, p. 160) 
Telling the Story of Jesus' Identity 
In weaving these tales from the great metaphors of the Judeo-
Christian tradition, Shea is exploring the historical nature of human 
existence. His concern with human well-being, with human development 
and the transformation of human persons is evident. This conc~rn flows 
from a conscious choice he has made in his approach to Christology--to 
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the burning questions of "Who Jesus is for us today?" and "Is contact 
with the graciousness of Mystery possible for us through Jesus of 
Nazareth, today?" Before elaborat"ing his own Christological choice, 
Shea reviews some of the current, influential approaches of other 
theologians. He presents the approach of those who chose "the way of 
admiration," and marvel at the story of Jesus; the way of imitation, 
which tries "to put on the mind and the heart of Jesus" (Phil: 2:5), as 
well as, sometimes at least, literally imitating the behavior of Jesus; 
the way of explanation, which focuses on the person of Jesus and pursues 
the question of his identity. He entitles his own approach "the way of 
telling his story" (1980, p. 127). This is an approach which 
consciously adopts a trinitarian perspective and thus presupposes "the 
primacy of the relational" (p. 140). By this latter expression he 
emphasizes that if Jesus is at all important today, it is because we 
have an encounter with him of such depth and power that we want to 
extend its influence to every area of concern in our lives. We want to 
find ourselves in the position of those, who "in the days of his flesh," 
discovered God striding into their lives in the approaching footsteps of 
th~ carpenter from Nazareth, who talked, not at all about himself, but 
about what he called the "Kingdom of God." The primacy of the 
relational also means that when we speak of Jesus, we are speaking of 
our own commitments and experience. "There is always a self-referent in 
Jesus-Talk" (p. 140). If I say "Jesus is Love," I mean that "When I am 
with Jesus, I experience myself as being loved." In other words, I do 
experience the graciousness of Mystery through him. If this were not 
the case then "he would be dispensable" (p. 141). The conditions which 
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permit this redemptive encounter with Jesus are fulfilled in the telling 
a?d the hearing of the stories others have told about Jesus, as long as 
these stories are told within "a fully appropriated trinitarian 
perspective," within a trinitarian experience of God, which prevents 
Jesus of Nazareth from sinking into "the seas of the past" (p. 146). 
Shea explains what he means by reflecting on how Jesus "leaves 
twice," "First he departs into the realm of death from which he emerges 
triumphant. Secondly, he departs for his permanent home with God" 
(1980, p. 147). The gospel narratives are clear: after the ascension, 
Jesus was not available as he used to be. When this happened, people 
began to tell stories of what they remembered about him. Their 
pref erred place for storytelling was in the context of the meal they 
celebrated, in memory of his own favored practice, which was also an 
expression of their hope that he would "return to establish a new 
fellowship" (p. 147). In their view, Jesus came once to live his life 
among them, he would come again in power, with the escathon. This 
earliest view of Jesus followers soon gave way to another--that of the 
Jesus who led an earthly life and who now, at the right hand of God was 
Lord of life and the sender of the Holy Spirit. As time passed and 
Jesus did not return, there was an increasing emphasis on the Spirit's 
activity. Christians increasingly came to view the resurrection in 
terms of their own experience of the Spirit which anointed them for 
mission, in terms of the reconciliation and metanoia they practiced, and 
of the eucharistic fellowship they enjoyed. They realized that the 
absence of Jesus was real. But there was a paradox: he was still 
present, they could encounter him as forcefully as when he walked the 
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streets of Capernaum, only now this encounter took place "through the 
Spirit of God." 
The experience which Jesus was able to trigger [when he was on the 
earth] did not go into the far reaches of God with him. What had 
happened when the earthly Jesus was with people continued to happen 
when the earthly Jesus was not with them. Yet this experience was 
so linked to the person of Jesus that it was inconceivable to 
experience God as Father without simultaneously experiencing the Son 
who bodied him forth. The logic was inescapable. The God of Jesus 
was here, so Jesus must be here. But Jesus is definitely not here 
as he once was. Rather his Spirit is here among us. And since the 
Spirit belongs to Jesus and to the Father, it is capable of 
initiating the experience of God as Father through Jesus. (p. 148) 
Telling the Story of the Trinity's 
Presence in History 
At this point, what we are getting from Shea seems to me to be 
Christian specification of "the gracious mystery" that reveals itself at 
the heart of reality, to every person. This gracious Mystery in 
Christian terms, has a threefold relationship to humans: 
We dwell now with the Spirit, who is actively at work soliciting our 
freedom and transforming our lives and our environments. But this 
Spirit directs our minds and hearts to the events of which Jesus is 
the center. Jesus is the Son, the concrete embodiment of God; and 
any experience of the divine gravitates toward him. Yet the Son 
carries our minds and hearts to the ultimate reaches of transcendent 
Mystery we live within and calls it Father-generating love. (1980, 
p. 149) 
The Trinitarian structure of our faith is traditionally expressed in the 
formula: "we live in the Spirit and go throu~h Christ, to the Father. 
Shea now applies this formula to the metaphor of the journey of faith 
and demonstrates how the contours of that journey are clarified. 
When we initially become aware of Mystery, we are caught up in 
the "fray of everyday living." There is the experience of ambiguity we 
have already described, and we are not at all clear about what we are to 
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think, how we are to deal with the confusion of feeling, much less be 
clear-sighted about what we should do. 
But the Story of Jesus is the story of faith in the concrete. He is 
the visibility of the invisible movement of God: and contact with 
him, means the specification of God's intention and the spark to go 
on. To experience Jesus is to experience yourself "on track" in the 
Spirit on the way to the Father. This trinitarian approach is the 
inevitable structure of every meeting with Jesus after his death, 
resurrection and ascension. (1980, p. 150) 
When the evangelists got around to telling their stories, they 
were not in the ahistorical and uninvolved position of giving a heavenly 
account of what happened to Jesus. Theirs, like ours, was the "murky" 
situation of everyday struggle. So, while they knew Jesus as a 
historical figure, and while they proclaimed him a-s "seated in glory, at 
the Father's right hand," they also knew him as a presence among them 
through is Spirit. 
Therefore, they structure the remembered elements of his earthly 
story so that his continued presence in the Spirit can be discerned. 
The Spirit of Jesus is at work in the community, but its intentions 
are difficult to discern. The story of the Giver of the Spirit 
clarifies the Spirit's urgings and maps the journey to the Father. 
(1980, p. 151) 
This accounts for the very different Jesus-story that is told by 
each of the evangelists. We might contrast the story of Mark with that 
of Luke. For Mark's persecuted, yet expectant, community Jesus is the 
Suffering Son of Man who will return in judgment. For Luke's community, 
which is settling down in history, such an account of Jesus is 
inadequate. Luke makes his Jesus the exemplar of Christian life: if 
Jesus prays and attends worship, so does the believer; if Jesus forgives 
his enemies, so does the believer (Stephen). 
Differing historical and religious conditions provoke different 
renditions of Jesus. Certain features of the story become 
prominent, because they speak to a given situation. These features 
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in turn reorganize and interpret the rest of the tradition. (1980, 
p. 151) 
These writers teach the rest of us an important lesson: in our efforts 
to faithfully respond to Mystery's self-disclosure, our situation makes 
us attentive to certain dimension of the story of Jesus, and we all 
retell the Story of the Son so that the path to the Father is revealed, 
and the movement of the Spirit is clarified. 
Exploring Our Historical Existence Through Story 
We are now in a position to understand why Shea weaves the tales 
he does from the great metaphors of the Judea-Christian tradition and 
why he explores the historical nature of human existence. Today, 
under the impact of the Holy Spirit, people are deeply exploring 
their commonly shared humanity, specifically in terms of its 
historical development. The way to the Father is not to escape the 
conditions of individual and social living but to transform them. 
(1980, p. 152) 
Consequently, people have a lively interest in "the quest for the 
historical Jesus" and in the "portrait of him which current historical 
methods would consider reliable .... In pursuing the historical Jesus 
we are attempting to "enter our own humanity and historicity through 
his" (p. 152). 
We allow the life story of Jesus to focus the areas of importance in 
human life and to give a perspective on these areas. In no way do 
we give up our critical faculties but we allow the story to guide 
and sharpen their use. The story of Jesus which is the initial 
partner in this dialogue,k is the historical portrait~ (p. 156) 
Shea does not want to deny the value of the faith portrait of 
Jesus which the gospels give us--the portrait that is an interpretation 
of Jesus, that has the inner meaning of Jesus and his impact as its 
guiding principle. He values the stories of the faith portrait. These 
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stories highlight what happened to the followers of Jesus in their 
interaction with him. 
To call Jesus the Lamb or the Vine is not to engage in historical 
reconstruction. These are metaphors of significance. They carry 
acknowledgement and allegiance. However, it is the portrait of the 
historical Jesus which is most fascinating. Today, to say the 
historical Jesus is the Christ of faith ... enshrines a 
contemporary preference. People take their lives to this historical 
Jesus for affirmation and challenge. (p. 155) 
III. By Way of Conclusion and 
Contextualization 
At the conclusion of this chapter I want to do two things. 
Firstly, I want to try to organize all that we have heard John Shea say, 
into a single perspective, in order that when we have reviewed what 
Object Relations Theorists have taught us about human experience and 
God-human relationship, we can engage the two disciplines in 
conversation. It seems to me that a powerful metaphor which organizes 
much of his insight into an organic whole is that of graciousness. All 
living and all life is pregnant with graciousness. The details of each 
person's life-journey open out into Grace, which is Mystery. No one, 
potentially, is excluded from the possibility of gracious experience, 
(cf. pp. 14-19, 47-52, above) since every person is able to engage all 
reality through the use of his or her sacramental imagination. Shea 
calls the response he makes to the invitation Mystery offers him, faith. 
There are individuals, of course, whose depth experiences lead them to 
perceive Ultimate Reality as indifferent or even hostile. Shea is 
respectful of their perceptions, and of their beliefs, attitudes and 
values, which flow from these experiences. His faith response joins him 
to, rather than separates him from, these others. They, no less than 
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he, are engaged in the quest to bring every aspect of life under the 
influence of these revelatory experiences--whether gracious, indifferent 
or hostile. Agnostics or atheists differ from Shea, only in that their 
faith assumptions see Ultimate Reality as indifferent or hostile, while 
he is urged to see the same Reality, Mystery, as gracious. The metaphor 
which helps me appreciate "the faithing" a person carries on, is that of 
self-interpretation. I use the word "faithing" because faith is an 
active process. Once Mystery takes the initiative to reveal Itself, 
faith begins, with the exercise of sacramental imagination, continues, 
as an appropriating response to the gracious relationship to Mystery 
that is revealed, and climaxes, as a capacity to celebrate life's 
goodness or to creatively live in the presence of the ambiguities of 
human existence, such as senility, illness or moral evil (p. 27). On 
the humanward side, the appropriating response to Mystery is 
fundamental. It involves the telling of the person's own lifestory, 
retelling it in the light of his or her appreciation of the story of 
Israel and of Jesus (pp. 28-32); the forging of his or her own preferred 
metaphors or adoption those of his tradition; working out a set of 
values which are shaped by these stories and metaphors; and finally the 
incarnation of these stories, values and attitudes in the concrete 
behavior-patterns of his or her daily life, in the context of intimate 
interpersonal relations with others, and of the less personal milieu of 
social roles and involvement, as well as in the context of his 
relatedness to the whole of creation. 
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The "From Whence of Faith" for John Shea and the 
Tradition of Which He Is a Part 
The second thing I want to do is to locate Jack Shea within the 
Catholic tradition, on the question of faith, and to point to his 
affinity to that part of this tradition that has been developed in the 
work of Karl Rahner. Whereas much of the Catholic.tradition, since the 
Reformation has looked on Revelation as a fixed body of Truth, and on 
Faith, as the graced assent to these truths, typically, the Rahnerian 
view looks on human existence itself as the graced locus of God's 
revelation and faith as an ever present human activity, developmentally 
prior to an explicit formulation of faith-propositions. The roots of 
faith plunge down to the very sources of the human personality, and 
anyone who reflects on faith is invited to look for faith, not only in 
his or her own believing community, and in other faith-systems, but also 
must look to his or her own earliest and inner experience, in order to 
find the basis for faith. As Rahner writes "to lead to [explicit) 
faith, is always to assist understanding what has already been 
experienced in the depths of human reality as grace" (quoted by McDargh, 
1983, p. 47). 
Rahner's approach contrasts with the position of Niebhur for 
instance, a well known and respected interpreter of the Protestant 
tradition, whose basic question is "whom shall I trust?" a question that 
arises from a vision of the human condition as haunted by brokenness and 
alienation (cf. McDargh, 1983, pp. 27ff.). The Catholic position, one 
shared by Shea, operates with a sense that faith operates out of a 
"plenum," a fullness of life, which of its very nature is pointing 
beyond itself to the "fullness of life" of which Jesus speaks in John 
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10:10. It is concerned to show that the human person is invited, 
called, impelled or persuaded to reach out to the "yet more" that is the 
Ultimate. We have seen Shea espouse a theory of knowledge which 
accounts for faith as a very powerful form of human knowing, and have 
heard him protest against any effort which would set knowing over 
against faith. This knowing is of course, not just an intellectual 
activity, rather it is a mode of "perception through feeling," that 
knows through participation in its object. This is a way of viewing 
knowing that has biblical support. Scripture views knowing as a total 
human activity, in which one enters a relationship which participates in 
the reality of that which we desire to know. What we desire to know is 
reality, that which is real and ultimately true. Within the Catholic 
tradition "the primal human question which is the beginning of faith, 
might then best be put 'What is the real?"' "(McDargh, 1983, p. 48). 
Right from the beginning of psychic life, there is a desire to know that 
assumes that there is a horizon of intelligibility that holds out the 
promise that the quest for the real will not ultimately be in vain, even 
if it will have to face severe obstacles. Let Michael Buckley comment 
on this: 
The drive of the mind is towards the real. The drive of the 
intellectual search is for more inclusive contexts, in which the 
real, either understood or simply encountered, exists. Even the 
drive for meaning is not for abstract formulae which bear no 
relationship to existence, whether possible or actual, but towards 
those which provide an understanding of, and a context for 
everything affirmed as real. Human inquiry takes place within a 
primordial grasp of the real, and is an effort to deepen and extend 
that grasp. The real is found--or rather speaks to me--right from 
the beginning of rationality. (Quoted McDargh, 1983, p. 49) 
In this philosophical context, the "endlessly intelligible or -infinitely 
rational" horizon of all knowing is identified as Mystery, the 
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Transcendent. When rationality meets Mystery, it is not the case that 
it has run into a limiting and impenetrable wall, rather it has touched 
a loving Reality, which fascinates and draws one into every deepening 
levels of personal engagement and knowledge. It is this absolute 
Mystery "present to consciousness as the asymptotic horizon of its 
transcendence" (Buckley, as in McDargh, 1983, p. 49) that this tradition 
identifies as the experience of God. People like Rahner or Shea do not 
necessarily imply that God is immediately and always present, as a 
thematized and conscious reality, at the level of ordinary knowing, or 
at every moment of one's life. What they wish to assert is that Mystery 
or God is there, as the direction or horizon of our consciousness. 
The "To Where of Faith" for John Shea and the 
Tradition of Which He Is a Part 
We have looked at how this tradition has understood the "from 
whence" of faith, but we have said nothing about what it perceives as 
the goal of faith, its "to where." Shea leaves us in no doubt but that 
he sees our ability to use our sacramental imagination as severely 
impeded by emergence of what he calls the envious and rejected hearts, 
by sin in other words. The net result of all this is that the drive to 
know, and to become involved in the fullness of life, is experienced in 
its fragility and in its wounded form as much as in its free exercise 
and completeness. This explains why it is that human beings are unable 
to enter fully into many of their moral acts and especially many of 
those acts by which one intends one's relationship with Mystery. 
Thus in many, or maybe even most, efforts to know, each person 
is limited by that which is in her that does not want to know. 
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In all our efforts to meet and be met by that which is real and 
lasting, at some level of our being something is reserved from that 
meeting, some part of ourselves holds back in fear, in doubt, in the 
sheer inertia of old ways of knowing and relating, which however 
unsatisfying they are, are at least familiar. The "from whence of 
faith" by this analysis is not only the conatus towards Divine 
Reality, it is also the resistance to that pull. (McDargh, 19834, 
p. 51) 
If this is congruent with what Shea says about the envious and the 
rejected heart, then perhaps we can see what he suggests as the "to 
where" of faith: it is a personally shaped world, a meaningful world 
where people tell stories of "Hope and Justice," of "Trust and Freedom," 
in such a way that "faith vanquishes anxiety, freedom wins out over 
slavery, and hope banish.es fear" (Shea, 1978, p. 42). In this world, a 
person finds fulfillment as her imagination is increasingly peopled by 
images that are more and more in tune with the Kingdom-Images of Jesus. 
These images ground the values and the attitudes which govern the 
person's life, more and more, until they become beatitudes. In turn 
these attitudes motivate and inspire behavior that is self-affirmative, 
that promotes mutuality and begets compassion. 
These are the very characteristics, I submit, that we find 
present in the cohesive self, described as the end of the developmental 
process in Object Relations Theory. Before we turn to a consideration 
of the psychological aspects of faith development, just let us keep in 
mind something that is vitally important for John Shea and for the 
tradition of which he is a part: while the transformation of human 
consciousness, which is the term of the faith journey does involve the 
psychological processes of growth or impairment and integration, leading 
to a discovery of one's self, it is not to be reduced simply to these 
processes. The transformed consciousness of faith is incomprehensible 
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apart from the content of what faith grasps: one's relationship with 
Mystery, a relationship whose model is that of Jesus with "Abba," his 
Father, who not only sustained him in life, but who was faithful to him 
in death and raised him from the dead. 
CHAPTER II 
MEANING AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BIRTH 
Listed by John Shea as one member of the set of environments in 
which each person necessarily participates, is the environment of the 
"Self." This chapter will try to understand this "environment," using 
Object Relations Psychoanalytic Theory. In this chapter we will pose 
the same questions to Object Relations sources as we posed to the Shea 
tests: What are the contours of a meaningful human world? and How does 
a person create a meaningful world? 
It is fitting to begin with a review of the work of Sigmund 
Freud and acknowledge this man's genius in struggling towards the 
development of an Object Relational conceptualization of experience. 
Though he was never quite at ease in acknowledging the pure 
psychological strand in his own thinking as distinct from the 
psychobiological strand (cf. Guntrip, 1971, p. 81) others carried on 
from where he left off. I will then move on to the developmental 
paradigm suggested by Margaret Mahler. I will use that as an organizing 
schema for the material I will present about Object Relations Theory, 
though I shall modify or complement her insights with those of 
researchers and of other Object Relations theorists as the need for a 
more complete picture, or one which mitigates the Freudian view of the 
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role of instincts as an explanatory principle in human experience, 
emerges. 
Freud postulated the existence of two fundamental urges or 
"instincts" in the depths of the unconscious (cf. Wulff, 1991, pp. 
264ff.). The first, which he termed Eros, the life instinct, seeks to 
preserve the unity and harmony of life; the second Thanatos, the death 
instinct, seeks to sever connections between the person and reality and 
to return life to an inorganic state. Eros grounds the sexual interests 
of people. Thanatos is accountable for the aggressive, destructive 
dimensions of human existence. It is the mutual opposing pull of these 
two instincts which explain the multiple vicissitudes of life. "Yet 
they are only the first, though also the most fundamental, of the 
antinomies that constitute the human drama" (p. 264). 
Immediately after birth, according to Freud, the neonate is 
governed completely by the Pleasure Principle. His (Freud's choice of 
pronoun) world has little or nothing of the clarity that adults take for 
granted. He vaguely apprehends that he is in a general state of 
excitation. If there is an increase in tension the child experiences 
unpleasure. When tension is reduced he experiences pleasure. 
Gradually, the infant becomes able to imagine states or object which 
bring him relief and consolation. These imaginings are incapable of 
satisfying his biological needs. This bad situation is made worse by 
the fact that the nursing adults do not appreciate that the infant 
considers them at his beck and call. Only gradually does the child 
relinquish his total dependence on "the autistic and illogical laws of 
the infantile psyche, laws in their totality that Freud called primary 
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process" (Wulff, 1991, p. 265). As long as the child is influenced by 
primary process thinking, he demands instant gratification of his 
wishes, and he does not mind where this satisfaction comes from, he is 
polymorphously perverse. Once he finds an object that yields pleasures, 
he invests sexual energy or libido in it, a process termed cathexis. 
The mother is the first target of this cathexis, and the parts of her 
body which gratify the child's desires are especially cathected. The 
child also invests part of his own body, which in the early stages is 
scarcely differentiated from that of the mother, with libido, and so the 
child is described as existing in a narcissistic condition--after the 
Greek hero, Narcissus, who fell in love with his own reflection. But 
reality impinges before long on this condition, and the child must 
withdraw his cathexis of many satisfying objects. Primary process 
thinking yields to secondary process thinking, the logical thinking of 
conscious awareness, and the pleasure principle cedes to the reality 
principle, which eventually permits the person to effect a compromise 
between the demands of outer reality and inner instinctual drives. 
These new capacities that the individual develops, are the achievements 
of the young Ego. The psychological province from which the ego grows 
is termed the Id, which remains unconscious, in eternum, and retains the 
character of the infantile psyche. The Id continues to be the home of 
primary process and the pleasure principle, but these are now controlled 
by unconscious parts of the ego, whose task it is to decide which 
impulses can be safely satisfied and which may not. 
The Ego, Freud claimed, is forever the servant of the Id. It 
seeks to find gratification for Id impulses, in ways that avoid anxiety, 
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which signals imminent danger of unpleasure. It is responsible for 
sublimation, an unconscious process through which strongly conflicting 
impulses are transformed and expressed as socially acceptable 
activities. The Ego is also responsible for dream work, the complex 
mental operations that change unconscious thoughts and wishes into well 
disguised dream fantasies. These dreams represent fulfillment of latent 
wishes. By interpreting dreams, Freud endeavored to bypass the Ego's 
unconscious defense mechanisms and uncover the repressed psychic 
contents that cause mental illness. 
The development of the infant from an irrational pleasure-
centered organism to a mature, reality-oriented adult, is a pilgrimage 
through several clearly defined, though overlapping stages. The first 
three stages are identified in terms of different body zones, erotogenic 
zones, that serve as the first source of "sexual" excitement. Libido 
flows in turn towards each of these zones and the pleasure giving object 
associated with them. The first stage of the developmental sequence is 
that of the Oral Stage, when the mouth is the principal source of 
pleasure. Through the mouth comes food, but much more, too: utter 
satisfaction and blissful fulfillment, which Freud dubs as the prototype 
of adult sexual satisfaction. Even after being fed, an infant seeks 
this satisfaction and hence the practice of thumbsucking. In adulthood 
the same pursuit of pleasure is seen in the practice of gum-chewing or 
smoking. The later oral period is characterized by a new behavioral 
item--biting and chewing. This indicates the appearance of sadistic 
impulses to find pleasure in inflicting pain on another, and illustrates 
how sexual and destructive impulses interpenetrate. The child is marked 
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forever by what happens to him in the oral stage. If he has been 
caringly nurtured he will enjoy unconscious blissful memories and 
develop an optimistic outlook on life. If he is disappointed then he 
will be fearful and pessimistic. Over indulgence is likely to encourage 
an attitude of passive expectation that there will always be someone 
there to look after his needs. Neglect, on the other hand, breeds 
impatience, a tendency to cling, or a demanding, aggressive social 
attitude. 
During the Anal Stage (anal-sadistic, as Freud referred to it), 
the libido relates to feces and processes of control. Retention of 
feces, and then, its' sudden expulstion, is intensely pleasurable, and 
maybe, sometimes suffused with pain. Initially the child views his 
feces as a detachable, interesting, and valuable part of his own body. 
He shares neither adult disgust for it, nor dislike of its odor. Feces 
are the child's first gift to external reality: by producing them he 
complies with external authority, by withholding them he can defy it. 
Thus, fecal matter is a means of producing pleasure and expressing his 
relationships to his caretaker. Freud viewed the attitudes associated 
with learning bowel control as have far-reaching consequences for later 
values and tendencies. Intense anal eroticism frequently finds later 
expression in qualities of miserliness, obstinacy, and orderliness. A 
broad range of traits from sadistic cruelty to creative productivity are 
considered by some, to be rooted in this developmental stage. 
Around the beginning of the third year a new stage is begun, at 
the end of which boys and girls will be very different. Freud named 
this stage the Phallic Stage. Already, the child has achieved a 
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considerable degree of psychological integration and objects, 
particularly the mother, have become stable. The child develops a keen 
interest in his genitals at this stage, which are a mystery to him, but 
the sensations which he associates with them, are somehow connected to 
his mother. He intensely wants exclusive rights to her love, and, at 
the same time, experiences jealousy and rage towards any rivals, 
especially his father. Freud names this pattern of object relations the 
Oedipus Complex, after another Greek hero, who unwittingly murdered his 
father and married his mother. The Oedipus Complex is a tempestuous, 
but inevitable, affair. As long as family pathology does not get in the 
way, the complex is brought to an end by the tormented ego. On the one 
hand, there is the simultaneous hate and love of the same sex parent. 
The father is indeed the cherished protector, as well as the hated 
rival. The mother may excite intense jealousy, when she spurns her 
would be lover--her son--in favor of her husband. On the other hand 
there is fear of castration--the revenge of the father because the son 
covets the mother. Three factors encourage the child to be aware of the 
possibility of castration. He has already experienced the loss of two 
things which he initially considered as parts of his own body--his feces 
and the mother's breast. He may have been threatened with the loss of 
his penis when an adult caught him manipulating his genitals. Thirdly, 
he may have seen human beings who lacked the prized organ, not because 
they are female, but, he reasons, because they too had forbidden 
desires, and got punished for them. Eventually, the narcissistic 
interest in his sex organ is sufficiently strong to encourage him to 
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withdraw the libinal cathexis of the mother, and thus the Ego finally 
renounces Oedipal desires. 
The foregoing of the cathexis to the mother opens the way for 
the child to identify with the father. Instead of trying to displace 
him, he identifies with his authority and values. In this process, he 
either desexualized the libido towards the mother, or inhibits their 
aim, changing them into bonds of affection. The ideal outcome is that 
the Oedipus complex is totally resolved--which Freud thought to be a 
rare occurrence--or the complex is repressed, and thereby becomes a 
pathogenic element in the id. 
We now come to the third structure in Freud's account of the 
psyche--the Superego. The parental attitudes and values which are 
introjected, form the nucleus of this structure. These introjects take 
over the function of parental authority, and often function in a manner 
far more severe than do the parents. The excessive severity of the 
superego is the consequence of the strength of the defenses used against 
the temptations of the Oedipus Complex. Though the superego will 
normally undergo further development, thanks to further identifications 
in later childhood, adolescence and adulthood, the original nucleus 
always remains the firmest and most active part. 
Like her brother, the young girl starts out by cathecting her 
mother. She too interprets sex differences as the result of castration. 
But instead of the fear which her brother experiences, she is enraged, 
envious and jealous. She blames her mother for the castration, and 
turns to her father for consolation. The unconscious logic of the 
primary process takes over, and she hopes to be comforted for the loss 
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of her penis, by identifying with her mother, and in her mother's place, 
wishes to receive a baby from her father. Even after she learns that 
she shares the fate of all females, she still retains the fruitless hope 
of having her father's baby and is still plagued with feelings of 
inferiority. Because females do not abandon the Oedipal triangle as 
effectively as males do, they have a less developed superego--according 
to Freud. It is less strong and more dependent on its emotional 
origins. Not many men attain the ideal of masculine maturity and all 
human beings, thanks to their bisexual disposition and cross 
inheritance, combine in their person, both masculine and feminine 
characteristics. 
With the resolution of the Oedipus complex, children enter into 
the Latency Period, a time when they are relatively free of the crude 
sexual interests of infancy. Thanks to sublimation and reaction 
formation, libinal activity is directed into new activities and objects 
in the environment, many of them in school and peer friendships. 
The fourth, called the Genital Stage, emerges as the child 
enters puberty. Thanks to physiological sexual maturation, the person 
has to organize the revivified cathexes of early childhood, and 
subordinate them to the primacy of the genitals. Freud understood that 
these early cathexes had a variety of fates: some are maintained as 
they initially developed; others have a secondary role in the 
preliminary stages of sexual intercourse; still others remain outside 
the organization, either to be suppressed or to be transformed into 
character traits, or into sublimation with new aims~ Since the process 
of development is so complex and subject to some many difficulties, in 
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childhood, it is likely that this process is frequently aborted or 
seriously inhibited. Libido may be fixated at an early stage of 
development, and thus the precondition for sexual deviation is 
established. A different scenario emerges when genital organization is 
incompletely attained, which leaves earlier pregenital cathexes intact. 
When faced with stress, this individual is likely to regress when there 
is unsatisfactory genital stage experience. 
If a person successfully attains genital stage organization, 
then the pilgrimage from the stage of being a narcissistic pleasure-
seeking infant to becoming a well socialized, reality oriented, adult is 
completed, and he is capable of mature heterosexual relationships. The 
crass, self-seeking interests of the earlier period are replaced with 
altruistic, morally enhancing and culture-appreciative motives. There 
is a cost to this transformation: high motives are won only if there is 
a large measure of instinctual renunciation--civilization depends on 
this. Yet even this assures only a partial victory, for each generation 
must begin anew. The victory is precarious in each person's life, for 
the loftiest achievements of instinctual transformation retain the marks 
of their original in the irrational demands of the Id. 
From a Freudian Psychobiolo~ical Theory 
to Object Relations Tbeory 
Freud's concern to have his new science accepted within the 
nineteenth-century scientific community precluded him from following 
through the distinction he made 
between psychoanalysis as the psychodynamic science of our 
subjective life as persons in relationships, and physical or natural 
science as the science of the material basis and setting of our 
personal life. (Guntrip, 1971, p. 80) 
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Up to the end of his life, he never wavered, in his theoretical 
reconstructions, from giving the drives the prime place in his view of 
human functioning. He insisted on the instincts, their innate nature, 
and on the earliest state of the child as being narcissistic libidinally 
cathecting his own ego. All of this leaves the child, in the Freudian 
world, without a preordained tie to other people. The drives precede 
the object, and even "create" the object by the experiences of 
satisfaction and frustration. They are the determinants of the quality 
of relationships, and object relations are simp1y a function of them. 
Yet it is clear that that is not the whole story. Guntrip is prompted 
to say 
Freud's ideas fall into two main groups: i) the id plus ego-
control apparatus and ii) the Oedipus complex of family object 
relationship situations. The first group of ideas tend to picture 
the psy~he as a mechanism, an impersonal arrangement for securing 
de-tensioning, a homeostatic organization. The second group tends 
toward a personal psychology of the influence people have on each 
other's lives, particularly parents on children. (1971, p. 28) 
The second group of Freudian ideas that cluster around the notion of the 
Oedipus complex of family Object Relationships, is the object-relational 
strand, and gives us Freud's view of the individual as located at the 
heart of his relational situation with external reality. 
From an Object Relations perspective, the way a person relates 
to people in the external world is determined by the intrapsychic 
structures, or object relations, that he or she has developed. These 
structures are the residue of the person's relationships with those in 
his or her environment, who, in the days of infant-dependence, and early 
stages of maturation, nurtured and cared for him or her. Here is the 
95 
part of the Freudian legacy that has been maintained. In 1914, Freud 
could write 
The nature and quality of the human child's relations to people of 
his own and the opposite sex have been laid down in the first six 
years of his life. He may afterwards develop and transform them in 
certain directions, but he can no longer get rid of them. The 
people to whom he is in this way fixed, are his parents and his 
brothers and sisters. All of those whom he gets to know later 
become substitute figures for these first objects of his feelings. 
. . . These substitute figures can be classified from his point of 
view according as they are derived from what we call "imagos" of his 
father, his mother, his brothers and sisters, and so on .... All 
his later choices of friendships and love follow upon the basis of 
the memory traces left behind by these first prototypes . . . the 
imagos--no longer remembered. (1914, p. 243). 
This passage suggests the main features of a theory of Object 
Relations, toward which Freud was ambivalent (cf. McDargh, 1983, p. 
119): (1) that our earliest involvement with parents and family members 
has a lasting influence on later relationships; (2) that this influence 
is mediated by the "imagos" or representations of the earlier 
personages, which may be transformed and changed, but which (3) can 
never be destroyed, and hence are, in the psychic sense at least, 
"immortal" (Schafer, 1968, p. 220). There are two other features added 
to this list by Rizzuto, an author who is of special interest to us. I 
include them here, and will return to them later. She adds that (4) the 
process of object internalization ceases with the end of childhood and 
(5) the final internalization is that of the divinity, in whatever form 
it may take (Rizzuto, 1979, p. 29). She quotes (p. 30) a 1924 study of 
Freud to illustrate these features. 
The course of childhood development leads to an ever increasing 
detachment from parents, and their personal significance for the 
superego recedes into the background. To the imagos they leave 
behind there are then linked the influences of teachers and 
authorities, self-chosen models and publicly recognised heroes, 
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whose figures need no longer be introjected by an ego which has 
become more resistant. (Freud, 1924, p. 168, as quoted by Rizzuto) 
And again for point number (5) 
The last figure in the series that began with the parents is the 
dark power of Destiny, which only the fewest of us are able to look 
upon as impersonal .... All who transfer the guidance of the world 
to Providence, to God, and Nature, arouse a suspicion that they 
still look upon these ultimate and remotest powers as the parental 
couple, in a mythological sense, and believe themselves linked to 
them by libidinal ties. (Freud, 1924, p. 168) 
What is new with Object Relations theorists, and very different 
from Freud's theoretical assumptions, is the way that they explain how 
the psyche evolves and comes to be structured. In the quotation from 
Freud's 1914 paper, he is describing the evolution of the superego, the 
third of his psychic structures, alongside the Id and the Ego. The 
Freudian psychic structure and the explanation of its origin, are 
challenged by Object Relations theorists. They explain the formation of 
the Ego in a way that resembles Freud's account of the superego. Their 
focus is on the influence of external objects (parents and significant 
others) for the building up of the whole internal psychic structure. 
Internalization is the process through which this is achieved. This has. 
been defined by Schaf er as 
those processes by which the subject transforms real or imagined 
regulatory interactions with his environment, or real or imaginary 
characteristics of his environment, into inner regulations and 
characteristics. (1968, p. 8) 
In the case of Object Relations theorists, the Freudian emphasis on 
drives, and their repression, has been emphatically replaced by an 
interest in relationships. Structural formation involves a process by 
which an aspect of the external world has been abandoned as an external 
object, and taken into the Ego through identification, thus becoming a 
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part of the infant's internal world. This internal agency now carries 
on the same functions that had been provided by the people, or abandoned 
objects, in the external world. 
Like Freud, Object Relations Theorists propose a developmental . 
theory. Unlike him, and his focus on the Oedipal conflict in the 
Phallic Stage, their interest focuses on earlier developmental stages 
and processes. They see as crucial the infant's move from a state of 
fusion and dependence on the nurturing person to a state of increased 
independence and differentiation. 
Object relations theory links the emergence of the self with the 
increasing maturity of relationships with objects. Theorists discuss 
the timing of the formation of the various psychic structures, 
especially the Ego, by closely observing the processes and interactions 
that go on within the child-mother dyad. They are also keenly 
interested in the quality of the relationships that these psychic 
structures have with their objects. 
In the (1914) quotation above from Freud, if we pay attention to 
the metaphors and languages he uses, we shall see that they tend to 
~mply that object representations or imagos are "things," concrete and 
discrete entities, which can attract desires, both sexual and 
aggressive, and in turn, exert a powerful influence over us. This 
static character to the notion of representation was picked up by later 
theorists as well, and little attention has been paid to the question of 
how these change throughout the life cycle. Though this is a criticism, 
a profound truth lurks here as well. When clients report the experience 
of their flow of consciousness, they often speak of processes which are 
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genuinely in interaction with what Schafer calls "primary process 
presences" (1968, p. 220). There is an important sense in which it is 
true "to speak of object representations as consoling or persecuting, 
comforting and confronting, provoking anxiety and demanding restitution" 
(McDargh, 1983, p. 120). What we must realize, when we talk like this, 
is that we are engaging in a phenomenology and not speaking of 
metapsychological entities (cf. Rizzuto, 1979, pp. 60-64). 
Before we conclude this section on the move from Drive Theory to 
Object Relations Theory, a word on how pathology is conceptualized in 
each approach. The traditional Freudian model understands pathological 
disturbance as conflict between instinctual demands and the demands of 
reality, and conflict between the Id, Ego and Superego. The unresolved 
conflicts of childhood, especially those involved in the Oedipal 
Complex, can continue to unconsciously emerge in adulthood. The Ego 
then defensively responds to threatening thoughts and libinal feelings, 
and thus, the person begins to manifest neurotic symptoms. The task of 
the Freudian Analyst is to uncover these conflicts and seek the 
unconscious causes of these neurotic symptoms. 
The Object Relations Theorists see things differently. 
Pathology arises because of damage to the self and the psychic 
structures. Early deficits in development hinder the formation of a 
cohesive self and prevent the integration of psychic structures. These 
deficits may result in narcissistic and borderline personality 
disorders, which are more serious than the classical Freudian neurosis 
(cf. St. Clair, 1986, pp. 13-17). 
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Margreat Mahler's Developmental Paradigm 
As I indicated earlier, I will use Mahler's developmental 
paradigm as the organizing schema, to account for the ways in which the 
human person organizes her experience, and creates meaning in the world 
which she inhabits. Althea Horner (1984, p. 26) presents the stages and 
processes of Mahler's developmental paradigm in this manner: 
Stage I Normal Autism 
Process A Attachment 
Stage II Normal Symbiosis 
Process B Separation-Individuation 
Stage III Identity, Object Constancy, and healthy self-
esteem. 
Normal Autism 
The period of normal autism begins at birth, and lasts until the 
baby is about a month old. During this time, the periods of sleeplike 
states far outnumber the states of arousal. The neonate seemingly is in 
a state of primitive hallucinatory disorientation. Echoing Freud, 
Mahler uses the image of a bird's egg as a metaphor for the child's 
closed psychological system: 
A neat example of a physical system shut off from the stimuli of the 
external world, and able to satisfy its nutritional requirements 
autistically ... is afforded by a bird's egg with its food supply 
enclosed in its shell; for it, the care provided by its mother is 
limited to the provision of warmth. (Mahler et al., 1975, p. 41) 
By way of mothering, the infant is gradually brought out of the 
inborn tendency towards vegetative regression, into sensory awareness 
of, and contact with, the environment. The task of this phase is for 
the newborn to achieve a balance of homeostatic equilibrium of the 
100 
organism outside the womb, "by predominantly somatopsychic, 
physiological mechanisms" (Mahler, 1975, p. 43). The infant has 
impressive strengths at birth. Though her condition at birth is one of 
"mental and psychological non-organisation and non-integration" (Horner, 
1984, p. 9) she is endowed with a central nervous system, which grounds 
her capacity for mental activity, and thanks to which, she can at birth, 
or soon thereafter, set about the task of organizing the world of 
experience. She is ready to receive, and to respond to, stimuli and 
patterns in the environment. 
Sensation occurs when a sensory system responds to a particular 
stimulus. Perception occurs when the brain recognises that response 
so that the individual becomes aware of it. · 
At birth, both sensation and perception are apparent. Newborns 
see, hear, smell and taste and they respond to pressure, motion, 
temperature and pain. Most of these sensory abilities are immature, 
becoming more acute as the child develops. 
The perception demonstrated by newborns is very selective. 
Neonates pay attention to bright lights, loud noises and objects 
within a foot of their eyes and usually screen out everything else. 
Their perceived world is very simple--not at all the "great, 
booming, buzzing confusion" psychologists once believe it to be. 
(Berger, 1983, p. 108) 
In what concerns motor abilities, the newborn has several important 
reflexes which may be essential for life itself--as for instance, the 
breathing reflex, the sucking reflex, or the rooting reflex. In the 
process of using these abilities the infant begins to organize 
experience. In so doing, he initiates the process that eventually leads 
to the formation of character structure, that gives ·rise to ego-
structures, and establishes a sense of self. While this is true, in 
terms of Object Relations Theory this first stage is "objectless." 
Mahler retained the Freudian term of primary narcissism, and dubbed this 
stage as one of absolute primary narcissism. She hypothesized that 
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towards the fourth and fifth week, there develops a stage of 
dim awareness that need satisfaction cannot be provided by oneself, 
but comes from somewhere outside the self (primary narcissism in the 
beginning symbiotic phase) .... We might term this stage of 
primary narcissism the conditional hallucinatory omnipotence. 
(Mahler, 1975, p. 42.) 
Mahler's findings indicate however that this stage is truly one 
of undifferentiation. The infant cannot differentiate between its own 
attempts to reduce tension (by urinating, vomiting, squirming) and the 
actions of the mother to reduce hunger, and other tensions and needs. 
As we can see from the foregoing, Mahler is a theorist who 
accords an important role to the mother. I would like to round out 
Mahler's picture of the infant by reviewing Winnicott's understanding of 
the importance of mothering, because he, more than anyone else, has been 
able to clarify the conditions that make possible an infant's emerging 
awareness of being a person separate from others. The infant will 
flourish, says Winnicott, if he or she is surrounded by a facilitating 
environment. The mother is this facilitating environment, because after 
delivering her baby, the predominant feature of her life 
may be a willingness, as well as an ability . to drain interest 
from her own self on to the baby. I have referred to this aspect of 
a mother's attitude as primary maternal preoccupation. (Winnicott, 
1960, p. 15) 
It is this preoccupation which will enable her to be the "good enough 
mother" who can provide the highly specialized conditions necessary for 
development in the infant. Good enough mothering in its earliest phases 
involved three functions: (1) holding, (2) handling (which we will deal 
with when we come to Mahler's symbiotic phase, later in this chapter), 
and (3) object presenting or realizing (cf. p. 128 of present chapter). 
Holding includes the whole routine of care throughout the day, 
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especially the physical holding of the child. Its main task is to 
reduce to a minimum impingements that the infant cannot manage, and 
which cause the infant, in Michael St. Clair's words to "shut down or 
feel annihilated" (1986, p. 76). A successful holding environment 
builds up the positive feelings of being actual and in existence, in the 
infant. It promotes psychic integration. Also vital for the creation 
of a "perfect environment" is a responsive maternal face that, like a 
mirror, faithfully reflects back to the child what the concerned mother 
sees in him or her. Mirroring is preeminently a matter of eye contact. 
Eye contact is the first indication of that exclusive human capacity to 
symbolize. In this experience, two human beings respond to each other 
beyond the boundaries of need satisfaction, and through it enter the 
area of play and transitional space, which we shall have occasion to 
reflect on later (cf. Rizzuto, 1979, p. 184). As the child's eyes meets 
her mothers, in the healthy situation, she discovers her own beauty and 
value mirrored in the eyes of the caretaker; she knows herself to be an 
appealing, wonderful and powerful person. Kohut and Winnicott describe 
this phenomenon of need for reflection by the other, as a core 
experience in the process of becoming human. Mirroring is a phenomenon 
that is not restricted to Mahler's Normal Autistic stage--it extends far 
beyond it to the phase of object constancy and into adult life. When 
mirroring is successful, the child will have seen her own grandiose 
self-representation in the magnifying mirror of her maternal aggrandized 
imago, and will be ready to emancipate her own representation from the 
maternal one. More of that anon. A third characteristic of the 
mother's presence to the child is that it is non-demanding--it allows 
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him to develop the capacity to experience the state of "formless being" 
typical of the early post-natal period. 
Fortunately, the infant's need for such an idyllic milieu soon 
diminishes, at the same time as the mother begins to become preoccupied 
again with her own life concerns. It is essential that the mother 
gradually introduce the child to the hard realities of the 
uncontrollable world, by progressively "failing" in her adaptation to 
the infant's needs. Supported, as we will see, by the growth of ego 
functions, and an emergent urge towards separation, the child grown in 
his perception of the reality of objects, and learns to express a 
variety of needs through gestures and other expressions (cf. Wulff, 
1991, p. 339). 
If the holding is faulty, then the infant manifests extreme 
distress, which Winnicott believes grounds a later sense of 
disintegration, a feeling that external reality cannot be used for 
reassurance and many other reactions, that have been commonly called 
"psychotic" (1960, p. 18). Rizzuto gives a graphic description of the 
situation of the person for whom holding and mirroring are aborted. If 
holding and mirroring 
[have] not sufficed to assure the child that for his mother he is a 
wonderful creature, the individual may suffer partial arrest of his 
development and remain fixated to a narcissistic need for psychic 
mirroring as well as to an actual need for mirrors. Bewilderment, 
narcissistic rage, vengeful, grandiose wishes (hidden in fantasy or 
enacted in adaptive or maladaptive behavior) and identification with 
God are the common adaptional reactions to make the painful state of 
not being mirrored as oneself, tolerable (Rizzuto, 1979, p. 186) 
A little earlier I referred to Horner's judgment that at birth 
the human infant is born in a state of mental and psychological non-
organization, but that she very quickly sets about organizing her 
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experience. Horner (1984, p. 6) quoting Beres lists seven ego-
functions: (1) Relation to reality; (2) regulation and control of 
instinctual drives; (3) object relations; (4) thought processes; (5) 
defense functions; (6) autonomous functions; (7) synthetic function. 
Horner concedes priority to the synthetic function as it is 
responsible for the assimilation, organization and integration of 
experiences that are carried out by the Ego. She then acknowledges the 
value of the work of Piaget in gaining an understanding of the processes 
or organization, and in demystifying some of the metapsychological 
concepts of Object Relations Theory. We follow her example here and 
briefly present Piaget's work as it bears on some of the major 
conceptualizations of Object Relations Theory, and on the early stages 
of development. 
Intelligence, in Piaget's view comprises two interrelated 
processes: organization and adaptation. We organize our thoughts so 
that they make sense. We separate the more important ones from the less 
important, and we establish links between one thought and another. In 
learning about animals for instance, a child may organize them mentally 
in clusters, according to whether they are birds, animals or fishes. At 
the same time, people adapt their thinking to include new ideas, as 
experience provides further information. This adaptation occurs in two 
ways: through assimilation and accommodation. In the process of 
assimilation, information is simply added to the cognitive organization 
already there--in everyday life we interpret reality in the light of 
what we already know. In the process of accommodation, the organization 
has to adjust to a new idea--a child looking at a nature movie may 
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discover whales for the first time and has to rearrange his prior schema 
on mammals--there are some which look like, and live like, fish (Berger 
1983, pp. 49-50). These cognitive processes are at work in the child 
from the earliest stages of development "during which the infant 
organises its experiences into patterns and then into patterns of 
patterns. Eventually meaning is ascribed to these patterns, which 
Piaget designates "schemas" (Horner, 1984, p. 10). There are three 
other processes connected with the schemas which are important. First 
there is the process of generalization, by which the schema becomes 
representative of a class of events or experience. Secondly through the 
process of differentiation, a global schema comes to be divided in 
several new ones. Thirdly, integration: as individual schemas develop, 
they begin to form more complete and interlocking relationships with 
other schemas. Two schemas may enjoy parallel development up to a 
certain point, and then integrate, to form a single "supraordinate" 
schema. Horner cites the example of the gradual integration of good and 
bad object representations into a single, ambivalently experienced 
representation (1984, p. 10). 
Piaget's discussion of the Sensorimotor Developmental stage is 
helpful in enlarging the picture Mahler draws for us of the infant's 
development and will help us clarify her thinking at several points as 
we proceed. The Sensorimotor Development stage, is Piaget's first stage 
of cognitive development. It begins at birth and lasts until the child 
is two years. Unlike his parents, the child thinks exclusively with her 
senses and her mot'or skills. If she is given a rattle, a baby will 
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stare at it, suck it, shake it or bang in on the floor. One author 
describes it this way: 
[The infant] exhibits a wholly practical, perceiving-and-doing, 
action-bound kind of intellectual functioning; he does not exhibit 
the more contemplative, reflective, symbol manipulating kind we 
usually think of in connection with cognition. (Flavell, as in 
Berger, 1983, p. 122) 
Calling this stage the Sensorimotor stage is an acknowledgment of the 
fact that the child learns about her world, and expresses this learning, 
chiefly through her senses and motor skills. Piaget subdivides this 
stage into six stages, each characterized by a somewhat different way of 
understanding the world. We confine our remarks here to those aspects 
of Piaget's work that have direct bearing on Object Relations Theory. 
The following diagram illustrates Piaget's understanding of the 
Sensorimotor Stage. 
The Six Stages of Sensorimotor Development 
To get an overview of the stages of sensorimotor thought, it helps to 
group the six stages in pairs. 
The first two involve the infant's own body. 
I. Birth to 1 month Reflexes--sucking, staring, listening. 
II. 1 to 4 months Tbe first acguired adaptations--accommodation and 
coordination of reflexes--sucking a pacifier 
different from a nipple; grabbing a bottle to suck 
it. 
The next two involve objects and people. 
III. 4 to 8 months 
IV. 8 to 12 months 
Procedures for making interesting sights last--
responding to people and objects 
New adaptations and anticipation--becoming more 
deliberative and purposeful in responding to 
people and objects. 
The last two are the most creative, first with action and then with 
ideas. 
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V. 12 to 18 months New means throu~h active experimentation--
experimentation and creativity in the actions of 
"the little scientist" 
VI. 18 to 24 months New means throu~h mental combinations--thinking 
before doing provides the child with new ways of 
achieving a goal without resorting to trial and 
error experiments. 
Stage Four--New Adaptations and Anticipations 
The major intellectual achievement that marks the onset of stage 
four is the child's dawning understanding that objects continue to exist 
even if they cannot be perceived. This recognition is called object 
permanence, a phenomenon we shall return to later when we deal with 
object constancy. With the neonate, "out of sight is out of mind." If 
a three-month-old drops a toy, she will not look for it. It is as if it 
had completely disappeared from her consciousness. From approximately 
eight months on, babies begin to show evidence of realizing that just 
because a thing cannot be seen does not mean that it has ceased to exist 
for them. If they loose something, they search for it. Piaget designed 
a simple test for object permanence. He showed his daughter an 
interesting toy, then covered it up with a blanket. At seven months, 
she made no effort to search for it, once he hid it. At eight months, 
the story was completely different: she immediately searched for it and 
found it. 
Between eight and twelve months, as infants become more 
knowledgeable about their environment, they also become more deliberate 
and purposeful in what they do with what they meet. Instead of merely 
applying one schema to a variety of objects, now they apply a.variety. 
They suck a toy, for example, but then they will rattle it, shake it, 
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drop it, throw it and be very satisfied when they have used their whole 
repertoire. 
Stage four babies can also anticipate events. If they enjoy 
splashing in water, they will squeal with delight when they hear the 
water turned on. If they see the mother putting on her coat, they may 
anticipate separation and begin to cry. Younger babies may spit out 
food that is not to their liking after they have taken it into their 
mouths. A year old will keep her lips firmly closed when she sees the 
dreaded porridge on the spoon. 
Stage Five--New Means Through Active 
Experimentation 
As the toddler begins to anticipate, she contributes to the 
onset of the next stage, which is a time of active exploration and 
experimentation, in which the child often seems hell-bent on discovering 
every possibility that may exist in her world. Because he noticed so 
much experimentation at this stage, Piaget called the stage-5 child "the 
little scientist." Once one possibility is discovered with an object, 
it is as if the toddler then went on to ask: "What else can I do with 
this?" Through trial and error ~xperimentation, a toddler can discover 
that by pulling the table cloth the jar of cookies on the table comes 
within reach. 
Stage Six--New Means Through Mental 
Combinations 
At this point, toddlers begin to anticipate and solve simple 
problems by using mental combinations before they act. That is, before 
they do something, they can rehearse them before they do them. Thus the 
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child can invent new ways to achieve a goal without resorting to trial 
and error experiments. 
The key to understanding the mental combinations a child makes 
is to appreciate the nature of representations--of the emerging ability 
to create mental images of things and actions that are not currently in 
view. Representation is a primitive form of symbolic thought. It also 
allows the child to reproduce behavior she has seen in the past. For 
example a quiet child sees her neighbor throw a tantrum, screaming and 
threshing about. She has never manifested such behavior untii the day 
after seeing it. Piaget named such behavior of acting out of a mental 
image, deferred imitation. 
It is at this stage that a child develops the ability to 
pretend. Pretending involves not only deferred imitation (a child digs 
the soil with her toy spade in imitation of her mother) but also mental 
combinations, as an action from one context (riding a car) is mentally 
combined with another (pushing a toy car around a table). 
At stage six, there is full object permanence. As we saw, at 
stage four, a child will search for a hidden object. As time passes, 
the child's search becomes more prolonged and earnest. But this child 
can still make a striking mistake. If a ball rolls under a chair, and 
the child sees it, she will follow it and retrieve it. But if the ball 
rolls away a second time, but this time under a couch, and is not found 
quickly, the stage four will look where is was previously found--under 
the chair. 
A stage five baby will not make that mistake. As long as she 
sees the ball disappear, she will retrieve it. However, the stage five 
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child is unable to imagine "invisible" displacements, that is, places 
that she has not seen used as hiding places. 
When a child arrives at stage six, she will look in the places she has 
seen used, in order to hide the object, but then she will turn to places 
she has not seen used. Her ability to use mental combinations, helps 
her imaging where the object might be, without having seen it hidden. 
At this point full object permanence is attained, according to Piaget. 
We have followed Piaget to a stage that goes far beyond that 
with which Mahler deals in her Normal Autistic Stage, but it would be 
ungainly to try to split up the presentation of Piaget's work on the 
sensorimotor stage. The limitations of the nature of Piaget's work, 
from an Object Relations point of view should be noted. As Horner has 
it, Piaget is concerned to describe the "how" of organization. The 
central focus of Object Relations Theory is not really the "how," but 
the "what" that is being organized--the ego. We can put this in another 
perspective if we look at the functions of the ego that we listed 
earlier. We have dealt with the development of the synthetic and 
thinking functions, but with none of the others. We now turn to the 
second of Mahler's stages and see how further functions of the ego are 
said to evolve during the process of Symbiosis. 
The Symbiotic Phase 
As we have seen, Freud postulated that during the phase of 
primary narcissism, the infant exists in a world where all libido is 
cateched by the child's inner reality--there is no connection with 
external reality. In the history of Psychoanalysis (cf. Greenberg & 
Mitchell, 1983, pp. 281ff.), Hartmann is the figure who tentatively 
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begins to alter this understanding when he talks of the human organism 
being brought into contact with the environment, through adaptation to 
"the average expectable environment." Mahler fields this ball that 
Hartmann threw, and specifies what the "average expectable environment" 
is. It is the mother, who in response to the affecto-motor discharges 
of the infant, functions as "an auxiliary ego." The human infant, at 
birth, is at a severe disadvantage for two reasons: (1) she is 
physically immature and (2) in Freudian language, her instincts of self-
preservation have decayed substantially. Mahler proposes that human 
beings are rescued from this predicament, 
by the evolution of "species specific social symbiosis," which 
provides for the survival needs of the child. The neonates 
rudimentary ego is helpless against the world at large, but it is 
uniquely suited to_ deal with the environment as it is redefined by 
Mahler: it can illicit the aid of the mother who, in the capacity 
of the auxiliary ego, supplements the infant's abilities. (p. 283) 
Mahler thus not only specifies what adaptation means, but spells 
out how adaptation occurs--through the establishment of a specific mode 
of object relationship with the mother, "the ordinary devoted mother," 
which she calls symbiosis. In passing, let us note that what is denoted 
by "mother" is an interpersonal reality. A person of either gender 
could, conceivably, fulfill that role. 
There are two characteristics of symbiosis that are particularly 
important. If symbiosis is to occur, the mother must be willingly 
available to the infant, caring for him, for only then can the symbiotic 
object be created. Symbiosis is essentially a dyadic phenomenon, which 
ensures survival within a field of interpersonal relationships. 
Mahler's claim is that specific human objects and a relationship to them 
are essential to respond to the child's need for survival. Second, 
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Mahler's emphasis falls on the child's innate ability to adapt to the 
caring environment: "What impressed us ... was the great extent to 
which it is the normal infant who actively takes on the task of 
adaptation in the mother-infant interaction. (Quoted by Mitchell & 
Greenberg, 1983, p. 284). 
We pass now to a description of the symbiotic phase as Mahler 
conceptualizes it. Round the second month of life, the autistic 
envelope that has surrounded the neonate begins to dissolve and a new, 
more positive psychological membrane develops. The child experiences 
herself, not as a differentiated, experiencing self, but as a "dual 
unity" (Mahler et al., 1975, p. 48). From this time, Mahler and her 
associates postulated that the infant has an increased "perceptual and 
affective investment" in external stimuli (which the observer sees as 
coming from outside) but that the infant does not recognize as having an 
external origin (the observer theorizes). This is the beginning of the 
normal symbiotic phrase, during which the neonate behaves and functions 
as though she and her mother were an omnipotent system, a dual entity. 
They propose that within this dual unity, the infant experiences a 
boundless oceanic feeling, a sense of omnipotence and perfection, 
precisely because she is merged with the mother. Kohut called this 
experience "primary narcissism." Thus, the discriminating quality of 
this phase is the hallucinatory or delusional omnipotent fusion with the 
representation of the mother, and in particular, the delusion of a 
common boundary joining the two. The average mother functions like a 
magnet for the child, pulling her from the tendency to regress to 
autism, to an increasing sensory awareness of the environment. There is 
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a movement of libidinal investment from inside the body (centered on 
those body-parts associated with urinating, vomiting, etc.) to the body-
surface which permits tactile, visual, and auditory awareness. 
Gradually, the child begins to differentiate between pleasure, 
and therefore good experiences, and experiences which are painful, and 
therefore bad. The child is oriented to distinguish between the good-
pleasurable, and the bad-painful experiences of extra-uterine life. She 
is exposed to a rhythmic pattern of need, tension and hunger. Only an 
outside agency can satisfactorily answer these needs. 
It is the repeated experience of a need satisfying, good outside 
source that eventually conveys a vague affective discrimination 
between th~ self and non-self. To the bad stimuli coming from 
outside or inside, the infant reacts with aggression and by ridding 
and ejective mechanisms. To the "good" stimuli coming from inside 
or outside, the baby reacts with bliss and reaching out. (St. 
Clair, 1986, p. 109) 
Mahler proposes to account for a nascent sense of self by 
suggesting that the autonomous ego function of memory begins to play an 
important role in the child's life. Predominantly good memory islands 
become allocated to the self and predominantly bad memory segments get 
associated with the non-self. Mother is linked to both pleasure-giving 
and paining-inflicting qualities. Memory also plays it part in the 
evolution of an image of the child's own body, since sensations of 
pleasure and pain from within the body are also stored. Winnicott talks 
of this as "personalization." As memories of a parent touching and 
gently handling the baby are accumulated, the baby's person becomes 
grounded in its own body and the signs of this are good muscle tone and 
reflex coordination (cf. 1960, p. 19). This marks a movement from the 
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birth-situation, when the child's soma and psyche are not closely bound 
together. 
When a reasonable degree of adaptation to the needs of the infant is 
provided, this gives the best possible chance for an early 
establishment of a firm relationship between psyche and soma. Where 
there is a failure of adaptation, so there is a tendency for the 
psyche to develop an existence that is only loosely related to 
bodily experience. (1958, p. 6.) 
Let us return to Mahler: with the accumulation of memory traces of 
pleasurable (good) and unpleasurable (bad) instinctual and emotional 
experiences, images of the love object, of body image, and psychic self, 
begin to emerge. The ground is prepared for the emergence for a sense 
of a core self, around which a sense of identity--"that I am"--will 
form. We shall have more to say about this later on. 
During this phase, no clear differentiation of "inner" and 
"outer," of self and non-self is possible. Mahler terms the level of 
object relations "preobjectal," but she stresses that it is thanks to 
the capacity to invest in, and connect with, the dual unity of child-
mother, that further development in the ability to relate becomes 
possible. Moreover, during the symbiotic phase, the primal soil out of 
which all subsequent relationships will grow, is laid down. Mahler 
believes that the vestiges of this stage remain with us for life. 
Whether as toddler or adult, the representations of the symbiotic phase 
remain with us to lend power and confidence to life, through the 
feelings of being part of the omnipotent other. Helplessness is 
manageable, because one feels merged with someone who is able to provide 
(cf. Garanzini, 1988, pp. 81-82). 
The symbiotic phase is a time when the infant thoroughly 
familiarizes herself with the mothering half of the symbiotic self, as 
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indicated by the unspecific, social smile. "The smile gradually becomes 
the specific (preferential) smiling response to the mother, which is the 
grucial si&n that a specific bond between the infant and his mother has 
been established" (Mahler et al., 1975, p. 52). Mahler acknowledges her 
dependence on the work of John Bowlby for this insight. Familiarization 
with his work on the vicissitudes of attachment and bonding that emerge 
as critical, at this point in a human being's life, will help us to add 
a balance to the emphasis placed on cognitive development by Jean 
Piaget. 
Attachment Theory, as developed by Bowlby, conceptualizes the 
state of the mature person as being one in which the individual has 
built up "a representation model of himself as being both able to help 
himself and as worthy of being helped should difficulties arise" 
(Bowlby, 1976, p. 136). Erikson talks of such a person as showing 
"basic trust." Bowlby stresses the interpersonal nature of the neonates 
world. If the child is to grow up healthily, he needs caregivers who 
fulfill the crucial role of being responsive to the cues for care that 
the child gives, as and when he gives them, and who intervene 
judiciously when the child is heading for trouble. Bowlby singles out 
three patterns of behavior as prime examples of the kind of behaviors 
emitted by the child, which he calls attachment behavior. The child 
cries and calls, behavior which elicits care; he follows and clings; and 
he protests when he is left alone, or in the presence of strangers. He 
defines attachment behavior in this way: 
[It is] ... conceived as any form of behavior that results in a 
person attaining or retaining proximity to some other differentiated 
or preferred individual, who is usually conceived as stronger and/or 
wiser. (Bowlby, 1976, p. 129) 
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Such behavior is emitted most intensely and frequently during childhood, 
but does in fact perdure throughout the life cycle. Bowlby rejects any 
suggestion that such behavior has anything intrinsically childish or 
immature about it. Attachment theory emphasizes seven features of 
attachment behavior: 
a) Specificity. Attachment behavior is directed towards one or a 
few intended persons, usually in a hierarchical order of 
preference. 
b) Duration. An attachment is often life-long, though at different 
phases in the life cycle old attachments bay be attenuated, or 
die, to be replaced by new ones. However, early attachments are 
abandoned only with great difficulty, and commonly persist. 
c) En~a~ement of emotion. The deepest and most significant human 
emotions are roused during the formation, maintenance, 
disruption and renewal of attachment relationships. People 
describe the formation of the attachment bond as falling in 
love, sustaining the bond as loving someone, and losing the 
object of the bond as grieving. When the threat of loss of the 
object arises there is anxiety, and its actual loss induces 
sorrow. In all of these situations anger is never far away. As 
long as the bond is firmly established a person feels a great 
sense of security and overflowing joy when an attachment is 
renewed. 
d) Onto~eny. The critical period for the development of 
affectional bonds is the first nine months of life. Newman and 
Newman, after their review of the pertinent literature, conclude 
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their answer to the question of whether there is a specific 
time, during infancy when the child develops a strong, well-
differentiated liking for one person in this way: 
We can say that the onset of a critical period for attachment must 
begin some time after about the age of 6 months of age. This does 
not mean that the first six months play no role in the establishment 
of a strong bond between the child and the caregiver. On the 
contrary, these early months provide the background experiences of 
consistency, warmth, and familiarity upon which the specific 
attachment is built. (Newman & Newman, 1987, p. 171) 
The more frequent contact a child has with a particular person, 
the more likely that person is to become the attachment figure--
normally this will be the mother. Attachment behavior continues 
to be easily activated until the end of the third year. When a 
person has not successfully completed his or her developmental 
tasks up to that point, it becomes less readily activated after 
that. 
e) Learning. Conditioning may account for some part of the 
attachment process, but only for a small part. Attachment is 
still likely to develop despite repeated punishment from the 
attachment figure. 
f) Organization. In the initial stages of attachment, behavior is 
mediated through the reflexes and capacities with which the 
infant is endowed. From the latter part of the first year it is 
mediated by "increasingly sophisticated behavioral systems 
organised cybernetically and incorporating representational 
models of the environment and self" (Bowlby, 1976, p. 131). 
Certain conditions activate and terminate these systems, as for 
example, strangeness, hunger, or tiredness. Terminating 
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conditions would include such things as the reappearance of the 
mother and soothing interaction with her. In instances where 
there is a strong arousal of attachment behavior, it may not 
cease until the child is hugged and has had the opportunity for 
extended tactile contact and clinging. Once soothing has 
occurred the child becomes free to explore his environment. 
g) Bowlby suggests that the biological function served by 
attachment behavior is survival, especially protection from 
predators. 
Before leaving Bowlby there is one other point that deserves a 
little more attention than the sentence we have devoted to it in (f) 
above. There we referred to the child exploring the environment, once 
soothing has taken place. Exploratory behavior is now recognized as 
being crucial in its own right. Because of it, a person is able to 
build up a coherent picture of the world into which she is inserted. It 
may even be vital for survival to have such information. 
Children ... are notoriously curious and inquiring, which commonly 
leads them to move away from their attachment figure. In this sense 
exploratory behavior is antithetical to attachment behavior. In 
healthy individuals the two kinds of behavior normally alternate. 
(Bowlby, 1976, p. 133) 
Mahler's most significant contributions to object relations 
theory are precisely in this area of attachment and autonomy. She 
postulates that as internal tensions are felt to be reduced, thanks to 
safe anchorage in the symbiotic unity, and as pleasure in maturationally 
increasing sensory perception invites cathexis of external reality, the 
child is empowered to leave this ideal symbiotic state and to embark on 
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the next developmental task--that of differentiation and separation 
(Mahler et al., 1975, p. 53). 
The Process of Separation and 
Individuation 
After the achievement of symbiosis, there are two parallel 
tracks that the child embarks upon. One is the track of individuation, 
"the evolution of intrapsychic autonomy, perception, memory, cognition 
and reality testing" (Mahler et al., 1975, p. 63). The second is the 
intrapsychic developmental track of separation "that runs along 
differentiation, distancing, boundary formation and disengagement from 
mother" (p. 63.) 
These two processes of separation and individuation issue in the 
child's capacity to function separately, but yet in the presence, and 
with the support, of the mother. One of the challenges that the child 
needs to navigate, at this time, is that of separation anxiety, which 
arises as he takes distance for the first time, from mother. This phase 
will have reached a successful term when the child has achieved an 
awareness of the separateness of the self from others, which coincides 
with the emergence of a sense of self, of true object relations~ips and 
an awareness of external reality (St. Clair, 1986, p. 110). 
The First Sub-Phase: Differentiation and the 
Development of Body Image. Also Called "Hatching" 
The unfolding cognitive development of the child, as Piaget 
understands it, will have reached stage III, which he calls "procedures 
for making interesting sights last," when the child has reached four or 
five months, which in Mahler's terms, is the high period of symbiosis. 
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In the language of attachment theory, this is the time when the 
background experiences "of consistency, warmth and familiarity_upon 
which specific attachment is built," are facilitated. Mahler, like 
Piaget notes how outward perceptual engagement is increasing, at this 
time, and how, when awake, the child is observed to have "a more 
permanently alert sensorium"--the perceptual conscious system (Mahler et 
al., 1975, p. 54). 
Mahler estimates that at about six months, the child begins his 
first experiments in separation-individuation. She and her associates 
have noted how the infant begins pulling at the mother's hair, nose or 
ears, and putting food into her mouth; how he begins to arch his body 
away from her, so to gain a better perspective of her. He attempts to 
scan her and her environment. The contrast here is with the baby just 
molding her body to that of the mother. 
There are definite signs that the baby begins to differentiate his 
own from his mother's body. Six to seven months is the peak of 
manual, tactile, and visual exploration of the mother's face, as 
well as of the covered and unclad parts of the mother's body; these 
are the weeks during which the infant discovers, with fascination, a 
brooch, a pair of eyeglasses or a pendant worn by the mother. 
(Mahler et al., 1975, p. 54) 
A new characteristic of the child's behavior at this phase, 
emerges at the seventh to eighth month--what Mahler calls "the visual 
pattern of 'checking back to mother'" (Mahler~ 1975, p. 55). She judges 
this to be "the most important regular sign of beginning somatopsychic 
differentiation." The baby seems to visually scan others and to compare 
mother with others, the familiar with the unfamiliar. In doing this, 
the child, in the first instance, seems to be familiarizing himself more 
thoroughly "with what is mother, what feels, tastes, smells, looks like, 
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or has the 'clang' of mother" (p. 56). His continuing explorations, 
begun in the earlier days of this phase continue, and deepen his 
appreciation of what does, or does not belong to mother's body. 
Many psychoanalytic writers have commented on the "stranger 
anxiety" which begins to manifest itself at around eight months. While 
not denying it, Mahler would like to situate such behaviors in a wider 
context, one of wonderment and exploration--a context which Bowlby would 
appreciate. 
Once the infant has become sufficiently individuated to recognise 
the mother's face ... and once he familiarizes himself with the 
general mood and "feel" of his partner in the symbiotic dyad, he 
then turns with more or less wonderment and apprehension to a 
prolonged visual and tactile exploration and study of the faces and 
gestalt of others. He studies them from afar or at close range. He 
appears to be comparing and checking the features of the stranger's 
face with his mother's face, as well as whatever inner image he may 
have of his mother (not necessarily or even predominantly visual). 
He also seems to check back to his mother's gestalt, particularly to 
her face, in relation to other interesting, new experiences. 
(Mahler et al., 1975, p. 57) 
The child who has a strong ability to·approach a widening world, 
is the one for whom the symbiotic phase has been optimal, and who has 
emerged from it with "confident expectation": his experience of life is 
such that he can rely on ~eality to respond to his needs. In the 
· hatching phase this "confident expectation" encourages curiosity and 
wonderment in the child, which manifest themselves in the "checking 
back" pattern. To the degree that the development of basic trust has 
been inhibited, stranger anxiety is likely to be present. 
Hatching, or the emergence of the child from inward directed 
attention to outward-directed attention and alertness, can be seriously 
interfered with in many ways. Hatching may be delayed or pre~ature. 
Mahler cites the case of Peter, a boy whose symbiotic experience was 
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intense, but unsatisfactory. He moved early to the phase of 
differentiation, extricating himself from the uncomfortable symbiosis. 
He manifested severe levels of stranger anxiety, and later this pattern 
of anxiety would reoccur whenever Peter was under stress. Mahler 
comments: 
It seems as if the unsatisfactory symbiotic phase had prevented 
Peter from accumulating a sufficient reservoir of basic trust, of 
that normal narcissism, which provides the solid base from which to 
reach out confidently into the "other-than-mother" world. (Mahler 
et al., 1975, p. 59) 
Mahler also describes the case of a little boy who did not get 
sufficient emotional supplies from his mother, because of her depressed 
condition. His specific smiling response to her came late. He was late 
in using his visual modality, to keep distance-perceptual contact. He 
apparently "prolonged the period of symbiosis as if to give himself and 
his mother time to catch up" (p. 59). In another case, where the 
child's mother was symbiotically too enveloping, the child learned to 
push her away, and was more comfortable in the arms of other people. 
There are thus a wide range of factors that can disturb the hatching 
proces·s, and among them Mahler ranks indifference, depression, 
unpredictability, as well as too intense or intrusive mother, as being 
of special significance. 
Object and Self-Representations 
We have referred in the foregoing pages, among other things, to 
the child's delusional omnipotent fusion with the representation of the 
mother, to how his representation of himself is a source of comfort and 
valuation. We have spoken of how a sense of self begins to e~erge as 
memory traces are established. At this point we need to inquire into 
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the nature and function of these representations. 
As we saw when we dealt with Piaget, the eighteen-month-old 
child reaches the stage of object permanency, and has the capacity to 
retain mental images of things and actions not currently in view. 
Thanks to this ability, the child can engage in such symbolic activities 
as deferred imitation and pretend play. Piaget is of course concerned 
with establishing the objectivity of perceived objects "out there." His 
use contrasts with that of clinicians like Anna Freud, for example, who 
talks, not of objected permanency but object constancy and who is quoted 
by Selma Fraiberg as saying: 
What we mean by object constancy is the child's capacity to keep up 
object cathexis irrespective of frustration or satisfaction. At the 
time before object constancy the child withdraws cathexis from the 
unsatisfactory ... object .... After object constancy has been 
established the person representing the object keeps his place for 
the child whether he satisfies or frustrates. (1969, p. 14) 
Object Relations Theorists would not talk of the cathexis of libidinal 
drives, but their concerns too, would be different from those of Piaget. 
His concern is not with what psychoanalysts call the libidinal 
investment in objects, or the nature of the attachment bonds between a 
child and her caretakers, or the mothering dyad. From within the 
psychoanalytic tradition, Rene Spitz, who used the criterion of stranger 
anxiety, spoke of the child has having achieved object constancy, at 
eight months. His rationale for this is that stranger anxiety implies 
the capacity to evoke the image of the mother in her absence. Others, 
Negara, for instance, spoke of the attainment of object constancy as 
being a gradual process which starts at three or four months and reaches 
its full development at eighteen months. For her part, Mahler envisages 
the attainment of object constancy at around twenty-four months. 
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Selma Fraiberg illustrates how the term object constancy 
acquired different meanings, and explains why different authors suggest 
widely varying ages for the attainment of object constancy. 
The writers who ascribe object constancy to the middle of the first 
year, are using "constancy" only in the sense of attachment to the 
love object. The writers who give a range from eight to eighteen 
months are adding some form of mental representation to the criteria 
for libinal cathexis of the object; those who place object constancy 
at eighteen months appear to be following Piaget's criteria for 
mental representation and object concept. [Mahler] ... who placed 
object constancy at twenty-four months was using a still more 
restrictive criteria, in which mental representation of the mother 
had attained a high level of stability. (1969, p. 19) 
Fraiberg goes on to suggest that some of the ambiguities 
evaporate if we distinguish between "recognition memory" and evocative 
memory," following the example of Piaget. 
Thus a memory trace or a mental image of the mother does not in 
itself imply the capacity to evoke the image of the mother 
independently of the presenting stimulus of her face or voice. 
Recognition can take place when the person or thing perceived has 
the characteristics or signs which revive mnemonic traces laid down 
through previous experience. The test for evocative memory is the 
demonstrated capacity to evoke the image without the presenting 
stimulus. (1969, p. 22) 
A simple example from everyday experience illustrates the 
difference between these two types of memory. If one thinks back to 
one's undergraduate class of three hundred students, one might be able 
to image the face of twenty of them. Should one meet one of the other 
two hundred and eighty in an airport, one might recognize her face 
immediately. This means that the presentation of the forgotten face 
revived the image stored in memory; the face acted as a sign, the image 
was "compared by means of this sign, and recognition occurred." This 
matching of images by means of signs, is what Fraiberg intends by 
"recognition memory." She reserves "evocative memory" for those 
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instances like the first one mentioned above, where the image can be 
produced without the mediation of signs. 
The question now is: "At what age can the child use evocative 
memory?" Is it at around six months, when the baby smiles 
preferentially for the mother? Is it during the eight to twelve month 
period when manifestations of stranger anxiety are at their highest 
levels? Fraiberg suggests that it is not necessary to claim that 
evocative memory is already developed at this stage. When the eight-
month-old child demonstrates stranger anxiety, he certainly displays the 
ability to make perceptual discriminations between the familiar and 
unfamiliar, but "the act of recognition may only tell us that 
recognition memory has progressed to a certain level of complexity" 
(Fraiberg, 1969, p. 23). Mahler's explanation for stranger anxiety, as 
we have seen, is that the "confident expectation" which should be 
awakened in the symbiotic phase, has failed to occur. From Fraiberg's 
viewpoint, what stranger anxiety indicates is that the mental image of 
the mother is unstable, and still dependent on affirmation derived from 
visual perception. 
Recognition memory.stabilizes itself through repetition. The 
appearance in the perceptual field of the mother's face elicits the 
joy of recognition .... In this transitional period for the baby, 
when mental operations begin to take into account the objective 
attributes of persons and things, we may suppose a kind of 
"expectation" in the baby that people and things in his world should 
have resonance in memory. At the eight month level of cognitive 
development, is it possible that the face that cannot be affirmed, 
"p;aced" through memory, is momentarily disruptive to the child's 
sense of the "real," that expectations are not confirmed. (1969, p. 
24) 
Fraiberg's contention is that the unfulfillment of the child's 
"expectation" of a familiar face does not require us to suppose the 
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intervention of evocative memory. If evocative memory were indeed at 
work, then the evoked image of the mother would soothe the child, and 
eliminate the anxiety. While Fraiberg is willing to admit that the 
image of the mother, provided by evocative memory is available to an 
infant sooner than an evoked image of a thing--since libidinal 
investment is much greater in the mother--she is not prepared to argue 
that the time lapse between the occurrence of an evoked person-memory, 
and that of a thing-memory i~ great. 
Fraiberg's reflections, and the use she makes of Piaget's work, 
have helped us, I suggest, to understand those "representations," in the 
psychoanalytic meaning of the word, which are formed at the later stages 
of infant development. 
Now let us consider the following vignettes taken from chapter 
four of Ana-Marie Rizzuto's 1979 work, Ihe Birth of the Livin& God. 
A Visceral Memory 
A 26-year-old woman comes to Rizzuto's clinic. Her breathing is 
fast and shallow. Her mouth is wide open, her eyes bulging. She talks 
of her mother who has told her that she and her father will be cremated. 
In the telling of this story she recalls having had pneumonia when she 
was seven. She remembers no one held her, and the longing she had for 
human touch. Her mother had not touched her, even when she was in an 
oxygen tent, though she could remember her mother's concern for her on 
that occasion--the only childhood memory she had of such care or 
closeness with mother. The patient was hesitant about seeing the 
therapist, because of her wish (the patient) for closeness with her. 
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Rizzuto called attention to the pattern of the patient's breathing--it 
was as if she had pneumonia. 
The wish for closeness, the representation of the mother as caring 
and the feeling of having been "touched in the lungs" by her mother 
during her illness, became a compound object relation in connection 
with me as the caring therapist. (Rizzuto, 1979, p. 58) 
A Sensorimotor Memory 
As Rizzuto rose from her chair to welcome her next client, she 
was struck by his unusual posture. His knees were bent, his hips were 
flexed forward, his back and shoulders hunched, his head berit and 
slightly turned away from her. He squinted at her from the corner of 
his eye, and began to tell his story of how his wife was uncaring and 
bad for him, how she refused him sex. He admitted to an extramarital 
affair. Then he remembered his mother, and how she used to get mad at 
him, yell at him, and hit him. His fantasy was, at that moment, that 
the therapist would hit him. 
The patient was not aware of his posture, when he entered the room, 
but he was aware of having acted out. The memory of his mother 
hitting him became conscious; it had been already present in his 
posture when he entered the room. I call this a sensorimotor 
representation of the object. (1979, p. 58) 
An Auditory Memory 
A female client has great difficulty in talking during sessions. 
At last she blurts out that she cannot talk. She feels as if her mother 
is in the room repeating an order she gave to her child repeated: 
"Never tell anyone about us. Don't betray your family." Breaking this 
taboo caused this woman great guilt. 
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An Iconic Memory 
This anorexic patient feels that her mother's presence invades 
every space she enters, although the mother lives on the other side of 
the world. The woman feels that only her mother's death will set her 
free. She fantasizes splitting her mother with an axe. But the mother 
will not go away, she clings to the daughter. She fantasizes hitting 
her a second time. She became convinced that only the actual demise of 
her mother would bring her freedom. "The visual--nonhallucinatory--
presence of the mother was the object representation that made this 
patient's life quite unbearable" (Rizzuto, 1979, p. 59). 
A Conceptual Memory 
A 27-year-old patiently repeatedly insisted that she was 
shameful, because she was not as "sophisticated" as her mother. In the 
eyes of this woman, her mother was a cosmopolitan, poised proper woman 
of the world. The word "sophisticated" captured for her all that her 
mother was. In fact this was a word that the mother used as a self-
description, and used too, in her instructions to the patient. Every 
time the patient felt "unsophisticated," she felt shame for not being 
like her mother. 
As a child develops, her interactions with the significant 
others in her life are codified, and then throughout the life cycle are 
retrieved, as representations, "in which multiple, and even 
contradictory aspects of the object are simultaneously included" 
(Rizzuto, 1979, p. 57). We have just seen five levels which may 
contribute to the content and tone of a representation. The 
129 
representation may involve physical sensation, either the remembrance of 
past sensations, or their actual physical enactment in the body of the 
person--visceral and sensorimotor memories. The object representation 
may also take the form of a sense of presence, visual or auditory that 
is not hallucinated, but experiences as real--perceptual or iconic. 
Finally, the object representation may operate at a certain level of 
abstraction and secondary process elaboration, and survive in the 
association of certain sentiments and sensations evoked by certain ideas 
and words. 
In her review of psychoanalytic literature, Rizzuto briefly 
refers to the work of Sandler and Rosenblatt (The Representational World 
of the Child, 1962), where they underline the active role of the child 
in creating the internal world of representations. She approves of 
their view that this "means that in order to know what is 'outside,' the 
child has to create a representation of that 'outside' as part of his 
representational world" (Rizzuto, 1979, p. 68). In their account, a 
representation is an "existence," more or less enduring, an organization 
or schema, which is constructed out of a multitude of impressions. "On 
the basis of these, [the child] gradually creates a whole range of 
mother images, all of which bear the label 'mother'" (quoted by Rizzuto, 
p. 68). To understand what is meant by saying that the child actively 
contributes to the creation of a representation of the external world it 
is helpful to recall what Winnicott says about the third function of the 
good enough mothering, that we referred to earlier in this chapter. 
There we saw that the mother has to be "object-presenting, or 
realizing," that is, she presents to the child, what the child needs, at 
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the right time, and thus initiates his or her capacity to relate to 
external objects. For example, the mother has a breast with milk, and 
she would like the infant to nurse at her breast. The mother needs to 
shape how the infant deals with this external object. There needs to be 
the illusion that the child can either experience the breast as its own 
hallucination or as a thing belonging to external reality. The infant 
needs to come to the nipple excited and ready, so that when the actual 
nipple appears, it is the nipple that the infant has hallucinated. And 
so the infant begins to build up the capacity to conjure up what is 
actually available. The mother needs to continue providing this type of 
experience, where the child seems to create the object, and actively 
participates in his or her own instinctual satisfactions, rather than 
having them imposed from without. Winnicott wrote: 
Each infant must recreate the world, but this is possible only if, 
bit by bit the world arrives at the moments of the infant's creative 
activity. The infant reaches out, and the breast is there, and the 
breast is created. The success of this operation depends on the 
sensitive adaptation the mother is making to her infant's needs, 
especially at the beginning.· From this there is a natural 
progression to the individual infant's creation of the whole world 
of external reality. (1958, p. 12) 
Rizzuto's quotation of Sandler and Rosenblatt supports what 
Winnicott emphasizes. They note three aspects of the 
"representational": " (i) the child (his ego indeed) constructs or 
creates the representation; (ii) he does this in an active way and (iii) 
he does it to organise his world in a meaningful way" (Rizzuto, 1979, p. 
132). Then they say 
The representations which the child constructs enable him to 
perceive sensations arising from various sources, to organise and 
structure them in a meaningful way., We know that perception is an 
active process, by means of which the ego transforms raw sensory 
data into meaningful percepts. From this is follows that the child 
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creates, within its perceptual or representational world, images of 
his internal as well as his external environment. (1979, p. 132) 
In an article written in 1970, by Beres and Joseph, entitled The 
Concept of Mental Representation in Psychoanalysis, the authors point 
out the failure of many writers to consider the unconscious components 
of representations. To take account of both the conscious and 
unconscious elements, Beres and Joseph propose a working definition of 
the representation as "a postulated, unconscious psychic organization 
capable of evocation in consciousness as a symbol, image, fantasy, 
thought or actions" (quoted by Rizzuto, 1979, p. 71). Rizzuto is 
critical of the attempt by these authors to differentiate representation 
from memory, when they point out that perceptual experience is changed 
by the human capacity to transform the perception of a stimulus into a 
more complex mental representation. In itself, such an observation is 
true. But, says Rizzuto, all that amounts to saying is that animal and 
human memory are different. The latter never deals with facts as facts, 
but with the meaning of facts, and when it does so, it "transforms a 
memory into a memory with intrapsychic and interpersonal meaning that is 
a representation" (p. 71). 
We might summarize Rizzuto as saying that object representations 
are the actual perceptual memories, of the original interpersonal 
experience, at whatever level of cognitive development they occurred. 
But, as yet, we have made no reference to the ways in which the 
defensive and adaptive distortions of that perception, which were 
historically needed at the time the memory was registered, or which are 
active dynamic factors in the present. Rizzuto quotes Jacobsqn on this 
(from Tbe Self and the Object World, 1964, p. 21): 
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The cutting out of a considerable sector of unpleasurable memories 
by infantile repression eliminates a large amount of unacceptable 
aspects of both the self and the outside world. The defects caused 
by the work of repression, may be filled in by screen elements, by 
distortions and embellishments, produced by elaborate maneuvers of 
the ego's defence system. (Quoted by Rizzuto, 1979, p. 69) 
All defensive maneuvers prevent the maturation of self-awareness and an 
awareness of the historical process through which we have come. Where 
there is massive repression of objects and their corresponding self-
representations, then, says Rizzuto "the individual may experience 
loneliness, emptiness, a fear of losing oneself, a feeling of being 
abandoned, or when it is expressed in bodily metaphors, of having a hole 
where objects supposedly belong" (p. 81). 
I appreciate McDargh's concrete illustration of how an 
individual's object representations of his parents might have been 
formed under the influence of the defensive need to idealize one and 
devalue the second. In the historical present, as long as the need for 
the idealization and devaluation continues, such an object 
representation would persist. But supposing, says McDargh, that such a 
defensive need diminished with time, either because the person's 
relationship to the parents has improved, or because of maturational 
factors, where the sense of self does not depend on such distortions--
what then? There may be a reconstruction of the representation of the 
parents, which may well resemble their actual characters, in a more 
realistic fashion. 
This transformation of object representations is another factor 
to which Rizzuto calls attention. She refers to an article by 
Kestenberg--which is marked, in its vocabulary, by the psychobiological 
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strain in the Freudian heritage--From Or&an-Object Ima&ery to Self and 
Qbject Representation (1971, pp. 76-77): 
Each developmental phase is distinguished by a heightened cathexis 
of a dominant organ by a zone specific pleasure and a phase specific 
contact with the drive object from which a united organ-image 
emerges. At the end of each phase, new shapes of self and object 
representation differentiate from the global imagery of a united 
organ-object. . Through successive phases of separation-
individuation the child forms self and object representations from 
the images of his own and his mother's satisfying bodies. 
Kestenberg's reference, not only to object representation, but 
to self-representation affords the opportunity to turn specifically to 
the relationship between these two inseparable aspects of 
representational activity. The formation of self-representations is 
always concurrent with the formation of an object relationship. In 
other words, we form memories, not only of significant others in our 
life, but also of how we felt, sense ourselves to be, as we engaged 
another person in a relationship. At this point, Rizzuto turns to the 
work of Kernberg; for whom the prototypic internalized object relation 
is that with the mother. This internalized relation is unit with three 
parts (1) an image of the object in the environment, (2) an image of the 
self in interaction with the object and (3) a feeling that colors the 
object image, under the influence of whatever drive was present at the 
time of the interaction (St. Clair, 1986, p. 127). Without getting into 
an expose of Kernberg's theory, I just remark that the process of the 
formation of self and object representations takes place in the service 
of the child beginning to make the discrimination between self and 
other. Throughout the life cycle, self and object relations are in 
continual dynamic interaction. Growth experiences, which result in 
changes in the one, will introduce a sense of incongruence and conflict 
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that induces the modification or reelaboration of the other. The 
pattern of change-conflict-change lies at the heart of the process of 
the maintenance of the self. As Rizzuto expresses this insight, 
The richness, the complexity, the dialectical connection which 
object representations have with our self-representations, is what 
gives the constantly reworked memories their paramount importance in 
mental life (1979, p. 78) 
The Practicing Subphase 
Mahler defines this period as the time when toddlers invest much 
of their libido in their own autonomous functions, and in expanding 
reality testing. Three developmental events occur which contribute to 
the child's awareness of being separate. There is (1) rapid body 
differentiation from the mother; (2) the establishment of the specific 
affectional bond; (3) and the rapid development of the autonomous ego 
functions while in proximity to mother (Mahler et al., 1975, p. 65). 
It is these developments which pave the way for the interest in 
reality, personified in the mother, to spill over into interest in a 
still wider world. Mahler distinguishes two distinct periods in this 
subphase: early and late practicing. The early period overlaps the 
hatching phase. Practicing, the child's ability to move physically away 
from mother, is exemplified, in the early period, by crawling and 
standing up, but while holding on. As the child wanders from mother, 
Mahler notices how absorbed she seemed, how oblivious of the mother's 
presence. But accompanying this movement away from the mother, the 
observers also noticed how the child would return periodically to 
reestablish contact with the parent. Mahler reports Furer as calling 
this "emotional refueling" (Mahler et al., 1975, p. 69). In 
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reestablishing contact, Mahler notes how the wilting infant "perks up" 
and immediately afterwards sallies forth, once more, to explore. Some 
mothers and their children, who value independent functioning, like to 
refuel at a distance. Such children are reassured if they can just look 
and see the mother or hear her voice (p. 67). 
The condition necessary for the successful emergence of the 
early practicing period seems to be the acquisition of the "confident 
expectation," during the symbiotic stage, that mothers will be available 
to relieve distress and emotional closeness--when the child needs it, 
and not merely when mother is ready to be available or because such 
availability answers her needs. When mother is available in an optimal 
way, the condition is present wherein the child can "separate out and 
differentiate the self-representation from the previously fused 
selfobject representation: (St. Clair, 1986, p. 111). Selfobject is 
Kohut's term for the object representation formed during the symbiotic, 
"dual unity," phase. During the practicing phase the child's self-
representation is not yet firmly established and integrated as a whole 
representation. The ability to crawl, and then the facility for upright 
locomotion, play a crucial role in the development of a clear psychic 
representation of the self. 
Once he can walk upright (a stable capacity at eighteen months), 
a point which marks the beginning of the later period of the practicing 
phase, the child begins "his love affair with the world," and takes his 
greatest step in human individuation. From his new bipedal position, he 
has a new vantage point on the world, which brings unspeakable pleasures 
--and equally as powerful frustrations (Mahler et al., 1975, p. 71). 
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Characteristic of children during this period is the narcissistic 
investment in their own functioning, in exploring the world and their 
obliviousness to danger and falling. They delight in escaping from 
fusion and engulfment with mother. Running away, but then to be swooped 
up, seems to be the toddler's way of working out autonomy and a way to 
get reassurance that the mother is still available (p. 71). Toddlers at 
this period are at the peak of their belief in their own omnipotence, 
which is derived from their sense of sharing in the mother's magical 
powers (St. Clair, 1986, p. 112). The child lives out of grandiose, 
idealized, sense of self. Still possessed of a maternal selfobject, the 
child is exhilarated by her developing autonomous functions, which 
permit her to believe in the magic of her own powers. 
"No" is a word readily on the lips of the toddler. This is the 
behavioral accompaniment to the process of distancing from the child-
mother symbiosis. The child seems to fear reengulfment, just when the 
process of differentiation has begun. A special word about mothers 
seems in order. Late in their study Mahler and associates noticed that 
it is the rule rather than the exception that the child's first, unaided 
steps are in a direction away from the mother, rather .than toward her, 
or she takes them while the mother is absent. This only underlines the 
crucial role of the mother in helping the normal child to feel 
encouraged and to gradually relinquish symbiotic omnipotertce and to 
delight in a more interpersonal form of functioning. This period is 
especially significant for those who have had an intense form of 
symbiosis. There are classic traps in which mothers may fall. Some get 
nostalgic for the symbiotic days, and become intrusive in the child's 
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life. Others are relieved that the child can function on his own, and 
behave towards him, as if he were already grown up. This makes it 
difficult for the child to grow apart and, not surprisingly, he will 
often demand closeness. Other mothers fail their "fledgling" because 
they find it difficult to balance being supportive and merely watching 
from a distance. 
Transitional Objects 
Some of D. W. Winnicott's contributions have already helped us 
in trying to understand how to conceptualize the structuring of 
experience, in an object relations mode. There is a further aspect of 
his work that deserves our appreciation--his understanding of the nature 
and role of transitional objects. 
The classic exposition of Winnicott's thoughts on this matter, 
is found in his article Transitional Objects and Traditional Phenoma. a 
Study of the First Not-Me Possession. In this article, Winnicott is 
concerned to draw attention to what he calls a "third part of the life 
of a human being," an intermediate area of experiencing, to which both 
inner reality and outer life both contribute" (1951, p. 4). The 
transition from the hallucinatory omnipotence of the child's fantasy 
life, to the recognition and acceptance of objective reality--a 
transition for which good enough mothering is a sine gua non--is eased 
by the transitional object, the child's first "not-me possession." 
Whether it is the soft and shapeless blanket that is cathechted around 
six months or the stuffed cuddly animal adopted during the second year 
of life, the transitional object occupies "the intermediate area between 
the subjective and that which is objectively perceived" (p. 4). 
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The transitional object and the transitional phenomena start each 
human being off with what will always be important for them, i.e., a 
neutral area of experience which will not be challenged. Of the 
transitional object it can be said that it is a matter of a~reement 
between us and the baby that we will never ask the question "Did you 
conceive of this or was it presented to you from without?" The 
important point is that on this point no decision is expected. (p. 
12) 
Thus the child is accorded certain rights over the self-chosen object, 
and no one shall raise questions about its source or nature. In this 
way, the transitional object is preserved relatively free of 
disillusionment, and it affords relief from the strain of bringing 
together the inner and outer worlds. In this capacity, Winnicott 
affirms "The transitional object stands for the breast, or the object of 
the first relationship" (p. 11). Evidence for this interpretation says 
Wulff, is found in the blanket's being typically brought to the mouth at 
bedtime, or in moments of crisis (1991, p. 338). Although widely 
assumed to be symbolic of the mother and her nurturing, the transitional 
object gains an autonomy of its own. Should it be mislaid, even the 
mother may be unable to console her offspring. 
Winnicott assures us that no one completes once and for all the 
difficult transition from "primary creativity" or hallucinatory 
omnipotence, to full reality acceptance. Hence every person stands in 
need of an intermediate area of experience, of illusion and transitional 
phenomena, which are present in the whole of human culture, but which 
are particularly prevalent in art and religion. As long as we are not 
over insistent that others accept our "illusory experience," as being 
objectively real, we are free to enjoy it, and even gather with others 
to share and deepen such experiences. However if an adult "make(s) 
claims on us for our acceptance of the objectivity of his subjective 
139 
phenomena, we discern or diagnose madness" (1951, p. 13). 
Mahler has occasion to make use of the concept of transitional 
objects in her description of her third subphase, the consideration of 
which, we now turn. 
The Rapprochement Phase 
Mahler calls the ability for upright, free locomotion, and the 
attainment of the beginnings of representational intelligence the 
midwives of the child's psychological birth. By the middle of the 
second half of the second year these are in place. The maturity they 
bring enables the child to recognize both her separateness from the 
mother, as well as her inability to function without her. Because the 
infant no longer feels omnipotent, but on the contrary dependent, she 
turns back to the mother. Mahler and her associates witnessed an 
increased level of separation anxiety, which they interpreted as fear of 
object loss, and which was manifested in many types of behavior, but 
especially in restlessness and hyperactivity--a defensive activity to 
ward off the painful effects of sadness that separation entails. They 
showed a concern with the mother's whereabouts and active-approach 
behavior toward her. Children at this stage constantly "shadowed" the 
mother--incessantly watched her and followed her, and also "darted" from 
her, with the expectation of being chased and swept into her arms--
symptoms, says Mahler, of the child's wish for reunion with the mother, 
but also of a fear of reengulfment. On the one hand the toddler is 
sensitive to disapproval of the mother, but on the other hand, shows 
increased aggression, by her incessant "No." By fifteen months, the 
toddler has discovered that the world is not his "oyster," that he is 
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relatively helpless and unable to command assistance, just by feeling 
the need for it. Thus he has an increased need to seek the closeness 
with his mother, which, during the practicing subphase, he held in 
abeyance. 
From their intense observational study of nine toddlers, Mahler 
and her associates found that the rapprochement subphase could be 
divided into three periods: (1) the beginning rapprochement period; (2) 
the rapprochement crisis; and (3) the individual solutions of this 
crisis (Mahler et al., 1975, p. 89). 
Beginning Rapprochement 
Up to about fifteen months, the child returns to mother for 
refueling, but does not seem to recognize her as a separate person. Now 
it is different. The toddler seems to want to share everything with 
her. She continually brings things to the mother, and puts them on her 
lap. The emotionally important issue seems to be the child's need to 
share with the mother, she wants the mother to enjoy her discoveries 
with her. Along with the dawning awareness of separateness, comes the 
realization that mother's wishes are not always identical with her own. 
This is a major blow to the child's sense of grandeur and omnipotence--
gone is the symbiotic sense of unity. The shock of this dampens the 
child's preoccupation with locomotion, and her greatest source of 
pleasure now becomes social interaction, especially with other children, 
but with adults who may enter her world. This is the time too, when the 
child's desire for extended autonomy finds expression in a reaching out 
to include father. He is a figure who has not been quite ou~side the 
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symbiotic dual unity, but never fully a part of it either (Mahler et 
al., 1975, p. 91). 
Early rapprochement culminates at around seventeen to eighteen 
months, with what Mahler calls "a temporary consolidation and acceptance 
of separateness" (Mahler et al., 1975, p. 93). This goes along with 
great pleasure in sharing possessions and activities, not only with 
mother but with father, other adults and younger or older children. 
However, the increasing frequency of temper tantrums, signs of 
helplessness, of impotent rage, greater vulnerability, and bouts of 
stranger "shyness," are all harbingers of difficulties yet to come in 
the individuation process. 
Tbe Rapprochement Crisis 
At around eighteen months, there is the onset of the 
rapprochement crisis, a phrase Mahler uses to describe the conflicts the 
child experiences in trying to work out her increased need for mother, 
at the same time as she asserts her autonomy, by refusing to acknowledge 
the need for external help. This may last until the child's second 
birthday. 
In more cases than not, the prevalent mood changed to that of 
dissatisfaction, insatiability, a proneness to rapid swings of mood, 
and to temper tantrums. The period was thus characterized by the 
rapidly alternating desire to push mother away and to cling to her--
a behavior sequence described most accurately by the word 
"ambitendency." (Mahler et al., 1975, p. 95) 
The observers noted how at this stage the child uses the mother 
as an extension of self--a process which diminished the pain of 
separation. The child uses, for example, the mother's hand as a tool 
for picking up an object. A strange phenomenon also appeared: the 
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child's anxiety that the mother had left, when she was all the time 
sitting in her chair--a precursor, Mahler says, to projection of 
negative feelings, and an indication of the stress of having to function 
separately. 
The range of affect experienced by the toddler seems to widen. 
The variety of the children's behavior, during observation, suggests the 
presence of sadness, anger, disappointment with mother, and frustration 
at one's helplessness. Children in this period were noticed, for the 
first time, fighting their tears, and suppressing the need to cry. 
Children develop an early form of the capacity to identify with others 
and to empathize with them. 
Teddy ... could not bear to see another child cry. This seemed to 
stimulate his aggressive defensiveness; unprovoked he would attack 
other children. His undeniable awareness of separateness . . . 
seemed to have given rise to a capacity for empathy which was 
expressed in positive ways .... For example he would bring his 
bottle to Mark, when Mark was crying. We saw, at this stage many 
signs of identification with the attitudes of others, especially 
those of mother and father. (Mahler et al., 1975, pp. 97-98) 
The great danger for children at this period, who have a 
disturbed relationship with mother, is that of "splitting." Mahler 
illustrates what she means by citing at length (1975, pp. 82-84) the 
case of one of their subjects, a verbally precocious little girl. When 
left with one of the observers in her mother's absence, the observer 
became "the bad mother." She could do nothing right. A mood of 
crankiness descended upon her. She craved for the "good mother" who 
seemed to exist only in fantasy. On the mother's return there was no 
greeting, no delight in seeing her, just a grumpy "what did you bring 
me?" followed by a series of angry, disappointed, and negative. 
reactions. Sometimes, the observer was treated as the "good symbiotic 
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mother" and the toddler would sit on her lap and eat cookies, like an 
infant. On the mother's return there might be an impulse to run to her 
and at the same time, another to withdraw, rejecting the mother's 
overtures, as if to spare herself further disappointments. In the 
latter instances, it would seem that the absent mother had become the 
"bad" mother, and thus was avoided. 
Another mechanism observed for dealing with separation was that 
of the use of transitional objects. One little girl for instance, 
transferred the demand for exclusive possession of mother to mother's 
chair (Mahler et al., 1975, p. 100). The repertoire of coping 
mechanisms also included symbolic play, through which they betrayed 
their identification with mother or father, in the way they held on to 
the teddy or the doll; and internalization of the object representation 
(p. 92). 
Tbe Individual Patternin& of Rapprochement 
By twenty-one months the toddler is able to find an optimal 
distance from mother, which enables her to function at her best. Three 
factors make growing individuation possible: (1) the development of 
language; (2) the internalization process, inferred from acts of 
identification with the "good" father and mother and from the 
internalization of rules and demands (the beginning superego); and (3) 
progress in the ability to express wishes and fantasies through symbolic 
play. Mahler's observation of the children at this period led her to 
believe that it is very difficult to group toddlers in accordance with 
the kind of general criteria they had been using up till now. - Each 
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child's progress was very distinct, "different from one child to the 
next: (Mahler et al., 1975, p. 102) 
By the children's twenty-third month, it seemed that the ability to 
cope with separateness, as well as physical separation, was 
dependent in each case, on the history of the mother-child 
relationship, as well as on its present state .... We found it 
hard to pinpoint just what it was in the individual cases that 
produced more anxiety in some and an ability to cope in others. 
Each child, had by this time, developed his own characteristic way 
of coping. (Mahler, p. 103) 
She also reports that boys seem to develop with less difficulty than 
girls, the crucial factor being the realization of sex differences (pp. 
102-3). 
A key factor in the child's development at this subphase is the 
attitude of the mother toward the toddler (cf. St. Clair, 1986, p. 115 
for the following). Some mothers are unable to accept the child's 
demandingness. On the other hand, others are unable to face the child's 
gradual separateness. Anxious because of their own symbiotic and 
parasitic needs, a third group hover over, and shadow the child. In 
response to this, the toddler is likely to become more determined in his 
drive toward separateness. 
Maternal unavailability can make practicing and exploratory 
activities brief and subdued. A child who is concerned with mother's 
availability, is unable to invest energy in his or her environment, in 
the development of other important skills, and often returns to her in 
an effort to engage her. The child may even become insistent and 
desperate in attempts to woo her. This depletes energy from the ego, 
and the child may revert to earlier splitting mechanisms. Two forms of 
serious pathology have their roots in the developmental arres~s of this 
period (cf. Garanzani, 1988, pp. 86-87). In narcissistic disorders, 
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while separation and a sense of a cohesive self have been attained, 
autonomy has not. Thus, others are needed to shore up self-esteem, due 
to a growing, and all pervasive, fear of an ability to survive outside 
of the symbiotic pattern. Making demands, and refusing to accept 
limits, become part of the relational style of such persons, especially 
when it comes to important caretakers. Borderline disorders are typical 
of those who have not been able to rely on transitional objects as aids 
for separating from, or internalizing the mother. Such persons have not 
achieved a cohesive self, and so are unable to differentiate a self from 
important others. In the case of borderline parents, they find it 
almost impossible to differentiate themselves from their children. The 
loss of the object results in a dangerous threat to the regulation of 
self-esteem, and threatens the very organization of the personality. 
Both borderline and narcissistically wounded people try to 
assert control over their milieu (especially over people) in order to 
maintain a vulnerable self-esteem. When these people have a family of 
their own, the children are pawns of parental psychopathology. One 
therapist, S. Slipp, quoted by Garanzani says 
Lacking internal tension-relieving mechanisms for sustaining 
narcissistic equilibrium in their psychic structures, they remain 
excessively sensitive to environmental self-objects to relieve 
tension and modulate self-esteem. (1988, p. 86) 
Success or failure then, in negotiating separation from the 
mother at this subphase has a crucial impact on the success or failure 
of later attachments and separations, because it determines the relative 
ease of difficulty in handling anxiety in relationships. 
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Emotional Object Constancy and Individuality 
This fourth subphase of the separation-individuation period, 
occupies mainly the third year of life, without a distinct ending point. 
There are two main tasks which have to be accomplished in this phase: 
(1) the attainment of some degree of object constancy and (2) the 
consolidation of individuality. 
We have already discussed the achievement of object constancy at 
length. Mahler sees object constancy as quite a late achievement--
"according to our conceptualization it does not seem to occur before the 
third year" (Mahler et al., 1975, p. 110). 'We have seen how, once 
object constancy has been achieved, a child is able to function 
separately, despite moderate degrees of tension and longing. Mahler 
sees the conditions necessary for object constancy are many. She 
includes object permanence, in the Piagetian sense, as a necessary but 
not sufficient, prerequisite for object constancy. Chief among the 
other conditions is the unification of the "good" and "bad" part object 
representations into one whole representation. "This fosters the fusion 
of the aggressive drives and tempers the hatred for the object when 
aggression is intense" (p. 110). As we saw with Anna Freud, so also 
with Mahler: in the state of object constancy, the love object will not 
be rejected or exchanged for another, even if it proves to be 
unsatisfactory; even with frustration, the object is still sought after, 
and not rejected or hated as unsatisfactory just because it is absent. 
The second task of this fourth subphase is the consolidation of 
individuality. The unfolding of such complex cognitive functions such 
as verbal communications, fantasy and reality testing, witness to the 
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child's self-identity formation. An important part of the process of 
working towards her own individuality consists in the struggle with 
aggression. In those situations where the selfobject of the symbiotic 
phase was experienced as "good," but where the caregiver was experienced 
as unpredictable or intrusive, then there is a strong possibility that 
the object becomes "bad." The effort to "eject" this bad object focuses 
aggression, and there is a strong inclination to confuse the selfobject 
with the bad introject. Aggression may become so powerful that it 
sweeps away the "good" object and with it the good self-representation. 
The signs of this are intense temper tantrums, and efforts to force 
caregivers to function as auxiliary egos. 
We have almost reached the term of this effort to understand, 
using the conceptualizations of Object Relations Theory, how human 
experience is structured. In order to·highlight the most important 
aspects of the terrain we have crossed, I suggest that we try to work 
out a tentative definition of The Self. 
Object Relations and the Quest for Meanin& 
At the conclusion of this chapter, we are in a position to 
answer the questions with which we started. The heart of the 
contribution that Object Relations Theorist make to our understanding of 
the psychological basis for meaning, lies in the Freudian insight that 
the nature and quality of the human child's relation to people .. 
have been laid down in the first six years of life .... All 
[one's] later choices of friendship and love follow upon the basis 
of the memory traces left behind by these first prototypes . . . the 
imagos--no longer remembered. (Freud, 1914, p. 243) 
Winnicott, Mahler and the rest, have tried to clarify for us,. the ways 
in which human experience is structured, and thus made meaningful, by 
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talking about the representations of self and others, that each person 
forms. Mahler's developmental paradigm might be likened to a light-
source which allows us to see the details of the various representations 
in the succeeding phases of their evolution, or, if the representations 
are already formed, to understand the vicissitudes of the process that 
has led up to their present shape. Let us try to draw together some of 
the insights this chapter has generated about the human quest for 
meaning and the ways in which that quest is either thwarted or 
satisfied. 
Meaning is a description of a quality that attaches itself to 
the experience of the person whose process of separation-individuation 
has reached a healthy term. Such a person has attained an integrated or 
healthy self. To the degree that one's self is healthy, to that degree, 
one experiences meaningfulness. The following paragraphs try to lay 
bare the nucleus of the process through which the "self" passes as it 
evolves towards integration, and hence towards meaning. 
The Healthy Self 
The variety of good and bad selfobjects, experienced throughout 
the duration of the autistic, symbiotic and separation-individuation 
processes established and develops an inner organization of wholeness, 
cohesion, continuity, goals and values. This inner organization is the 
self (cf. Garanzani, 1988, pp. 100-3). When we talk of the development 
of the self, the suggestion is not that it is set over and against 
others, rather the self is envisioned as being in relation to others. 
In terms of Object Relations Theory, the more mature a relati?nship is, 
the more it involves two differentiated selves, and the less it is 
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characterized by "primary identification," that is the internalized 
other. The uniqueness of this relatedness is such that it is its own 
reality, an independent entity. 
The 'Wounded Self 
If a relationship is characterized by a symbiotic-like 
intensity, then there is really a failure to differentiate between the 
self and the object; it is a failure in separation-individuation. When, 
and to the extent that such a state persists, there is a driven quality 
to the relationship. In the language of Melanie Klein, such a 
relationship is typical of the "schizoid position"--a state of affairs 
where a person is actually withdrawn from object-relations. Garanzani 
says that this belongs to a pre-moral stage of self-development and 
psychic life. The second Kleinian position, the depressive, is one 
where a person has overcome the difficulties of the schizoid position, 
and is able to enter more fully into whole-object relations, only to be 
exposed to guilt and depression over the discovery that he can hurt 
those whom he has become capable of loving. In Garanzani's words again, 
"the depressive problem exists on the level of psychic life and belongs 
to the pathological moral level" (Garanzini, 1988, p. 101). All this is 
a way of illustrating how the self may be poorly evolved, even ill. 
There is a degree to which each person has within the self a "split," 
due to the failure of "good-enough" parenting or less than adequate 
biological endowment or the combination of both. To this degree, the 
person experiences meaninglessness. This "wound" within can only be 
healed through adequate relating to another or to others. Pathology, 
and especially severe pathology, represents the extreme wound to the 
self. This happens when the caregivers, given to the child, or 
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individual, are not up to the task of helping to heal the wounded self, 
due perhaps to their own inadequate and fragile selves. There can be no 
doubt about the primacy that Object Relations Theorists accord to 
relating in the struggle to create a meaningful world. 
In the next chapter, still using the key concept of 
"representation," and by suggesting a process of transformation which it 
undergoes, we will see how Object Relations Theorists offer an 
explanation of the psychological resources for a living relationship 
with Mystery, or with God, if one prefers that language. 
CHAPTER III 
FAITH RESOURCES IN A PSYCHOLOGICAL KEY 
Lessons from Freud 
We turn our attention now to the task of trying to understand 
the psychological resources that a person employs in his or her 
breakthrough to Mystery, as these resources can be understood in the 
context of Object Relations Theory. We are following a tradition 
established in Freud's own writings, when we turn to the ways in which 
God is represented in the human psyche, and from our understanding of 
this process. to discern the function of the God-human relationship 
within the psychological economy. For Freud, gods and demons "are the 
creations of the human mind" (1913) and are based on "revivals and 
restorations of the young child's ideas" of his father and mother (1910, 
p. 123). Ana-Marie Rizzuto concludes "What Freud calls 'revivals and 
restorations of the young child's ideas of them' is what psychoanalytic 
theory would later call object relations" (Rizzuto, 1979, p. 15). 
Freud was bitterly anti-religion, especially of the Roman 
Catholic nineteenth-century Viennese variety, but he did not reserve his 
contempt for Catholicism only. His own tradition of Judaism was not 
spared either. It might seem strange then, to attempt to bring 
psychoanalysis into a conversation of the sort that interests us here. 
However, as other have said before, the outcome of applying 
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psychoanalytic theory to religious phenomena is dependent above all on 
the interpreter's fundamental attitude toward religion (Wulff, 1991, p. 
271). If one is a Freud, then one will conclude that religious 
experience, ritual, and ideas, are simply the product of human needs and 
desires. But if instead, one perceives a larger reality behind the 
panoply of religious phenomena, then psychoanalysis may be used as a 
means to comprehend the extraordinary responses to the transcendent, 
whether positive or negative. It can become a factor in the 
purification of religious faith. 
Freud set out to examine religion in the context of his general 
theory (Wulff, 1991, chap. 6). His presupposition was that "religion is 
nothing but psychology projected into the external world" (Freud, 1901, 
pp. 258-59) and on the basis of this assumption declared his ability to 
explain the myths of paradise, the Fall, of God, and of good and evil. 
In his study of Leonardo da Vinci (1910), he was able to demonstrate his 
theory. Leonardo, an illegitimate child, lived for the first few years 
of his life, without a father figure in his home. In later life he 
found himself exceptionally free of the fetters of authority, including 
those of religion, and was exposed to several charges of apostasy. 
Leonardo illustrates the fundamental claim of Freud's psychology, namely 
that religiousness in all its manifestations is ultimately rooted in the 
Oedipus complex. 
A personal God, is psychologically, nothing other than an exalted 
father .... The almighty and just God, and kindly Nature, appear 
to us as grand sublimations of father and mother .... Biologically 
speaking, religiousness is to be traced to the small human child's 
long-drawn-out helplessness and need of help; and when at a later 
date he perceives how truly forlorn and weak he is when confronted 
with the great forces of life, he feels his condition as he did in 
childhood, and attempts to deny his own despondency by a regressive 
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revival of the forces which protected his childhood. (Freud, 1910, 
p. 123) 
A person's longing for father, Freud said, which is the ground of all 
religion, inevitably reverberates with echoes of the Oedipus complex, 
including the affects of fear and guilt. Obedient submission to the 
all-powerful father of childhood, introjected as the ego-ideal and 
projected as God, restores the long lost relationship, although it may 
well continue to be tinged with ambivalence. 
Although many of Freud's patients brought problems tinged with 
religious dimensions, to his consulting room, it was the cultural 
process of religion's origin and function in the human race that was of 
major concern to him. In 1907, he published Obsessive Actions and 
Reli~ious Practices, and pointed out the parallel between neurotic 
ceremonials and religious ritual. In both cases scrupulous attention is 
given to every detail; they are executed in isolation from every other 
action and no interruption of them is tolerated; if they are neglected, 
the individual is torn by guilt feelings. There are differences of 
course: ritual occurs in a community setting, in contrast to the 
solitariness of neurotic ceremonies; religious practices are meaningful 
in each detail--but, says Freud, most devotees are completely 
unconscious of these meanings, not unlike the neurotic, who is unaware 
of the meaning of his rituals. From his clinical work, Freud had 
developed an understanding of the compulsive rituals of neurotics. 
These were performed as a defense against the temptation to commit a 
forbidden act and also as a protection against some unknown punishment 
which the neurotic fears. Obsessive actions also involve a compromise: 
they afford, to some degree, the pleasure they are designed to 
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forestall. "The formation of a religion too, seems to be based on the 
suppression, the renunciation, of certain instinctual impulses" (1907, 
p. 125, quoted by Wulff, 1991, p. 273). 
As in the case of neurotic suppression, so in the case of 
religion, suppression is always unsuccessful. Periodic penance is 
required. Freud drew the momentous conclusion: religion is a Universal 
Obsessional Neurosis. 
Freud's interest in religion found further expression in his 
1913 publication, Totem and Taboo. Freud set to examining two practices 
that he thought exceptional among "primitive" peoples. In the first 
place, the tribe and its members came to be symbolized by means of some 
object, frequently an animal. This animal, called a totem, is regarded 
as sacred and may not be killed. Second, these people establish a 
number of taboos, significant among these being the prohibition against 
intermarriage between group members. Freud found traces of obsessional 
neurosis here too, especially in submission to inexplicable 
prohibitions, accompanied by an unshakable conviction that violation of 
them would bring the direst of consequences. The chief prohibition of 
both obsessional neurosis and taboo, is against touching, either 
literally, or in the form of any contact whatsoever. Displacement 
operates in both cases: the prohibition extends from one object to the 
next, like a contagion. Following on both, comes a set of rituals 
designed to expiate, purify or to achieve reconciliation. 
The parallels between neuroses and religion prompted Freud to 
look deeper for connections between the two. He was struck by the 
correspondence between the basic prohibitions of totemism--against 
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killing the animal and the taboo against incest--and two dominant 
aspects of the Oedipus complex--the desire to kill the father and the 
wish to possess the mother. 
Freud next launches into a brave explanation of the origins of 
totemism. Drawing on highly speculative scientific hypothesis of the 
day, Freud proposed the following scenario. The setting is a Darwinian 
one, of the primitive "horde" in which early humans were supposed to 
have lived. The horde was under the control of one dominant and jealous 
male, who had total control of the harem, having driven off his sons as 
they challenged him and killed off all other rivals. 
One day the brothers who had been driven out came together, killed 
and devoured their father and so made an end of the patriarchal 
horde. United, they had the courage to do, and succeeded in doing, 
what had been impossible for them individually .... Cannibal 
savages as they were, it goes without saying that they devoured 
their victim as well as killing him. The primal violent father had 
doubtless been the feared and envied model of each one of the 
company of brothers: and in the act of devouring him they 
accomplished their identification with him, and each one of them 
acquired a portion of his strength. (Freud, 1913, pp. 141-42) 
Having slain their father, the brothers were gripped by remorse and 
guilt, for they had loved their father as well as hated him. Besides, 
once their father was dead, there was violent competition among 
themselves for the harem. Prey to guilt, and amid social anarchy, "they 
revoked their deed by forbidding the killing of the totem, the 
substitute for their father; and they renounced its fruits by resigning 
their claim to the women who had now been set free" (p. 143). Thus were 
born the basic taboos of totemism. Contemporaneous with these events, 
Freud postulates that a gynecocracy emerged along with the 
acknowledgments of mother deities (Rizzuto, 1979, p. 17). 
The sons did not forget their terrible deed, rather they 
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remembered it and commemorated, symbolically, in the yearly totem feast. 
In Freud's view, the totem feast represents a temporary suspension of 
guilty obedience to the father, and a renewed effort to appropriate his 
power. Freud further opines that each succeeding generation, down to 
our own day, has inherited the sense of guilt resulting from having 
killed, and eaten, the primal father. While he admits that his evidence 
for this claim is rather sparse, he says that such a theory is necessary 
to account for the survival of religious practice through the centuries. 
In 1939, Freud eventually published Moses and Monotheism. Its 
themes are continuous with those of the 1913, Totem and Taboo. Freud, 
in this book, asserts once again his view that totemism, the earliest 
form of religious tradition, gradually ceded place, to other forms, as 
"the return of the repressed" made its influence felt, until eventually 
the totem animal was replaced by a single anthropomorphic deity. "Thus 
while the totem may be the first form of father surrogate, the god will 
be a later one, in which the father has regained his human shape" (1913, 
p. 148). Men, on initially recovering the primal father, were 
rapturously devoted and filled with awe and thankfulness. Before long 
however, the flames of old feelings of hostility were fanned. Freud 
drew the consequences of this process for Judaism, in particular, and to 
a lesser degree for Christianity. 
In Moses and Monotheism, Freud sets out to explain how the Jews 
have a single non-representable God. He speculates about the origins of 
Moses. He claims the biblical account of Moses' rescue from the reeds 
is an effort to cover up his real identity. In reality Moses was an 
aristocratic Egyptian, perhaps even a priest from the followers of 
157 
Ikhnaton, the Pharaoh who had promulgated a religious monotheism, 
focused on the sun god Aten. When the Pharaoh died, the people returned 
to their traditional religion, and Moses, in disgust turned to the 
Hebrews, and adopted them as his proteges. He instructed them in the 
ways of his faith, introduced them to the custom of circumcision, and 
successfully led them out of Egypt. Freud is clear, at least in his own 
mind, that the God whom Moses presented to the people coincided with the 
representation of the father of the primal horde, and its concomitant 
feelings (Rizzuto, 1979, p. 20). Moses' tyrannical rule over the 
Hebrews was deeply resented and eventually they rebelled against him and 
killed him. Many generations later, during which time the Levites 
maintained the memory of Moses and his teaching, the Hebrews came under 
the influence of another religion, whose focus was Yahweh, a 
bloodthirsty and demonic volcano god. The mediator in this religion was 
the son-in-law of Jethro, a Midianite priest, whose name was also Moses. 
The outcome was a compromise. The practice of circumcision was 
retained. Yahweh was credited with the liberation from Egypt. To make 
it appear that Yahweh had been the god of the Hebrews, the legends of 
Abraham, Isaac and Jacob were introduced. 
Like repressed childhood traumas, the disavowed facts and ideas 
that did not fit into the new ideology lived on in the descendants of 
those who had followed Moses out of Egypt. Like repressed events, the 
religion of the Egyptian Moses gradually crept back, until it dominated 
once more. The Jews owe to this religion their conception of a single, 
Almighty God; their sense of being a chosen people; and their great 
intellectual advances and instinctual renouncement, which are the result 
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of the taboo against images. Yet they are burdened with the guilt of 
patricide, which itself harks back to a far earlier one, in the totemic 
past. Remorse for having killed Moses, stimulates the wish for the 
return of the Messiah, the return of the murdered father. 
In Moses and Monotheism, Freud also touches on the origin of the 
Devil representation. Mosaic religion was acquainted with only positive 
affect toward the father-god. But it was incapable of absorbing the 
complexities of the representation of the primal father. Hence there 
was the need of a new character--the Devil--to account for the hate, 
fear and envy, of the primeval brothers. In 1923, he returned to the 
theme. He clearly states here, that God and the Devil have a common 
origin. However he had another explanation for the origins of the Devil 
representation: as far back as the 1890s he cited aspects of the self-
representation as the source of the devil representation. 
Rizzuto then summarizes the review of the evidence and writes 
From the point of view of mental representation, the psychic 
mechanism involved in the formation of the Devil representation is, 
in both cases, splitting, although in one case it is splitting of 
the ambivalent father image and in the other of the good-bad self-
representation. (1979, p. 21) 
Thus while the splitting of the primeval representation of the father 
created the Devil representation, this is a process that repeats itself 
in each individual. If the God-representation is a reflection of the 
benevolent aspects of a man's relationship to his father, then it is no 
surprise that his Satanic representation reflects the hate, envy and 
fear he feels toward him. 
Rizzuto lauds Freud's achievement of being able to begin to 
think of these issues in object-relational terms, rather than in the 
159 
mechanistic terms of id-ego control apparatus, the predominant model for 
Freud's thinking, as we saw. She calls it 
one of his major contributions to the understanding of man--
particularly of man as an object-related being, of man's lifelong 
use of early imagos and object representations, his dependence on 
object relations and not least his religiosity as an object-related 
activity. (1979, p. 28) 
She summarizes the significant object-relational findings of Freud in 
eleven propositions. Primeval man was thought to be capable of: 
1. having a fully developed and internalized representation of the 
paternal image. 
2. experiencing intense ambivalent feelings in relation to the 
father and his representation. 
3. acting out of his ambivalence and murdering the father 
4. experiencing object guilt for killing the father 
5. but in spite of this, splitting the wished for aspect (strength) 
of the object representation from the rest of the paternal 
representation. 
6. identifying partially with the split off part of the 
representation. 
7. projecting that split off partial representation on to an animal 
8. symbolic reactivation of the primary identification by means of 
the ritualistic killing and eating of the totem animal 
9. repressing the rest of the parental representation, which 
remained latent until the arrival of monotheism. 
10. transmitting the repressed representation of the primal father--
and the corresponding guilt and longing--to every male child. 
11. transmitting the split-off partial representation symbolically 
reactivated in the totem sacrifice and meal. (p. 23) 
Further elements of the object relational stand are found in Freud's 
reflections on the superego which we dealt with earlier. There, we saw 
that the final imago to be internalized was that of God, which says 
Rizzuto, may be understood, in part, in the way Freud suggested--as a 
transformation of the paternal imago. At the resolution of the Oedipus 
Complex, for Freud, "the paternal representation--exalted, sublimated 
and merged with the memory traces of the primeval father--becomes the 
representation of God" (p. 30). As we will see, Rizzuto's own position 
is more nuanced. Before we turn to her, let us ask another question: 
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"What is the exalted father and the process of exaltation?" Freud gives 
two answers to that question. Answer one is already given in the last 
quotation. The original imago of the father merges with the imago of 
the primal father. In other places Freud claims that the original 
paternal imago undergoes important changes--either transfiguration or 
sublimation--which means that the God image is different from that of 
the original paternal one. Rizzuto points out that both the ancestral 
and the individual paternal imagos should be unconscious, because both 
are linked to powerful emotions incompatible with the resolution of the 
Oedipus complex. In the effort to explain a conscious God, Freud 
therefore has to resort to the twin ideas of exaltation of the paternal 
imago and the sublimation of the child's libidinal attachment to it. 
She quotes him: 
th~ transformation of object libido into narcissistic libido, which 
thus takes place, implies an abandonment of sexual aims, a 
desexualization--a kind of sublimation, therefore. (Freud, 1923b, 
p. 30, quoted by Rizzuto, 1979, p. 32) 
Hence, at the term of the Oedipal crisis, the boy would identify with 
his real father, repress the earlier paternal imago (which is tinged 
with intense feelings) and then sublimate the libidinal attachments to 
that representation, so that it becomes transformed into a nonsexual 
image of God. While forgetting about the hateful feelings a child may 
have toward the father at the time of the crisis, Freud is satisfied 
that he has explained that 
it is the sublimated, aim-inhibited, parental imago that permits the 
appearance of religiosity and pious devotion to God, which can now 
be not only conscious, but even become a source of self-esteem, love 
and feelings of security. (Rizzuto, 1979, p. 32) 
God representations are often unstable and subject to change. 
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For our purposes it is sufficient to note how a person's dealings with 
God may vary according as his relationship with his father in the flesh 
changes. Freud says himself that "young people lose their religious 
beliefs as soon as their father's authority breaks down" (1910, p. 123). 
Rizzuto culls these further thoughts on the matter from his writings: 
(1) the appearance of a real fatherly object may change the relation to 
God or make it vanish; (2) the coming of the father to his proper 
proportion in the young person's life, makes him forget about his imago 
sublimated into God; (3) the attachment to the father persists, and so 
does the one to God, and when one diminishes, so does the other; (4) the 
individual, for various reasons, drops his relation to God, but 
preserves the representation unchanged. Freud's own ideal, is of 
course, that these God representations be left behind entirely--self-
confessed atheist that he claimed to be. But he failed to give an 
account of why, unlike theists, that he, and people like him, did not 
have recourse to the "regressive revival" of God imagos when under 
stress and faced with overwhelming impotence. Freud is quite clear that 
parental imagos are immortal. The question remained unanswered: "What 
use of parental imagos does the unbeliever make, when the realities of 
life replicate the emotional situation of childhood?" 
Beyond Freud 
Freud is basically correct when he traces the origin of the God 
representation to early parental relations. Such is Ana-Marie Rizzuto's 
position. Yet he underestimated the complex way in which the 
representation is derived. Her complaint centers on the fact, that he 
neglected the role of the mother and forgot the contribution of 
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siblings. "My study, and present knowledge of the complexities of 
object relations, make it impossible for me to accept that the paternal 
imago is the only one used to form representations of God" (Rizzuto, 
1979, p. 44). She made a study of twenty Jews and Christians, who were 
her patients, by means of questionnaires, interviews and drawings of 
their families and God. Her findings are reported in her 1979 study, 
Ihe Birth of the Livin& God. Although she grants the importance of the 
Oedipal phase, she challenges Freud's exclusive focus on this crisis. 
As for the developmental level from which the image originates, 
persons whose oedipal conflicts are minimal but whose preoedipal 
processes are prominent have as much an image of God as those who 
have reached the oedipal crisis. I therefore conclude that 
formation of the image of God does not depend on the oedipal 
conflict. (p. 44) 
Her main, and substantial disagreement with Freud lies deeper than this, 
however. It centers on his claim that the God image is nothing but the 
father-image, exalted and cathected with desexualized and aim-inhibited 
libido. Such an explanation freezes the representation. It is not the 
type of energy that cathects the image that is significant, but rather 
"the many complex sexual and nonsexual, as well as representational, 
ideational components, present in the child which contribute to the 
genuine creation of an imaginary being" (p. 46). She reports that she 
has found God images belonging to every stage of the developmental 
itinerary. The formation of a God image is an object related 
representational process, 
marked by the emotional configuration of the individual prevailing 
at the moment he forms the representation--at any developmental 
stage. The clinical cases show God belonging to each level of 
development, from anal to oedipal" (p. 44). 
What are the conditions that prepare the child to form a God 
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representation? By the age of three, Rizzuto suggests, a child is 
deeply concerned with "animistic notions of causality" (p. 44). She is 
an implicit philosopher, possessed by an urge to know the why and 
wherefore of everything, and inevitably the harried caregivers end up 
telling the child that God stands behind everything as cause. There is 
a remarkable fit between this answer and the readiness of the child's 
mind, who at precisely this stage, is in awe at the "superior beings," 
of great size and power whom she needs to look after her. It seems true 
to claim that the image of God "is developmentally necessary to ground 
our earliest awareness of the existence of things" (Jones, 1991, p. 43). 
In psychoanalytic terms, the child is dealing with the idealized 
representations of his parents, to whom he attributes great 
perfection and power. He is also struggling with his own grandiose 
wishes for power of his own. (p. 44) 
The child has before her the example of the parents who pay homage to 
this great being they talk about and this impresses her immensely. In 
Rizzuto's own words: 
The fact that the parents mention [God] frequently to the child, 
send the child to Sunday School ... and beyond that, worship such 
a being themselves, produces a profound impression on the child, for 
whom the parents are the biggest visible beings. All of these 
factors contribut~ to the creation of a sense of God's reality which 
inevitably becomes linked to the reality of the parents and their 
personalities. (1979, p. 50) 
She also describes the circumstances that will shape the nature of the 
God-representation, its content, in other words. 
The type of God each individual produces as a first representation 
is the compounded image resulting from all these contributing 
factors--the preoedipal psychic situation, the beginning stages of 
the oedipal complex, the characteristics of the parents, the 
predicament of the child with each of his parents and siblings, the 
general intellectual and social background of the household. As 
though all these antecedents were not complex enough, the· 
circumstances·of the moment in which the question of God emerges may 
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color the God representation with insubstantial coincidences that 
become linked to it by primary processes. (p. 45). 
A child does not, obviously, create his or her object 
representation of God because of encounters with a perceptual object 
with the concreteness of a parent or a sibling. The representation of 
God is produced later than the first representation of the caregiver(s), 
but it can and does draw upon the resources of those parental imagos, 
though not necessarily in the straightforward way that Freud suggested. 
Rizzuto postulates that 
constant dialectic processes between primary object representations 
and the sense of self, bring the preoedipal child to form some 
representation of a being "like" the parents (mother and father), 
who is "above all" and bigger and mightier than anyone else. This 
being becomes a living, invisible reality in the child's mind. (p. 
50) 
Furthermore, as we have seen in the last paragraph, the God-
representation is influenced by a multitude of cultural, social, 
familial phenomena, and we might add from previous reflection on 
representation-formation, by the deepest levels of biological 
experiencing as well as the highest spiritual strivings. The task of 
integrating such a range of human experiencing, involves an 
understanding of the nature of the human capacity to represent and 
symbolize. Rizzuto does not want to enter into a detailed discussion of 
these capacities but does venture to say that 
all representations originate in multiple sources of experience 
(from proprioceptive to conceptual) and have potential for multiple 
meanings. All representations can be used dynamically for self-
integration under the never-ceasing synthetic functions of the 
psyche. The level of meaning as well as the shape and aspects of a 
given representation depend on the intrapsychic context of the 
synthetic moment when the representation is being used. From this 
point of view, very early representational components (as, tactile or 
sensory elements) may serve in the context of a much later and more 
mature level of meaning (e.g., the subjective experience of a 
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priest's consecrating hands) as a constant process of self-
integration in which all developmental moments may be present 
simultaneously. (p. 182). 
Hence, the God-representation is a new, original representation and is 
possessed of potential to "soothe and comfort, provide courage and 
inspiration--or terror or dread" away and beyond anything that the 
actual parents could hope to engender (p. 46). This contradicts Freud's 
claim that the believing person is inescapably neurotic and immature. 
Pointing out, that just as a mature relationship with parents is 
possible, so may a relationship with God be also, does not exhaust the 
significance of what Rizzuto is driving at. She looks to the way in 
which a person continually reworks and transforms his psychic balance at 
each stage of the life cycle. 
Those who are capable of mature religious belief renew their God 
representation to make it compatible with their emotional, conscious 
and unconscious situation, as well as with their cognitive and 
object related development. (p. 46) 
Reli~ion as Illusion 
Winnicott's reflections on the nature and function of 
"transitional objects" offer critical help in mapping the creative 
process through which the formation of the God representation occurs. 
In the situation of "good enough mothering" where effective mirroring is 
available to the child, a sense of basic trust is born, a "resting 
place" is inaugurated, from which a creative reaching out to reality can 
occur, while both mother and child enter the area of play and 
transitional space. When the God-representation is first formed, like 
other transitional phenomena it enjoys an unchallenged status. By that 
is meant that it is regarded by the child, neither solely as a creation 
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of his or her fantasy, and hence under magical control, nor wholly 
external to the self, like the caregiver. Before I go on to say more 
about the origin of the God representation as a transitional object let 
us listen to Rizzuto, echoing Fraiberg, 1969, sing the praises of "the 
fictive creations of our mind," which are as influential in our lives as 
the flesh and blood people among whom we live. 
We have forgotten the impressive power of muses, guardian angels, 
heroes, Miss Liberty, Ears and Thanatos, devils, the Devil and God 
Himself. Human life is impoverished when these immaterial 
characters made out of innumerable experiences, vanish under the 
repression of a psychic realism that does violence to the ceaseless 
creativity of the human mind .... In this sense at least religion 
is not an illusion. It is an integral part of being human, truly 
human in our capacity to create nonvisible but meaningful realities 
capable of containing our potential for imaginative expansion beyond 
the boundaries of the senses. Without these fictive realities human 
life becomes a dull animal existence. (p. 47) 
Religion as an illusion! Have we returned to Freud's negativism 
and pejorative judgments on religion? Nothing could be further from the 
truth, and Paul Pruyser is someone who can tell us why this is not so. 
In what follows, I am indebted to Wulff's presentation, of Pruyser's 
position in Between Belief and Unbelief (Wulff, 1991, p. 338). 
Illusion, Pruyser says, is etymologically derived from the latin word 
ludere, to play. So when we say that cultural phenomena, like religion 
or art, are illusionistic, we are referring to their origin in the play 
of the human imagination. While Pruyser agrees with Freud that such 
illusions are wish fulfilling, he insists that· they serve as ideals, 
uncovering a person's shortcomings, but at the same time, affording 
direction and impetus for the attainment of loftier goals. 
Pruyser's illusionistic world is Winnicott's world of 
transitional objects, a third world between the private inner world of 
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autistic fantasy, and the public, outer world of realistic, sense-
perceived data. In contrast to these two worlds the illusionistic world 
is, in Pruyser's words, 
the world of play, of creative imagination, in which feelings are 
not antagonistic to thinking, in which skills and talents are used 
to the utmost, and where pleasure is found without categorical 
abrogation of the reality principle. (Quoted by Wulff, 1991, p. 399 
from The Seamy Side of Current Reli~ious Beliefs, p. 334) 
The distinctive character of this third world is clear in the following 
diagram Wulff, 1991, p. 339). 
Pruyser's Scheme of the Three Worlds 
Autistic World 
untutored fantasy 
omnipotent thinking 
utter whimsicality 
free associations 
ineffable images 
hallucinatory events/ 
entities 
private needs 
symptoms 
dreaming 
sterility 
internal object, imago 
Illusionistic World 
tutored fantasy 
adventurous thinking 
orderly imagination 
inspired connections 
verbalizable images 
imaginative events/ 
entities 
cultural needs 
symbols 
playing 
creativeness 
transcendent objects 
prefigured by the 
child's transitional 
object 
Realistic World 
sense perception 
reality testing 
hard undeniable facts 
logical connections 
look-see-references 
actual events/ 
entities 
factual needs 
signs, indices 
working 
resourcefulness 
external object 
Religious language is particularly apt to describe the contents 
of the transitional or illusionistic world. As Pruyser sees it, the 
child's transitional object has a sacred quality about it. It functions 
as a kind of ritual object, subject to the reverent and ceremonial 
attention of all the family. Yet it is also "transcendent," in that it 
falls neither into the category of the autistic world nor tha~ of the 
realistic. Furthermore, we can reverse the equation "the transitional 
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the transcendent." Deities, ideal human virtues, and states of 
spiritual ultimacy are "all elaborations of the transitional sphere," 
symbols, about whose meanings there is communal agreement. It is 
Pruyser's thesis that religion finds its home in the transitional world, 
because 
the transcendent, the Holy, and Mystery, are not recognizable in the 
external world by plain realistic viewing and hearing, nor do they 
arise directly in the mind as pleasurable fictions. They arise from 
an intermediate zone of reality that is also an intermediate human 
activity--neither purely subjective, nor objective. (Quoted by 
Wulff, 1991, p. 340) 
The child encounters the raw material for the object 
representation of God in the same place, and in the same way, as the 
material for the imaginary companion (Rizzuto, 1979, p. 191) for the 
monster, the superhero, and the devil. The child brings to each of 
these the same vital agenda; the problem of becoming a self which means 
"the trauma of negotiating the terrors and the traumas of achieving a 
sense of self that is both separate and securely related" (McDargh, 
1983, p. 123). McDargh, like Rizzuto, refers to Bruno Bettleheim's 
illustration of how the characters of classical fairy stories can be 
used by the developing child for the purpose of working through the 
assaults on his or her narcissism, inevitably sustained in the process 
of growing up (Bettelheim, 1976, pp. 24-25). And yet there is a 
significant difference between the transitional object, God, and other 
transitional objects. The others are eventually outgrown. As every 
parent knows, throughout childhood, the toy-closet eventually overflows 
with discarded transitional objects--teddies, bits of blankets and 
favored outfits. But, says Rizzuto, God is not among their ntµ11ber. In 
the normal course of events,·the psychic history of God is the reverse 
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of other transitional objects: instead of losing meaning, God's meaning 
becomes heightened. Because God is a "nonexperiential" object, and the 
God-representation, unlike teddies and a blanket is infinite plastic, 
the person can throughout life, "create" a God according to his needs 
(Rizzuto, 1979, p. 179). 
James Jones questions whether that is a sufficient explanation 
of the differences between God and the rest of the inhabitants of the 
transitional world (1991, p. 45). He notes how Winnicott, Rizzuto's 
source of inspiration in this matter, argues in a different way. When 
speaking about transitional objects, Winnicott is really talking about a 
certain capacity for experience, insisting that transitional phenomena 
point to "an intermediate area of experiencin~ to which both inner and 
external reality contribute." Teddy bears and security blankets are 
left behind, but the capacity to transcend the dichotomies of inner and 
outer, subjective and objective, continues to grow and blossoms into the 
talent to create, in the arts and the sciences. Winnicott's conviction 
is that the transitional object 
is not forgotten and it is not mourned. It loses meaning, and this 
is because the transitional phenomena have become diffused, have 
become spread over the whole intermediary territory between inner 
psychic reality and the external world . . . that is to say over the 
whole cultural field. (Winnicott, 1953, p. 5) 
Imagination represents more than the world of ghosts and goblins and 
fairy tales; it is the source of a "Hamlet" or Einstein's theory of 
relativity. 
According to Jones, Rizzuto's misunderstanding of Winnicott, 
which leads her to focus on transitional objects, rather than on 
transitional experience, leaves her with the pseudo problem, with which 
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we have just seen her grapple. Jones notes how she often makes God 
sound like a supernatural version of the teddy bear and then speculates 
on why God is not discarded like other such "objects." What is crucial, 
then, is not the object, but the capacity for experience. He proposes 
that a person's "God" is not discarded, because it is the carrier, par 
excellence, of the capacity to experience in the "third way," where the 
subjective and the objective are both transcended. 
The Epi~enetic Ori~ins of the 
God-Representation 
I have mentioned how Rizzuto considers mirroring and holding as 
an important moment in the process of the creation of the God-
representation; and how ghosts and goblins brush shoulders with God in 
the child's imagination; but I have not yet described how she sees these 
two realities as part of an epigenetic process. Rizzuto spends three 
pages, 185-88, describing how a mirroring transference, and a selfobject 
bond, explain the creation of the God-representation out of the 
experience with the primary caretaker, normally the mother. She is 
convinced that our earliest sense of self, grows from sensing ourselves 
mirrored in our mother's reactions. If the mirroring is hesitant, or 
not there, our sense of self will be distorted. The experience of 
mirroring lies at the basis not only of our sense of cohesive self, but 
also at the root of the God-representation. All other images that are 
joined to it, in the elaboration of our private God-representation are 
colored by that core mirroring experience, or the failure to be 
mirrored. 
A second moment in the process of generating the God-
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representation lies in the achievement and stabilization of object 
constancy, in the second and third year (Freud's anal phase). At this 
time, comes the procession of "imaginary companion," of monsters, and 
fairies, with God drawing up the rear. This procession helps the child 
tolerate his badness, rage impulses, frustrations and deceptions, on the 
one hand, and allows him to experience his grandiosity, on the other, by 
controlling them. We have seen too, how the special propensities of the 
child as an implicit philosopher, the characteristics of his object-
related developmental stage, the attitudes of the parents to God, and 
the cultural "rumours" of God, all contribute to the nurturance of the 
God-representation. 
A third moment in the evolution of the God representation 
occurs, at the point where "the child's narcissistic preoccupations 
become intertwined with object-related wishes to be found attractive" 
(Rizzuto, 1979, p. 195). Rizzuto has reached the point where Freud 
concentrated his efforts to understand: the fateful moment when the 
child's struggle to gain the attention of the preferred parent is about 
to meet with failure, and the parental imago becomes cathected with 
sublimated libidinal energy, and is transformed into the exalted father-
protector who will not castrate the son (p. 196). Rizzuto takes 
considerable distance from this understanding. Already, at the onset of 
the Oedipal crisis, in her view, the God-image has a venerable history; 
in the Oedipal crisis the child learns that he is indeed small, but is 
given the hope that he or she can come to be like the preferred parent, 
and marry someone similar; the self-image changes and the presence of 
the powerful phallic hero or heroine, and later, the superhero, mediate 
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the healing of the narcisstic frustration and object loss, and the 
object-related exhibitionism and sadism that follow the defeat; the 
parental object representations also change, desexualized to a tolerable 
degree, and a wider knowledge of the parents becomes possible. Her 
distance from Freud is clear in a statement like the following: 
The God-representation suffers transformations that keep in step 
with the self- and parent-representations. The child's intellectual 
maturation permits him to think about God in relation to his 
enlarged experience of the world and his parents. At about the age 
of five, the representation of God, parents and the child himself 
become more pedestrian. (p. 196) 
A second phase in post-Oedipal development occurs when the child 
experiences disillusionment with parents and family. Three fantasies 
are typically associated with this time: (1) the fantasy of the family 
romance. (the child imaginatively develops a new family where experience 
is wonderful, and all the wishes which were denied by the real parents 
are fulfilled); (2) the fantasy of havini an animal companion; and (3) 
the fantasy of havini a twin (a being like the daydreamer himself or 
herself, with all the qualities he or she lacks, and from whom one 
cannot be separated). The psychodynamic interpretation of the "twin" 
suggests that the twin functions as an alter-ego, which helps reshape 
the self-image of the post-Oedipal child as someone whose separation 
from the parents is painfully obvious. Rizzuto proposes to see the God-
representation functioning in a similar way to relieve feelings of 
isolation and loneliness (p. 98). Contemporaneous with these 
developments, the child is normally introduced to the heroes and 
heroines of his or her religious tradition. These function, says 
Rizzuto, as alternative models to the family, and psychically provide a 
group of p~ople with whom one may wish to identify, and so have one's 
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worth validated. At the end of this period, before the onset of puberty 
the God-representation has achieved its "basic personality," "profoundly 
enmeshed with each developmental stage of childhood" (p. 199). 
The fourth moment in the evolution of the God-representation 
occurs at puberty, and once again there are two phases of events here. 
With puberty the person is now able to conceptualize in logico-
mathematical abstractions. For the first time he or she can grasp the 
concept of God beyond the limits of his or her God-representation. 
Thi& concept follows principles of philosophical inference, and 
though helpful for the intellectual integration of belief, it lends 
itself, not to belief, but to theorizing, and to the construction of 
theological or philosophical arguments. Properly integrated, it 
adds a dimension to whatever God-representation the child had at the 
time. Emotionally, it adds nothing. (Rizzuto, 1979, p. 200) 
In later adolescence the individual has to face the challenge of 
integrating a more unified and cohesive self-representation which will 
empower him to make the major life-decisions that are calling for his 
attention. This developmental crisis, characterized by intense self-
searching and remaking of the self-image, in the context of forging an 
identity for himself in the world of work and home-making, induces new 
encounters with both old and new God-representations, which Rizzuto says 
"may or may not lead to belief" (Rizzuto, 1979, p. 207). We will have 
occasion to return to this topic, in the next section, when we cite the 
example of Jean-Paul Sartre. 
Finally, throughout the life cycle a person develops the need to 
critically assess changes in self-representation, in order to cope with 
the inevitable advance of the life cycle, as well as to the ever-
changing encounters with peer and parental representations. The chances 
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are that the God-representation will not escape the need to be adapted 
too--right up to the moment of death. 
Psycholo~ical Resources and the 
Breakthrough of Mystery 
As a conclusion, we need to specifically answer the question we 
posed at the beginning of Chapter II: what, in object relational terms 
are the psychological resources which facilitate a breakthrough to 
"Mystery." In a nutshell the answer is a transitional object or God-
representation, which is compatible with the object and self-
representations a person has evolved throughout his or her life cycle. 
That needs to be expanded. 
I use Jean-Paul Sartre as an example to illustrate the value of 
thinking the religious quest in object relational terms. In his 
autobiography, Words, he describes how he was raised as the spoiled and 
worshipped child of a multigenerational French family, of bourgeois 
background. Bereft of a father from birth, his grandiosity was never 
"held" by the limitations and constraints of definite standards (cf. 
McDargh, 1983, p. 130). Thus, he suffered the confusion of a self that 
was continually on parade, and which was repeatedly forced into 
conformity by love, or worse as Kohut put it, "by the narcissistic needs 
of both a widowed infantalized mother and an inflated but death-haunted 
grandfather" (as cited by McDargh). The God served up to young Jean-
Paul was that of the established bourgeoisie. All this God asked for 
was a polite deference, but made no real demands, nor inspired any 
enthusiasm. As we listen to the following extract from ~. let us 
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pay attention to the form of the God-representation that emerges from 
the text. 
Raised in the Catholic faith, I learned that the Almighty had made 
me for his glory. That was more than I dared dream. But later I 
did not recognize in the fashionable God, in whom I was taught to 
believe, the one whom my soul was waiting. I needed a creator .. 
I was given a Big Boss .... Good society believed in God in order 
not to speak of him. How tolerant religion seemed! How comfortable 
it was. In our circle, in my family, faith was merely a high-
sounding name for sweet French freedom. 
At bottom, the whole business bored me. I was led to disbelief, 
not by the conflicts of dogma, but by my grandparents' indifference. 
Nevertheless, I believed. In my nightshirt, kneeling on my bed, 
with my hands together, I said my prayers everyday. But I thought 
of God less and less. (Sartre, 1964, pp. 97-99) 
The passion of this man's life is echoed in the opening lines of 
this quotation when he speaks of his learning that he was made for God's 
glory, that God was Creator. Here, Sartre is not dispassionately 
referring to an idea or concept of God, rather the close interaction 
between the ideas and the self-representation that Sartre beings to 
those ideas is what is uppermost. Long before Sartre was exposed to the 
insipid God of his family, or the formal religious instruction of his 
church, a powerful God-representation had gestated within him, and had 
made him his own theologian. The young Sartre has a powerful affinity 
with the Creator God. In his case, a God-representation which held 
great promise, met with another God-representation, that of the 
comfortable French middle class, and found no resonance. The primary 
creativity of the child died under the weight of social and 
institutional constructions. Rizzuto writes about this kind of 
situation: 
But the child brings his own God, the one he himself has put 
together, to this official encounter. Now the God of rel~gion and 
the God of the child-hero face each other. Reshaping, rethinking, 
and endless rumination, fantasies and defensives maneuvres will come 
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to the help of the child in this difficult task. This second birth 
of God may decide the conscious religious future of the child. . 
No child arrives at the "house of God," without his personal god 
under his arm. (1979, p. 8) 
"When Sartre tells his story, he recalls--more than that--he 
mourns, the abortion of an object relationship with the Creator God, 
which had held great potential for him. God as creator was a 
transitional object, whose presence to the young man had great promise 
as a source of creative energy for the process of self-becoming. 
Because they were unworthy of the object relations which he had already 
developed, and in order to remain faithful to the sense of self he had 
developed, Sartre chose to reject the ideas of God, and the kind of 
faith that his community offered him. For our purposes here, it is 
important that we be clear that it was not merely ideas or concepts of 
God that Sartre chose to reject. Let me quote McDargh again: 
It is our position that an approach to religious development as a 
cognitive process and to God as a concept, while it draws attention 
to some important features of the total phenomenon of human 
religiousness, fails to grasp the psychological uniqueness and 
developmental complexity, of an individual's relationship with his 
or her God. At base, it is a failure to distinguish between the 
processes whereby the child handles concepts, and the processes 
whereby the child forms, and relates to, significant objects. 
(1983, p. 128) 
I want to insist on a point here: Sartre rejects the beliefs of his 
community as unworthy of his trust and belief, because these ideas 
carried a set of object and self-representation which were totally 
foreign to those that were at the heart of his own personal project as a 
"separating-individuating" self, in Mahler's terms. It was not that the 
ideas themselves were illogical, or wrong, but simply foreign. Sartre's 
personal locus of trust--his faith--was grounded in his own s~lf-
becoming, and this led him to abandon his trust--his faith--in the 
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religious quest of his formal religion. The mourning for the 
possibilities of a genuine God-relationship, founded in a personal God-
representation can still be heard in the following paragraph: 
I have just related the story of a mixed vocation: I needed God. 
He was given to me, I received him without realizing that I was 
seeking him. Failing to take root in my heart, he vegetated in me 
for a while and then he died .... Whenever anyone speaks of him to 
me, today, I say with the easy amusement of an old beau who meets a 
former bell: "fifty years ago had it not been for that 
misunderstanding, that mistake, the accident that separated us, 
there might have been something between us. (~. pp. 102-3, 
quoted by McDargh, 1983, p. 130) 
As the aging autobiographer, Sartre adopts a Stoical attitude 
and puts a brave face on the loss of his relationship with God. He sees 
no possibility of an encounter with ideas of a different God, carrying a 
different set of self and object relationships, from that of the God of 
middle-class French people, which would open the door to reconciliation 
with the Creator God of his childhood. Yet such a reconciliation is a 
possibility, if not for Sartre, then at least for other people who might 
have taken leave of their God-relationship over similar faith issues. 
Exposure in later life to new sets of ideas about God, particularly at 
the critical points in the life cycle, may awaken the possibility of a 
renewed relationship with one's object representations of God, and be 
the catalyst which initiates a reworking of those representations, so 
that they are once more available for faith. 
This is the heart of the matter of God-representations and faith 
as far as Rizzuto is concerned. She states her conviction in this way: 
I propose that belief in God, or its absence, depends on whether or 
not a conscious "identity of experience" can be established between 
the God-representation of a given developmental moment, and the 
object and self-representations needed to maintain a sense of self 
which provides at least a minimum of relatedness and hope .... 
[The God-representation] as a transitional object appears in 
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early childhood and must undergo transformations in the course of 
life if it is to keep up with the transformations of the life cycle. 
If it loses its meaning, however, it can be set aside without being 
forgotten. [Cf. p. 168 above, for Jones' reservations about this 
way of talking.] And it can recover its meaning at the time of a 
life crisis, either by a progressive new elaboration of the God-
representation or by a regressive return to an earlier 
representation which once more lends itself to belief. (p. 202) 
Examples of renewed contact with God representations are many. 
From my own experience I can point to the impact that Liberation 
Theology made on me. The God who comes as Father from the future, to 
heal and lift up the wounded, and who entrusts his sons and daughters 
with his hopes for the world, empowering them to work for change 
oppressive structures, is the image that I have found most compelling 
throughout my adult life. It deeply touches into an earlier image of 
God as Father, strict but fair, powerful and somewhat remote, which in 
turn, for me was a transformation of the idealized representation of my 
father in the flesh. The new representation opened up possibilities for 
meaning and for sociopolitical action that I experience as exciting and 
a force for reconciliation. In my case at least, the work on the "self" 
gradually rendered the predominant older God-representation obsolete, 
and readied me for the ideas of Liberation Theology, which in turn 
carried a God-representation that I found congenial and have attempted 
to integrate. What bears repeating here, I think, is the fact that 
Liberation Theology was able to engage the very core elements of my 
personality, both conscious and unconscious. It was this appeal to my 
self-, object-, and God-representations that accounts for its effects on 
me, rather than the logical cogency of its discourse. Moreover, this 
transformation of my self and God-representations occurred only as the 
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new ideas allowed for the reorganization of alternative memorialized 
experiences. Rizzuto's way of putting this is: 
Even someone who believes intellectually that there must be a God 
may feel no inclination to accept him unless images of previous 
interpersonal experience have fleshed out that concept with multiple 
images that now coalesce in a representation that he accepts 
emotionally. (1979, p. 48) 
In other words no amount of talk of a God who offers the hope of a 
future, where justice and reconciliation reign will make any affective 
sense at all, unless the person who hears such a discourse has referents 
for the experience of living in that way. "Put more simply still, 'God 
is love' can make no saving sense to a human being who has never known 
what it feels like to be loved, however inadequately" (McDargh, 1983, p. 
132). 
I suspect that my work with the Theology of John Shea is another 
step in the process of adjusting my God-representation to my changing 
self and object representations. We now turn to the task of bringing 
Object Relations Theory and Shea's theology into a direct conversation. 
CHAPTER IV 
REPRESENTATION ENGAGES STORY AND VISA-VERSA 
The moment has come to initiate the conversation between John 
Shea's theology and Object Relations Theory. Conversation is a two-way 
process. Thus, the first and major portion of this chapter, may be 
described as "representation engages story," and is entitled "a 
constructive-relational view of faith." By making representation the 
subject of the sentence, we want to suggest that the psychological 
theory we have been working with, can sometimes expand or throw light 
on, and sometimes challenge John Shea's theology. In the second moment, 
when the story-theology of John Shea engages Object Relations Theory--
and we will dwell but very briefly on this part of the conversation--
the attempt will be to measure the depth metaphors of the psychology 
against those of the theology, and to tentatively suggest the outline of 
the theory of obligation that is implied by Mahler and her colleagues in 
the Object Relations "school." This section of the chapter is entitled 
"Depth Metaphors and Obligation." 
If our assumption that the metaphor of self-interpretation is a 
good one to express the kernel of what faith means, then we might 
suspect that there could be many points of convergence between this 
theological view and the views of the Object Relations Theorists we have 
studied. But before we develop these let us first say a word on the 
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method we will use to facilitate the conversation between the 
psychological and theological disciplines. 
John McDargh uses a methodology, borrowed from William Rogers, 
to guide the interdisciplinary dialogue that he conducts in his book, 
fsychoanalytic Object Relations Theory and the Study of Reli~ion, we 
propose to rely on that same methodology here. The methodology is 
called a "construction-relational model" (1983, p. 69). 
Constructive Position 
~ 
Psycholodcal Vantage 
Phenomenal Data 
For a constructive-relational model of interdisciplinary investigation, 
the object of study is some common data of human experience, which can 
be addressed from both a psychological and a theological perspective. 
This is what the above diagram refers to as "phenomenal data." In this 
chapter we will look at those inter and intrapsychic processes by which 
the person interprets his or her experience, unifies it, develops and 
experiences a cohesive self, and then can reach out to others in 
significant, "real" relationships. There is indeed data "out there" 
which begs to be understood. Children are born into a network of 
relationships, they Q.Q experience a species specific form of dependence, 
they Q.Q learn to symbolize, and they Q.Q carry with them a particular set 
of psychic wounds and strengths throughout their lives. Yet why do we 
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isolate this particular body of data and why link it to faith? That 
decision is based on the claim I have made about the essential core of 
John Shea's theology, and on the suspected convergence I perceive from 
the two perspectives we have examined--the theological and 
psychological. 
I shall endeavor to bring these two vantage points into 
conversation and invite each one to support, or correct, or offer a 
critique, of the other. The result of this will be a constructive 
position. In this process, it is not a matter of theology subsuming 
psychology, or visa-versa, but rather of allowing each one to have its 
voice and adding its insights. The arrows in the diagram are intended 
to emphasize how, when this methodology is adhered to, the constructive 
position is always accountable to the data itself, to the actual life 
experience being studied. One insists on referring back to the data· · 
which was the ground for both the psychological and theological 
formulations. 
Facilitating a dialogue between the psychological and 
theological disciplines, presupposes an openness on the part of these 
two areas of inquiry, and a readiness from each, to be sympathetic to 
the contributions the other can make. Rather than being contradictory, 
I suggest, that when they are related to one and other, the two 
perspectives may be able to convergently affirm a number of critical 
insights. Shea's view is, I believe, open to a conversation with 
psychology. This is so because he understands faith less as a graced 
assent to revealed truths, and more as a universal characteristic of 
human existence by which every person is oriented towards the Mystery. 
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Furthermore, he sees each person empowered to respond to It, my among 
other things, developing his or her life-story, through the metaphors 
and concomitant values of the religious tradition. Shea's analysis of 
the human condition has highlighted some aspects of faith as crucial for 
human living: the ability to symbolize and to create meaning, the sense 
of subjective and objective reality, the sense of being oriented within 
the flux of life, the ability to choose values which foster loving and 
enlivening interpersonal relationships. It seems to me that many of the 
developmental issues we explored in Object Relations Theory are closely 
related to, if not identical with, these same theological concerns. 
A Constructive-Relational View of Faith 
From the foregoing discussion I would like to propose a 
definition of faith, which I will develop, in the light of Object 
Relations Theory, in the following pages. Faith is a human dynamic of 
knOWin~ what is real which is (1) foundational for the shapin~ of a 
humanly meanin~ful environment and (2) finds its fulfillment in an ever-
~rowin~ capacity for self-affirmation. mutuality and compassion. 
Faith as Symbolic Knowing, the Capacity 
to Construct and Know the Real 
The emphasis that Shea and his tradition place on knowing as the 
basis of faith, sets the course for us, in approaching the wealth of the 
contributions of Object Relations Theory, for a psychological 
understanding of faith. We have seen that faith begins with the 
discernment of Mystery's approach to the human person. A person "knows" 
Mystery, thanks to the capacity for sacramental imagination. Remember 
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how the windhover was a symbol of Mystery's presence to Gerard Many 
Hopkins. 
We might begin our examination of the contribution that Object 
Relations Theory makes to our understanding of the psychological 
resources for faith by recalling our discussion in Chapter II, on Object 
Representations. There (pp. 127ff.) we saw that in order to know "what 
is outside" the child must create a representation of that "outside" as 
part of his representational world. We reviewed the part that 
hallucination plays in this, and how go~d-enough-mothering is crucial, 
if reality is to match the child's hallucinatory activity. "Each infant 
must recreate the world" Winnicott (1958, p. 12) told us, "but this is 
possible only if, bit by bit, the world arrives at the moment of the 
infant's activity. The infant reaches out, and the breast is there, and 
the· breast is created." To begin with, meaning happens, I suggest, 
because the child is involved in a symbiotic relationship. To the 
degree that this symbiosis is satisfactory, to that degree are 
sensations experienced as meaningful, the self experienced as real, and 
the basis for trust and a positive God-representation laid down. By the 
time the child reaches the stage of object constancy, he or she is ready 
to organize his or her world without being absolutely dependent on the 
caretaker, though the child still needs support and mirroring, of 
course. In Sandler and Rosenblatt's words: 
the representations which the child constructs enable him to 
perceive sensations coming from various sources, to organise them 
and structure them in a meaningful way. We know that perception is 
an active process by which the ego transforms raw sensory data in a 
meaningful way. (1962, p. 89) 
In the case of the lucky child, the world that he or she creates, comes 
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into being because of the cooperation between him or her and the 
caregiver. An essential element of the child's knowledge is the 
security of this cooperation, a sense of his inner core as safe. This 
security and safety continue to reinforce the sense of basic trust. The 
opposite may indeed happen, in which case the knowledge the child gains 
is that the real is threatening and untrustworthy. All of us, one 
supposes, fall somewhere on a continuum that stretches between the lucky 
and the unlucky. 
At this point, there is already a convergence between Shea's 
theological viewpoint and that of the Object Relations Theorists. 
Knowledge and meaning are basic to both. For Object Relations 
Theorists, they are rooted in the body's experience of being held, of 
being safe. While I have not seen John Shea write anything like this, 
he did affirm it in his conversations with me. Trust and knowledge are 
two sides of a single coin. Again, Object Relations Theorists do not 
restrict knowledge to sensory experience. There is a depth in knowledge 
beyond that of merely looking, sensing, smelling, etc. That is 
something that Shea would applaud. 
But that is only a start. What light does Objects Relations 
Theory throw on the claim that we know Mystery in and through the 
proximate environment of the self? To find the answer to this question, 
we need to return, first, to our considerations of the origin of the God 
representation, which as we have seen, Object Relations Theorists credit 
as a significant psychological event, which plays an honorable part in 
the psychic life of an individual. We have traced the birth of the God-
representation through its five phases in Chapter III (pp. 169-73)--the 
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laying of its basis in the mirroring experiences of early infancy; the 
birth of the first representations with the onset of object constancy 
(when God takes his place with ghosts and goblins in a long procession 
of illusory productions, which help the child cope with his badness, 
rage and frustrations while allowing him space to experience his 
grandiosity); the changing God-representations of the Oedipal child, who 
evolves God-representations to fit the changing self and object 
representations she has, and which function to relieve loneliness and 
isolation; the broadening intellectual capacity of the adolescent adds 
the element of a concept of God, and the capacity to build theological 
systems; and finally, throughout the remainder of the life cycle, the 
person critically assesses the God-representations by which he lives, to 
take account of the successive challenges and crises that aging brings. 
There is a striking parallel, and compatibility, between John Shea's 
claim that we know Mystery in and through the proximate environment of 
the self, and the Object Relations conceptualization of the processes 
involved in religious knowing. For John Shea, Mystery is not a datum of 
experience, like a parent or a blade of grass. We experience Mystery's 
relationship to us, in and through our relationship to these things, as 
well as in our relationship to our "self." Object Relations provide a 
psychological explanation of how this is possible. We construct 
representations of external reality, and we relate to external reality 
through them. It is one, or many, of these representations, that are 
transformed in the God-representation, and it is by means of this 
representation that we relate to Mystery. Furthermore, each of these 
object representations has its corresponding self-representation. We 
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saw this illustrated in the case of Jean-Paul Sartre, at the conclusion 
of the last chapter. He had an early "love-affair" with "The Creator 
God." At an early age, his knowledge of God was vitally important to 
him--at least as he remembered this knowledge as an older person, His 
God-representation, which I term "The Creator God," was the 
psychological element in this existential relationship with God. This 
God-representation was in deep harmony with the self and object 
representations of the little boy. God, self and world fitted together, 
they were all aspects of a single project--the unfolding of Sartre's 
potential. 
A second way that Object Relations Theory makes sense of Shea's 
claim that we know Mystery in and through our proximate environments 
becomes apparent when we look at what it says about transitional objects 
and experience. In his examination of religious experience, William 
Meissner acknowledges his debt to Winnicott, and accords a particular 
importance to transitional objects. His remark that "the use of symbols 
takes place within the intermediate area of experience that Winnicott 
designated as illusion" (Meissner, 1990, p. 105) establishes a 
significant link with Shea, and opens up the possibility of 
psychologically grounding "sacramental imagination." Let us try to see 
how this is so. 
The initial step here, is to recall that recourse·to "illusion" 
is not a flight to untutored fantasy, rather it is a necessary step in 
the process of learning, and of coming to a knowledge of reality. As we 
have seen, through the use of transitional objects, a child enters a 
mode of experiencing which stands at the intersection between the 
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experience of external reality, and that of internal subjective reality. 
Through the use of transitional objects, the dichotomy between the 
objective and the subjective is transcended. The primordial 
circumstance under which this occurs is that of the nursing dyad, where 
"the good-enough-mother" answers the needs of her child. The 
conjunction of the child's needs and the response of the real object, 
the mother, creates a situation of illusion in the child, in which, from 
the child's point of view, he has created the need satisfying object. 
This is the crucial insight for us here. Recourse to this transitional 
space is not a neurotic defense, rather, Winnicott argues, that illusion 
is an integral part of the developmental process whereby an individual 
engages his capacity to involve himself in the world of experience, "a 
human capacity that expresses itself in the creative shaping of a 
humanly meaningful environment" (Meissner, 1990, p. 102). It is an 
"interpretation" of reality that involves the experience of safety, of a 
proportion between the infant's self, and the external world, and of 
being appropriately linked to all the elements of reality (i.e., having 
one's place in reality). Learning, accommodation to reality, is 
promoted according as there is the repeated experience of being allowed 
the privilege of entering into illusional space. Illusion, in this 
sense, proves to be the doorway to knowing. Recall the nursing dyad 
again. An external observer can see, of course, that the mother's 
response comes from outside, but not to the child. With repeated 
experience of "resting" in this transitional space coupled with 
experiences of optimal frustration, the child's illusion of omnipotent 
control over the transitional object gradually diminishes. The child in 
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Piagetian terms accommodates to reality. There is a constant pendulum 
movement between illusion and disillusion. Thanks to Winnicott, we can 
recognize, without a sense of unease, that the use of transitional 
. objects, and the occurrence of transitional experience, is a normal 
healthy phenomenon. In fact, it draws the person and his surrounding 
environment together; through it, reality is engaged, known, at newer 
and deeper levels. Moreover, it is not confined to the nursing-infant 
or playroom child, but is a characteristic of adult life as well. 
This dialectic and tension between illusion and disillusion 
continues to be elaborated throughout the whole of human experience 
and life. The project of gaining knowledge and acceptance of 
reality is never fully completed. (Meissner, p. 103) 
We take the next step in relating Shea's claims for sacramental 
imagination to those of Object Relations, by turning to the insights of 
Paul Pruyser. In his terms, the realm of play, the illusionistic world 
of "tutored fantasy," is the place where faith is at home. We can quote 
him again: 
The Transcendent, the Holy and Mystery are not recognizable in the 
external world by plain realistic viewing or hearing, nor do they 
arise in the mind as pleasurable fictions. They arise from an 
intermediate zone of reality that is also an intermediate human 
activity--neither purely subjective, nor objective. (Quoted by 
Wolff, 1991, p. 340) 
How does this come about? A moment ago, we quoted Meissner as saying 
that the use of symbols takes place in Winnicott's illusory space. The 
capacity to use symbols is a development of the very early use the child 
makes of the blanket or the teddy bear, to find relief from the 
interminable tension arising from the task of bridging the internal and 
external worlds. Let us examine the use the child makes of a blanket. 
Observers suppose that the blanket symbolizes the mother's breast, but 
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its status as a transitional object is as important as its symbolic 
value. The fact is, that the blanket, while it is real, is not the 
mother's breast. That is as important as its standing for the breast, 
since it is this objective dimension that prepares the human child's 
capacity to become a symbol-making, and a symbol-using being. 
The use of transitional objects is more a step toward the symbolic 
function than itself a form of symbolism. When symbolism is 
achieved, the infant has already gained the capacity to distinguish 
between fantasy and fact, between internal and external objects, 
between primary creativity and perception, between illusion and 
reality .... I would argue that the use of symbols takes place 
within the intermediate area of experience that Winnicott designated 
as illusion. (Meissner, 1990, pp. 104-5) 
Meissner then goes on to generalize from childhood to adult 
life. Entrance into the transitional mode of experiencing--recall that 
this is occasioned by the coming together of external reality and 
internal attributions--means that the same, sense-experienced, external 
objects can become invested with subjective intentions and meanings, 
time after time, and in this fashion its symbolic dimensions are 
strengthened (Meissner, 1990, pp. 105-6). 
Symbols do not only draw on the conscious level of psychic life, 
of course. An adult, using her capacity for symbol-making, calls on two 
distinct levels of her psychic life--the conscious and the unconscious. 
We are using an insight here, that we met in Chapter II, when we 
referred to the Beres and Joseph article, wherein it was proposed to 
define a representation as a "postulated unconscious psychic 
organization capable of evocation in consciousness as a symbol, image, 
fantasy, thought or action" (cf. p. 130, above). Hence, it is possible 
that a person may, on the one hand, consciously decide to invest certain 
external objects with significance and power, and deliberately choose an 
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object, such as a person, a cross, a story or a church building, as a 
transitional object. On the other hand, she may be led to do so 
unconsciously, in which case "the meaning of the action or attribution 
is not immediately evident and can only be ascertained by interpretation 
within a broader social or historical context" (Meissner, 1990, p. 105). 
Thus, both Shea and Object Relations Theorists hold that our 
relationships to events, circumstances as well as to persons, are the 
building bricks out of which we create a meaningful world. These 
relationships are not "flat," empirical realities, rather they have a 
depth dimension that arises from the human capacity for transitional 
experience, which is the psychic "space" wherein the ability to form and 
use symbol arises. Symbols not only draw on the conscious level of 
awareness, they are rooted too in the unconscious. When in transitional 
"space," a person uses symbol, then, all the creative potential of which 
he is capable begins to flow, and not only great art (Freud's one 
acknowledgment of transitional space) but great scientific theory, as 
well as religious ritual and story are born. 
A further point of convergence is apparent, when Beres and 
Joseph talk of the interpretation that needs to be done, to bring 
unconscious material into consciousness. Shea conceptualizes the 
process in terms of myth-making and story-telling. His concern is with 
how the process works in the lives of adults, trying to create a 
meaningful world to live in, in the present. Story, as we know, gives 
rise to images. Images invite a conversation in order to distill values 
and attitudes, which then point to the practical strategies. Moreover, 
we saw Shea taking great pains to illustrate how biblical exegesis, the 
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scientific tools of contemporary western society, are powerful steps we 
can take in bringing the contents of the unconscious into consciousness. 
In the following quotation, used by Meissner (1990, p. 105), Andre Godin 
expresses his conviction that the two disciplines, psychology and 
theology, do indeed converge: 
These two levels of symbolic expression, [the conscious and the 
unconscious] are closely linked and complementary to one another. 
The symbolic function is always exercised by an encounter between an 
interior urge, which results from the whole organization of the 
personality, and its actualization in exterior expressions of which 
most (but not all) are modelled by the surrounding culture, 
traditions, and social conventions. The symbolic act therefore 
unites not only several degrees of reality (matter and spirit), but 
several levels of human reality (conscious and unconscious, 
individual and social). 
Godin not only points to complementarity around knowing as a 
phenomenon of sacramental imagination (in Shea's language) and symbolic 
knowing (in Pruyser's terms) as well as the importance of the 
unconscious in both, but he also speaks of the symbolic as involving the 
social dimensions of a person's life. Shea talks of an individual being 
bound to her community through the world-creating tales of her people. 
These tales and myths precede the individual and are a gift from his 
tradition with which he may choose to structure his life and give 
meaning to it. Object Relations Theory is, of its essence, interested 
in interpersonal and social phenomena--the emphasis accorded the mother-
child dyad and the claims made for the immortal influence it exerts on 
all subsequent phases of a person's life, is enough to illustrate that. 
However, it has a relevance beyond that, for our understanding of 
culture and religion. Culture happens--and I would add religion 
happens--thanks to the human capacity to make and use symbols-. A person 
exercising the symbolic function is creating the matrix within which 
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cultural experience (and religious experience) takes place. Cultural 
experience (or religious experience) 
is not merely subjective (as derivative of and determined by 
intrapsychic dynamics only) nor it is exclusively objective (as a 
reflection of extrinsic and objectively determined qualities of the 
object); it is compounded of objective qualities, as of a painting 
or a statue or a piece of music, and the subjective experience that 
an individual brings to it. (Meissner, 1990, p. 105) 
In the case of religious experience, there is the subjective dimension 
that comes from "the dynamic constituents of human understanding and 
motivation" (Meissner, 1990, p. 109) combined with the external 
objective dimension, which in John Shea's language is the traditional 
stories we inherit, coupled with the community's ritual. These stories, 
ritual objects, and ritual actions, are combined with the subjective 
element and are used in such a manner that they express meanings and 
values that transcend their physical characteristics. The symbolic 
dimension, Object Relations Theorists would tell us, is not something 
inherent in these stories or objects themselves. Meaning can come about 
only by the interpretative action of the believer: 
Consequently, the objects as religious symbols are neither 
exclusively perceived in real and objective terms, nor simply 
produced by subjective creation. Rather they evolve from the 
amalgamation of what is real, material and objective as it is 
experienced, penetrated and creatively reshaped by the patterns of 
meaning attributed to the object by the believer. (pp. 106-7) 
In this first moment, I have tried to uncover the convergence 
between the "from whence" of Shea's theological tradition and that of 
Object Relations Theorists in what concerns the view of faith as a human 
dynamic of knowing which is foundational for the shaping of a humanly 
meaningful environment. The Object Relational view has, I submit, given 
a psychological plausibility to the central claim of Shea's theological 
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account of faith as a form of knowing. As yet, little or nothing has 
been said concerning "the real" that is known through the form of 
transitional experience that we are calling faith. And it is to the 
issue of how psychologically, we may account for the sense of knowing 
reality, of being grounded in it, that is so typical of the "from 
whence," the starting point, of Shea's understanding of faith. 
Faith and the Developing Sense 
of Being Real 
In Shea's perspective, as we have seen, faith is a celebration 
of one's communion with Mystery. It is also a question, a hungering 
after Mystery, which is the ground of all that is real. In the light of 
Object Relations Theory, we can make a distinction between the 
subjective and the objective poles of this yearning. In doing this we 
are uncovering further dimensions of the psychological resources we 
bring to the faith-enterprise. 
At the subjective pole of this desire for the real is the 
profound and unquenchable thirst to be real oneself, to feel, in 
Erikson's phrase that one's existence has an "actuality." Many people 
can take their sense of "being" for granted, most of the time, though 
for everyone there are moments when a sense of their life being 
disconnected, and falling apart, rushes through consciousness. There 
are times too, when one may disassociate from one's feelings, and 
experience oneself as existing in a vacuum. Therapists frequently 
describe a condition characterized by a nagging sense of unreality, of 
being detached and unconnected. Work with clients presenting these 
symptoms led Harry Guntrip to suggest that "an absence, non-realization, 
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or dissociation of the experience of 'being' and of the possibility of 
it, and along with that, an incapacity for healthy, natural, spontaneous 
'doing' is the most radical clinical phenomenon in analysis" (quoted by 
McDargh, 1983, p. 77). 
The sense of being self, of "being," is a developmental 
achievement that grows out of the child's relationship to his or her 
interpersonal world. We have reviewed how the holding environment, 
characterized by mirroring promotes psychic integration, how the child 
discovers her own value, beauty and worth in her reflection in the 
caretaker's eyes. This sense of affirmation is the basis for the 
realization of the potentialities given in the natural endowment of the 
child, for developing as a person through interpersonal relationships. 
Theistic faith--the knowledge that is experienced in the Divine-
human encounters of a person's life, such as those described by Dillard 
and recounted by Shea--is active not only in the formative process, but 
in all events and circumstances of the life cycle, "supporting the drive 
for a sense of personal reality, which may have been compromised or lost 
in the processes of the development of the self" (McDargh, 1983, p. 77). 
Shea's use of the stories of "tieing up the strong man" in Mk. 3:27, the 
Elisha story and the story of the Cross, to illustrate how knowledge of 
Mystery's presence, thematized as "water and cake in the desert," 
illustrates faith's sustaining and enhancing presence in the quest for a 
deepening and enlarged sense of participation in being, of being real. 
Perhaps, it is in telling stories of Mystery being "the seductive lure," 
that the self' truest nature is experienced. I am assuming that all we 
have already said about our capacity to use symbol--and story is a 
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symbol--is in our minds here. In telling these stories, and entering 
the transitional experience they promote, we engage in what John Shea 
calls a "dangerous exchange": we hand ourselves over, and receive back 
our life from God. The results of this exchange, effected through the 
symbol, is that we learn to "love our finitude and battle our sin." We 
know we are free. We are freedom, not in the sense that we can escape 
all the alienating structures of existence, but in the sense that we are 
funded from beyond. We say, not, "we can do everything," but "now, in 
God, all things are possible." From Object Relations perspective, we 
would say that the self has achieved integration. At the moment of 
expressing itself thus, it is a real self, a cohesive self. 
Faith and a Developing Sense of Being in 
Relationship to a Real and Meaningful World 
The second pole we referred to in the last section was that of 
the objective pole. As we have seen, from Shea's perspective, we need 
to be related to "what is." We saw that Freud was also attentive to 
"what is," and in his discussion of the reality principle he would have 
us believe that our acquisition of the sense of reality is a painful 
process indeed, forcing a compromise between the drive for pleasure and 
the demands of an inflexible world. McDargh points out that Hartmann 
tried to soften the opposition between reality and the drive for 
pleasure by suggesting that behavior under the control of the reality 
principle assures a deeper, more human pleasure than that of pure 
instinctual gratification--the pleasures of sublimated activities were 
not to be sneered at (McDargh, 1983, p. 79). This was at least a first 
step towards stating something that Bowlby was quite impressed by, 
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namely that human beings, from infancy, love to explore their 
environment and to enjoy manipulating it. Such exploratory behavior is 
as common as attachment behavior and every bit as important for 
development. 
By exploring the "out there" the child or adult is engaging in a 
behavior that Bowlby considers vital for survival. However, if we were 
to use the metaphor of the child as the "scientific utilitarian" or the 
"calculating navigator" of hostile territory, who tries to make the best 
deal ~ssible with reality, we would be wide of the mark, in getting a 
picture of the child's relationship to reality (cf. McDargh, 1983, p. 
79). A much better metaphor, taken from our earlier discussion of the 
"practicing sub-phase" is that of the child as "the fledgling lover." 
As we saw, this is the period when the child takes the great step in 
individuation; when there is a powerful narcissistic investment in her 
own functioning, on the part of the child; when there is exquisite 
delight in exploring the world and escaping maternal fusion. And yet, 
this world is supremely interpersonal. For the very acquisition of the 
ability to "practice" depends on the "confident expectation" that needs 
will be met by the mother. It is the mother's presence, her ability to 
relieve distress, and to provide emotional closeness during the 
symbiotic phase, which birthed this "expectation"--and continues this 
service into the succeeding one. It is the mother's presence, and the 
confident expectation that she nurtures, that soothes the child's 
anxiety, and convinces her that the world is a welcoming place, that 
rewards her investigations with new delights and fresh wonders. When 
the toddler first ventures forth into the world, ideally, it is in 
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Michael Balint's image, with the belief that the entire cosmos is a kind 
of loving mother, holding the child tenderly in her arms--that it is 
solid and real. 
With the onset of the rapprochement period comes disillusionment 
and anxiety. The child discovers her limitations and the limits of her 
power. The development of cognitive skills and the capacity for 
conceptualization make the world increasingly available to the growing 
child. The capacity for creative engagement with "reality out there" 
and for a courageous exploration of it, depends in a large measure on 
the continued renewal, in age appropriate ways, of that fundamental 
"expectation" which sponsored the first forays of investigation. To the 
degree that the world remains, in Balint's image, a loving mother, to 
that degree is the individual exposed to the sensory experience that 
will lead him or her to encounter--may be construct is a better word--
reality. To the degree that "good-enough-mothering fails--and a person 
carries the corresponding self and object images with him or her, 
throughout the life cycle--or to the degree that one is driven by fear 
or anxiety, to that degree is one's reality subject to distortion and 
untruth. 
John Shea does not concern himself with the psychological 
origins of the basic question "what is real." I think that Object 
Relations Theory supplies a deficit in his reflections at this point. 
It is not that the issue is unimportant for him. He can say things 
like: "The paradox of theistic faith . is that living in a 
relationship with a gracious God means living dangerously in an 
ungracious world" (Shea, 1980, p. 40). Where do the psychological 
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resources for such a faith stance come from? In the light of the 
reflection in this section the answer to that question lies in the 
existential knowledge a person gains, through the ministrations of 
"good-enough-mothering," of the reliability, the security, the "reality" 
of the "out-there-and-not-me." Perhaps it is true to say, that 
prompting the question "what is the real" as the starting point of 
faith, is the experience of the "confident expectation" of the "good-
enough-mothered" child, who has been encouraged to engage in "a love 
affair with the world." 
Faith Expressed in the Ability to 
Enjoy Solitude 
Stories of Faith begins with the telling of three stories. 
Mystery reveals its bondedness to the three people concerned, as they 
enter deeply into their experience. Although, in the case of the 
grandfather on the plane, there is a companion with him, this companion 
acts principally as a sounding board, as far as the movement of the 
story is concerned. In the case of the other two characters, the 
teenage girl, and the middle-aged son, their solitude is complete. 
Through their relationship to what is, their bondedness to Mystery 
floods their consciousness, and they are "enticed to think, feel and act 
in accordance with this truth" (Shea, 1980, p. 15) Because of their 
awareness of their bondedness to Mystery, they become people of depth. 
Shea describes a variety of transforming experiences which are intensely 
personal and which take place in the solitude of each one's encounter 
with Mystery, the ground of one's being, of one's values and one's 
thinking--experiences that transform consciousness, conversion 
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experiences and revelatory experiences. Out of the encounter with 
Mystery in the solitude of a person's life, flows, not only a meaning 
for life--e.g., the girl listening to Mother Theresa sees that her life 
can be integrated around compassionate service--but also a set of values 
which give direction to her concrete behavior and which are an answer to 
her deepest needs, conflicts and aspirations. 
In keeping with our intention to outline a constructive-
relational view of faith we turn now to what we have seen of Object 
Relations Theory, and try to discern its contribution to our 
understanding of the place of solitude in the life of faith. The 
conceptualization of the challenges faced by the human person as he or 
she emerges from symbiosis to individuation, has exercised the 
imagination of people like Mahler and Winnicott. At a time when it 
appears that the major crisis in living, centers around the capacity for 
intimacy with others, and when the suffering that people most often 
experience is that associated with failed intimacy, it is striking that 
the capacity to be alone is hailed as a major developmental achievement. 
Mahler's work has provided an outline of the complex process through 
which a child must go in order to reach individuation, a state that 
involves the achievement of the capacity to be alone. We have augmented 
Mahler's outline, in Chapter II of this essay, with the work of other 
theorists and experimenters, and as a result, have an appreciation of 
the factors involved. The child learns to tolerate solitude only when 
she or he achieves object constancy. This capacity is the outcome of 
the developmental process that we have examined: the cognitive 
development described by Piaget, the affective bonding described by 
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sowlby, the use of evocative memory, internalization, as well as 
initiation of exploration of the world, all of which find their place 
~ithin the paradigm outlined by Mahler. At the time of achieving object 
constancy the child has the capacity to form whole objects, by which I 
lllean she recognizes that the same mother is both "good" and "bad," and 
in parallel fashion, that she herself is a cohesive whole, both "good" 
and "bad" too. Thanks to the ability to evoke representations of caring 
others--which concomitantly evoke good self-representations--the child 
has internalized the capacity to self-sooth, to control anxiety, to 
experience the "non-I" as trustworthy and real (as we have seen earlier 
in this chapter) and thus to not only tolerate being alone, but to 
actually value such solitude. In terms of the lifelong project of 
relating to others, it is this capacity to tolerate being alone, without 
being inundated by the fear of abandonment, that empowers a person to 
embark on intimate relationships with others. 
Correlating Shea and Object Relations Theorists, leads me to 
suggest that the psychological events which accompany the revelation 
experiences of Mystery in solitude are precisely those that we have 
considered in the preceding paragraph. Revelation-faith experiences 
have a psychological dimension which consists of the capacity to evoke a 
basic sense of trust, that holds annihilating anxiety at bay, that 
permits cognitive functioning; that involves the ability to bring 
together the "good" and the "bad," both internally and externally, and 
thus to tolerate the "bad." 
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Faith and the Developed Capacity to 
Tolerate Dependence 
The storied-world that John Shea offers us, is one in which 
human beings experience dependency. They are dependent on the gracious 
approach of Mystery towards them to reveal Itself as the ground of being 
and of valuing and of doing. Consequently, they depend on Mystery for 
the whole meaningful world that they construct through story-telling, 
image-making, value-naming and action-expressing. Think of the paradigm 
that Shea uses, taken from the writing of Annie Dillard, to illustrate 
our lack of control over, as well as our readiness for, the approach of 
Mystery. When he translates this image into a biblical one his choice 
is that of "Abba" the image of nurturing-fathering love, of the father, 
on whom Jesus depended throughout his life and ministry. Perhaps it is 
in the vision that Shea weaves from life as lived in the light of the 
creation story, that we have the clearest expression of how dependent on 
Mystery we are. The creation story is one of holiness--the holiness 
that pervades all creation. Creation can delight in itself because it 
is dependent on God's intention for it. Creation, human beings 
included, has dignity, a dignity conferred on it by God's presence to 
it. This dignity is an expression of the meaning God has given to 
creation. The experience of being dependent is brought home to one on 
every occasion one senses or knows oneself as related to the larger 
context within which one moves and has being. However, warns Shea, 
dependence is not an absolute--except dependence on Mystery itself. He 
sets boundaries around the dependence a person may have with another, or 
with a thing, when he begins to talk of the strategies of the-"panicked 
heart," especially when these strategies take the track of "envy." This 
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"heart" follows the track of "self-beautification." It fawns; it tries 
to please in every respect. The person falls into the trap of idolatry, 
which leads to self-deception, and ends up in oppressing others. 
It is part of our Freudian legacy that talk of being dependent 
is likely to arouse a certain uneasiness in us. People have found 
Freud's penetrating analysis of the relationship between dependency and 
neurosis so persuasive, that a person who speaks of any kind of 
dependency--especially one that has the blessing of religion--is likely 
to meet with severe suspicion, if not hostility. We are much more at 
ease talking of people being independent, coming of age, and 
responsible. Yet there is a fundamental truth about human existence 
stated in what Shea--and in this he joins a long line of theologians 
back to Augustine, who see creaturely dependence as a central character 
of the human person as the homo reliliiosus--has to say about the 
experience of being dependent. As we come to understand more about how 
the human person's journey through life and the developmental processes 
involved in this journey, we can assess dependency in a very different 
light from that of Freud. 
Our study of Mahler and Bowlby have revealed that it is 
completely normative for the child to begin life in an utterly dependent 
condition. In this context, the meaning of dependency is colored by 
what these ·researchers have to say about attachment, and the intense 
emotional bond that develops between the child and mother. By virtue of 
its immature state at birth, and for many months thereafter, the neonate 
depends on the ministrations of others. It is not merely the physical 
needs of the child that are satisfied by the nurturing mother, but more 
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importantly the person's psychic structures begin to form during this 
period, thanks to what Kohut refers to as "transmuting internali-
zations." In Mahler's words "the child is at first absolutely and 
remains later on, 'even to the grave,' relatively dependent on the 
mother." From her perspective, Mahler defines dependence in this way: 
"the need each human has, whether child, adolescent, or adult, for a 
libidinal object relation in order to ensure his· optimal psychic 
functioning" (quoted by McDargh, 1983, p. 84). In the case of the 
infant, dependence facilitates an important series of developmental 
increments: we saw that the child's dependence on the mothering figure 
draws him out of the tendency to autistically regress, into relationship 
with external reality (the mother herself); moreover, the memories of 
the experiences of being touched, while still utterly dependent on the 
mother, lead to "personalization," in Winnicott's term: the child's 
psyche becomes grounded in the body. When it comes to optimal psychic 
functioning in the adult we have to remember something that we said was 
the enduring part of the Freudian legacy: 
the way a person relates in the external world, is determined by the 
intrapsychic structures, or object relations, that he or she has 
developed. These structures are the residue of the person's 
relationships with those in his or her environment, who in the days 
of infant-dependence, and early stages of maturation, nurtured and 
cared for him or her. (p. 93, above) 
So our dependence as adults extends not only to those who are our 
friends, lovers, nurturing figures in the present, but those 
relationships from the past, which, leaving behind an internal set of 
object and self-representations, preserves a sense of continuity and 
"inner-sustainment." In McDargh's view, it is this inner-sustainment 
which enables us to accept the fact that we can never evade our 
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indebtedness to help that comes from the world outside us, and which 
impresses upon us the inevitability of the never-satisfied need we have 
of the love and acceptance of others. Dependence is an all-pervasive, 
but empowering reality in our lives. Thus, when Shea speaks to us of 
faith as involving dependence, he is touching, psychologically speaking, 
upon the inner sustainment which makes it possible for us to enjoy 
mature dependence, on other human beings certainly, but on Mystery, as 
well. 
P~rhaps we need to acknowledge that there is a continuum of age 
and condition-appropriate dependence--rather than a polarity of 
dependence/independence. During the autistic and symbiotic phases it is 
normative that the child emit attachment and "proximity-seeking" 
behaviors. But on a schedule, dictated by the security or insecurity of 
the child's attachment to the nurturer(s), a process of internalization 
begins, in the child, whereby he or she is capable of maintaining a 
sense of well-being and relatedness, even when the caretaker(s), is not 
present. This is what we have seen occurs with the attainment of object 
constancy. With the attainment of object constancy, the child no longer 
has to depend in a total way, on external figures for the sense of his 
own goodness and that of the world--he now carries within the capacity 
to not only self-soothe, but to affirm to himself, his own goodness and 
that of the world. 
The Object Relations view of healthy development helps us 
challenge, what in some contexts, frequently passes for the height of 
maturity. I am referring to that view which holds that total 
independence is the essence of maturity. But the mishaps that can occur 
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in the individuation-separation process warns us against accepting the 
apparent, clear-as~day-truth of that position. Poor nurturing, or over-
demanding nurturing can leave a person with an intolerable sense of 
weakness and vulnerability, in which the self is continually at risk. A 
lack of the sense that one can depend on caretakers, and on the world at 
large, for "goodness," may lead an individual to adopt what we have seen 
Melanie Klein term "a schizoid position." One develops a sense of self-
reliance and self-sufficiency that is a defense against the inhospitable 
nature of the environment. In this case, all need for love and support 
from those (or that) beyond the person is denied, and all dependence is 
suppressed. 
Time after time, John Shea insists on the primacy of the 
relational, and of our dependence on a greater reality. Once again 
there is a convergence of viewpoint between the theological an 
psychological disciplines. Both of t~em share a negative judgment of 
the assertions of the independence and adequacy of the self-made 
individual, as well as off the "implacable generosity of the relentless 
altruist who never seems to need or ask anything for him/herself" 
(McDargh, 1983, p. 87). Both the rugged individualist and the 
relentless altruist are touched by a quality of unfaith that looks on 
the world as hostile and threatening to that part of themselves which 
wants to acknowledge need, and which searches for relationship. 
The admission of dependence would be an invitation to reexperience 
disappointment and betrayal. To push the matter to its most radical 
point, perhaps to admit ultimate need, one that exceeds the 
resources of any finite source of strength and love, would be to 
risk ultimate frustration. (p. 87) 
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a_Pause for Orientation 
At this point I have completed an expansion of the first part of 
the definition of faith that I gave earlier. I have attempted to show 
how Object Relations Theory helps us see the implications of saying that 
faith is a dynamic of human knowing, that is the foundational for the 
shaping of a humanly meaningful environment. We now turn to the second 
part of the definition: that faith finds its completion in an ever-
growing capacity for self-affirmation, mutuality and compassion. As we 
have seen, this definition is largely inspired by our review of John 
Shea's theology. If we try to translate the theological language into a 
psychological register, then the fullness of faith development is 
reflected in the capacity for intimate, mature, mutual, loving 
relationships and self-commitment. This is what is involved in doing 
the "truth" that one knows. This loving will take many different shapes 
throughout a person's lifetime. I may be in the form of a child's first 
love affair with the primary caregiver, or that of a preschooler for her 
chum, or in adult life, the meeting with a stranger who is transformed 
into a lover or a spouse, or may be in the support and compassion 
offered to a neighbor. But given the fact that knowing in a "full" way 
is often very difficult--Shea's account of the envious and rejected 
heart reminds us of the possibilities of "missing the mark"--it is no 
wonder that doing the loving thing is often a test for even the greatest 
of heroes. Mature loving calls for resources as great as those which 
sustain a person in carrying the burden of solitude or coping with 
dependence. John McDargh comments in this respect: "In loving someone 
we make ourselves vulnerable to the first and gravest threat to the 
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integrity of the self--being bereft, abandoned, or disappointed by the 
loved one(s)" (McDargh, 1983, p. 90). Every time we love, there is a 
real possibility that the trauma associated with earlier experiences of 
living and leaving or loving and losing will be reawakened. But the 
reverse side of that scenario is no less true. All past love 
experiences in a person's life have been instances of profound knowing, 
of contact with reality, of encounters with Mystery. Experiences of 
caring, nurturing and mutuality, and the psychic residues they leave, 
are psychological resources a person has, to call on every time the 
invitation to engage in a living encounter is given in the present. 
Mutuality, compassion and mature loving, are both the goal of faith, and 
the source of the development which eventually empowers an individual to 
receive and to give love. 
Just as we spoke of the notion of faith as foundational for the 
shaping of a humanly meaningful environment into five distinct, though 
related aspects, so now it may prove helpful to analyze the capacity for 
love, self-affirmation and compassion into two component parts, chosen 
because of their relevance to faith as a dynamic process (1) faith and 
the capacity to overcome splitting, or the rejected heart and (2) faith 
and the development of the capacity to give oneself. 
Faith and the Capacity to Overcome 
Splitting or the Rejected Heart 
As we saw in Chapter I, Jack Shea describes in powerful imagery, 
the rejected heart and its two pronged strategies. With the first 
prong, the rejected heart stabs at everything and everybody around it: 
it sees everything in its devalued form--for it, sexual love can only be 
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lust, dedication must be guilt; reason becomes rationalization and 
neighborliness can only be egoism. In other words, it projects badness 
and evil all around. Freud noticed the same phenomena, and, at least 
towards the end of his life, spoke of Thanatos to explain it. With its 
second prong, the rejected heart gnaws away at the integrity of its own 
inner core. It is self-loathing. It deems itself unworthy of love from 
anyone or anything, Poignantly Shea concludes, "it makes its home in 
places where life is perishing" (1983, p. 157). 
In these passages Shea is dealing in theological terms with a 
phenomenon the Object Relations Theorists deal with in terms of 
splitting. Shea, at this point in his reflections, does not make 
mention of the fact that the very people or things that are hated, are, 
at the same time, the very people and things the individual longs for 
and loves. What is hated is loved; what is bad is good and good is bad. 
Ambivalence is everywhere. As I indicated a moment ago, when Freud met 
these data in experience he proposed an instinct theory, a dual instinct 
theory to account for them; alongside Thanatos, the aggressive drive, he 
enthroned Eros, the libinal drive. Object Relation Theorists see a 
different solution--these affects are not only resident in people, but 
they are also factors that are experienced in their interpersonal 
relationships. 
In our review of the work of Mahler and others, we have 
repeatedly seen that it is normative that the caretaker frustrate the 
wishes of the infant. This happens even in the optimal case. In the 
less than ideal cases the frustration level is higher. From the baby's 
perspective there is the alternation between satisfaction and 
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frustration, between pleasure and goodness on the one hand and between 
discomfort and rage against the parent, on the other. The. question then 
is: what does the child do with these conflicting affects? We have not 
treated this issue in any depth, previously. We hypothesize the answer 
that the child either "projects," and thereby locates the undesirable 
affects in the external world, or he "introjects," whereby he takes in 
those aspects of the interpersonal world that are associated with what 
is good and satisfying. Thus for example the child preserves the 
goodness of the mother by projecting both hatred and love, goodness and 
badness. Insofar as his experience is concerned, the "hated" mother is 
a different object from that of the "loved mother." The child, in other 
words has recourse to the defense of splitting. 
Almost as though there were two separate and unconnected figures in 
the universe, the child identifies as good the parental 
representations associated with the memory of the satisfaction of 
the need for closeness, acceptance, nurturance and the alleviation 
of anxiety; and as bad those representations linked to the tension 
of unfilled needs. (McDargh, 1983, p. 94) 
As a child matures under normal conditions, he or she gradually comes to 
recognize the "bad" bother and the "good" mother as a single figure--he 
recognizes that she is sometimes frustrating and sometimes satisfying. 
The child relates to a "whole" object. As we would expect from what we 
saw in Chapter II, as object representations change, so do self-
representations. Thus, as the child develops a "whole" representation 
of the mother, so she develops a "whole" self-representation, and 
recognizes that she is capable of both love and hate, love and 
aggression. It is helpful to recall what Melanie Klein suggested about 
the problems the child finds herself in, as she tries to work.out her 
relationships with the world. Klein proposed that the child, at various 
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times, finds herself in one of three "positions": the schizoid, the 
paranoid, or the depressive position. 
In the schizoid position the infant is withdrawn from object 
relations. In the paranoid position, the infant is in relationship, 
but feels persecuted by his objects. In the depressive position he 
has overcome these difficulties and has become able to enter more 
fully into whole object relationships, only to be exposed to iY.i.14 
and depression over the discovery that he can hurt those he has 
become capable of loving. (Guntrip, 1971, p. 61) 
There are two things in this quotation that are especially 
noteworthy for our purposes: (1) Klein is saying that the child has 
become capable of loving and (2) that this loving is associated with 
guilt and depression. In the "depressive position," the child needs to 
make reparation for the injury that she perceives her anger as having 
caused the parent. Here, Object Relations Theorists propose, is the 
starting point of the capacity for mutual role taking and for empathy. 
The drift of my argument at this point is, that we have, at a 
very early age, an orientation to look on ourselves as loving and loved 
creatures, who are at home in the universe and intimately connected with 
it. We assume that the universe is kindly disposed towards us and 
welcomes our initiatives. But from the beginning, before we have had 
the time to form even a primitive series of affects about our world, we 
come up against the unyielding character of reality, and this eventually 
arouses conflicting feelings within: love and rage. Introjection, 
projection and splitting are only three members of a defensive arsenal 
we form to help sustain a hopeful perception of the universe, and of 
ourselves as lovable. Rizzuto documents the result of the defensive 
maneuvers we make. She tells us that after we repress object-
representation, we repress self-representation and we "experience 
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loneliness, emptiness, a fear of losing oneself, a feeling of being 
abandoned." I want to suggest that faith is a kind of antidote against 
the distortions caused by all the defensive maneuvers we make. Faith 
can be such, because as we have seen, it breaks the tyranny of the sense 
perception, it frees the imagination, gives birth to symbol, and allows 
the individual to give meaning to events and circumstances. Faith can 
help a person, ·not to get rid of all projections and introjections, but 
to mitigate these defenses against the ambivalence that splitting gives 
rise to. Faith teaches one to restrain one's polarization of the world 
and self as all good and all bad in order to preserve a sense of self as 
lovable and the world as a loving place. 
Let us take an example to illustrate what I mean. A family is 
celebrating the second birthday of their child. Grandmother is present 
at the party. Midway through the afternoon they run out of pop. 
Grandmother offers to go to get some. She goes out, starts her car, but 
fails to see her grandson follows her. She reverses the car, runs over 
her grandson, and kills him Many weeks later, and each day, she sits in 
her sitting room, holding a cross in her hand, rocking gently over and 
back, as she says "My God, you love me, I know you do, I trust you, help 
me to go on." The cross, for this woman, functions as a transitional 
object; holding it in her hands, she enters into transitional 
experience, and is no longer tied down by the brute, hard facts of the 
situation. The cross frees her imagination as well as her cognitive 
functions. Her situation is reshaped in such a way that she senses that 
she can trust that Love, or God, is present even in this horror, in the 
guilt and shame, in the loneliness and suffering that she feels. 
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Because she can experience the situation in this way, give it meaning in 
the light of the symbol of the cross, she does not have to judge herself 
as all bad because of what happened, or bitterly recriminate against her 
daughter for not watching her child better. She can tolerate the 
badness and the goodness present in both herself and in external 
reality. She can know the "whole" and this knowledge overcomes the 
ambivalence she feels, supports mature self-love as well as other-love, 
and promotes genuine intimacy with her family. 
A person who knows in this manner, whose faith is like this, 
realizes that most of the attachments he forms throughout his lifetime 
are, at their best, less than the idealizations he makes of them, and at 
their worst, better than the severity of his judgments would paint them 
to be. Such a person knows his own lovableness and value in spite of 
the failures that might encourage self-devaluation. Despite his non-
attainment of the lofty ideals and expectations he places on himself, he 
is good, and more adequate than his worst fears would have him believe. 
Faith describes an underlying assurance of goodness and possibility 
that supports an awareness that the world as the object of my love 
and attention is imperfect, fallible, frustrating, and yet, 
confounding of all my efforts to divide it into good and bad, 
acceptable and unacceptable, us and them, mine and yours. (McDargh, 
1983, p. 95) 
Faith as Empowerment for Radical 
Self-Giving and Compassion 
The touchstone of the importance of Jesus for John Shea is found 
in the answer to the question "Is contact with the graciousness of 
Mystery possible for us today, through Jesus of Nazareth?" While his 
answer to that question is in the affirmative, all is not light. The 
ambiguity of the situation we find ourselves in is due to the fact that 
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Jesus is absent; that contact with him depends on our hearing and 
telling the stories about him in the context of being in the presence of 
other people. People who gather to hear, tell, and celebrate the Jesus 
stories, are often led to a startling discovery: that what happened in 
the lives of the men and women who encountered Jesus in the flesh, 
continues to happen in their lives right now--their hope is rekindled, 
they experience an expansion of conscious, undergo "metanoia," and 
deepen their fellowship and commitment to one another. The passion of 
Mystery, for the well-being of all reality becomes their passion too. -
In the shorthand of the Christian tradition, they discover that Jesus 
lives among them. To account for this experience of absence which is 
really presence, they say that the Spirit of Jesus is among them. 
More than any other circumstance of the life of Jesus, it is the 
cross and the stories it has generated, that reveal Mystery's 
graciousness and compassion to Jesus, and through him, to all human 
beings. It is the cross that rivets the attention of Christians. The 
images associated with it, powerfully attract the human imagination. 
They excite attitudes and values that govern behavior. While the cross 
proclaims Mystery's sustaining presence to human beings even in the 
direst of circumstances, it no less eloquently speaks of Jesus' total 
response and commitment both to his Father and to the well-being of his 
fellow human beings: the cross is Mystery's finest statement, and 
example of compassionate service and creative empowerment for others. 
Shea speaks of the cross doing three things for Christians: it grounds 
the Christian community, it is the symbol of its realism and an on-
going principle of critique (Shea,. 1978, pp. 157-60). As a symbol of 
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realism it is a reminder that responsible caring for others will entail 
risk and suffering. As a principle of critique the Cross states that 
while Jesus came, and in the Spirit still comes, to establish a genuine, 
nurturing human community, the machinations of self-protecting fear can 
never be underestimated. God on the cross speaks of his total 
opposition to "the facile wisdom that power is for control and muscle 
makes community" (1978, p. 160). God on the Cross unmasks the use of 
abusive power as a fear of life. It is perhaps the first function of 
the cross--as grounding the Christian community--that is of most 
relevance to our concern here. The cross clearly reveals God's self-
giving love, which liberates us from egoism and exploitation of others. 
Since we have handed ourselves over to God and received ourselves back 
from him, entrusted with his cause, we are empowered to belong to each 
other in a life-giving manner. The God in Jesus has taken the worst 
that humans can do into himself and has turned it toward the good. 
The law of the cross is not that evil has been eliminated but that 
it has been transformed into possibility. The power of sin and 
suffering which generated the anti-community styles of domination 
and manipulation and deceit have been broken. If we dwell with the 
cross of Christ, the compulsion to protect ourselves at all costs 
yield to the possibilities of dialogue, respect and integrity. The 
funding experience which makes Christian Community possible is God 
on the Cross. (1978, p. 158) 
A psychological analysis of what is involved in loving, 
nurturing, intimacy and compassion, offers us important insights into 
the humanside of the loving, respectful, holy (in the sense of 
dignified), service to which the Gospel calls all people. Psychology 
can help illumine the process by which people are led to commit 
themselves to the radical life of loving that is symbolized by the 
cross. What seems to be the case is that the capacity to be mutual in 
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one's relationships, to be compassionate and available for service has 
its source in the experience of fullness and completion of satisfying 
primary relationships. We are back at a point we have made on several 
occasions: where one has a history of satisfying object and self-
representations, then one has a capacity for more comprehensive, more 
profound, and continuous sharing and compassionate engagement with 
others. 
It seems reasonable to hold that the same conditions which 
induce a person to withdraw from human intimacy and to avoid taking risk 
in caring for others, are also at work in the resistances that same 
individual offers to an approach of love from Mystery or God. To the 
degree that an individual has experienced deprivation or neglect, whose 
self and object representations are negative, to that degree we can 
expect reluctance to enter the world of the Christian story of the Cross 
and to develop a lifestyle that is characterized by acknowledgment of 
the dignity of others and a commitment to them in a nurturing and caring 
way. Without the ability to sustain a sense of one's own reality, of 
the reality of the external world, without the ability to self-soothe--
which presuppos~s the internalizations of satisfying functions performed 
by another for the individual, initially--then part of the person must 
always be held back, there cannot be total commitment to the welfare of 
another or others. Wholehearted giving for such a person would pose a 
grave threat to her sense of self and well-being. All this suggests 
that the prerequisite for authentic mutual loving and compassion is the 
prior experience(s) of receiving care and compassion oneself--it is out 
of a "fullness" that compassion flows. 
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I am not suggesting that Mystery's approach to human beings is 
curtailed by the psychological traumas a person may have experienced--
as we have seen the cross is the symbol of Mystery's intense presence in 
suffering contexts--what I am saying however, is that the person's 
ability to receive Mystery's approach as gracious, and to respond to It, 
as well as to translate his or her experience of Mystery into concrete, 
caring strategies, may well be limited. 
From a theological perspective, it is totally fitting to suggest 
that the encounter with Mystery is therapeutic, that Mystery functions 
as a kind of self-object that holds, mirrors, affirms the individual and 
invites identification to the degree that he or she can form health-
promoting ideals. Granted this, it remains true that, psychologically, 
it is difficult for someone whose self and object representations are 
negative, or threatening, to be compassionate, to serve and love after 
the manner of Jesus going to the cross. 
John Shea offers an insight that throws a slightly different 
light on this issue. As he often repeats, it is in and through our 
immediate environments that we encounter Mystery, but the fact is that 
these immediate environments are often hostile and ambiguous. In that 
case, Mystery's intentions towards us are perceived as inimical or 
indifferent. Once a person makes such a discernment, then he or she 
must bring himself or herself into conformity with It, has to live out 
of that indifference. We "do not twist the Mystery to graciousness for 
personal benefits" (1980, p. 65). For such a person, the truth about 
himself or herself is found in the constant presence of fear and anxiety 
and the moments of graciousness and harmony are ultimately deception. 
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If, on the other hand, the relationship to Mystery is truly gracious, 
the effort is to move with graciousness, even though one may want to act 
indifferently. 
Once again, I think we can see a convergence between the 
psychological and the theological perspectives. Rizzuto has shown us 
how the Image of God that we create, is totally bound up with the self 
and object images that we have formed. To have a representation of God 
which is gracious and benign, implies that one's self-image is positive. 
This in turn depends on the "good-enough" mirroring, holding and 
nurturing that an individual has received. To be gifted with a positive 
God-representation implies that an individual has the resources to 
pursue the on-going task of self-integration, and of confirming one's 
relationship with self-objects--people and things. The contribution of 
Object Relations makes it perfectly understandable that a person whose 
image of Mystery is negative, will be unable to pursue either self-
integration or creative, healing activity in his or her world: the 
accompanying self and object images or representations means that the 
person has to busy himself or herself in the task of self-defense. 
Let us examine both of these scenarios--of the healthy and less 
healthy person--and seek to understand further dimensions of the 
dynamics, from both a theological and psychological viewpoint, which 
ground radical self-giving and compassion. We will take the case of the 
healthy person first. For Shea, behaviors flow from values and 
attitudes, which in turn are shaped by images, which are part of the 
legacy bequeathed by stories which are ways of explicitating the nature 
of the gracious relationship with Mystery, grasped in the moment of 
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knowing it. We have seen how the great Judea-Christian images of rescue 
and covenant, judgment and apocalypse, of resurrection and parousia, all 
come together, to weave stories of hope and justice, which are the 
source of the horizons which shape human worlds of justice and 
compassion, respect and solidarity; we have seen how images of creation 
and incarnation, Spirit and Church, unfold into behavior patterns, which 
speak of equality and respect. I perceive a convergence between this 
point of view, and Object Relations, at the point where the latter talk 
about the qualities of the healthy self (cf. p. 147, above). When the 
self develops into a healthy, cohesive self he or she enjoys a healthy 
level of self-esteem, such healthy esteem expresses itself through a set 
of goals and values, which in turn guide the person's use of his or her 
autonomous ego-functions. Healthy self-esteem is the source of the 
values which urge a compassionate reaching out to others, and sustains 
the ability for mutuality in intimate relations. 
Then, there is the case of the person who has been traumatized, 
who has experienced either serious or even mild and intermittent failure 
in the care offered by important others in his or her life. Elaborate 
classifications have been made of the disorders that result when a 
person's self has not been able to develop satisfactorily. Clinicians 
speak of psychotic conditions, borderline personality disorders, 
narcissistic behavior disorders, narcissistic personality disorders as 
well as of psychoneuroses. A clinical description of these conditions 
is not necessary for our purposes here. It suffices, just to refer to 
some of the behavior-patterns of people, who have not a cohesive sense 
of self. I use the description of these behavior patterns given by E. 
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s. Wolf (1988, p. 73). In the case of people who have a Mirror Hungry 
~rsonality, they like to display themselves to attract the attention of 
others, and in the attention they get, they find the counterbalance of 
the worthlessness they feel. People whose personality is what Wolf 
calls the Ideal ttungry Personality can only experience self-esteem if 
they have someone to whom they look up. Any impugning of the ideal 
leads to fragmentation of the self. If one has an Alter-Ego Hungry 
fersonality then one needs confirmation through association with another 
self whose opinions, values and appearance one shares. Some peoples' 
behavior is intended to give them the experience of merger with another 
and thus to control the other. Often the need to control is experienced 
by the other as a feeling of being oppressed, because the hungry person 
cannot bear the other's independence or separation. Such is the 
behavior pattern of the Merger Hungry fersonality. Finally there is the 
Contact Sbunning fersonality. The symptoms in this behavior pattern are 
the strategies the person employs to keep others at a distance, even at 
the moment when they experience an intense need for contact. Wolf 
mentions two constellations of behaviors--the schizoid and the paranoid. 
There are certain in-built dangers in the efforts such people 
make to appropriate the story of the Cross, in particular. Above, we 
said that the cross liberates us from egoism, and that it reminds us 
that care for others entails risk and suffering. If these two functions 
of the cross are not balanced by the third function, that of critique, 
whereby each person is attuned to the particular ways in which he or she 
falls a victim to fear and anxiety, then a form of life may evolve that 
is anything but Christian: often a perverse lifestyle is dressed up in 
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Christian clothing. Behaviors as diverse as aggression and humiliating, 
shame-provoking unassertiveness--to which people with the "hungry" 
personalities, may well be addicted--are interpreted as the cost 
involved in "carrying the cross," and the highest expression of "self-
sacrificing love." Shea, as usual, graphically puts it thus: "Asking 
people to stretch their skins is one thing, asking them to leave their 
skins behind is another" (1984, p. 160). He documents the terrible ways 
that love goes wrong. One of its most soul-destroying forms is that of 
identification, when the lover becomes the beloved, when the self is 
lost in the other. "This total love-alchemy, turning into another does 
not respect the non-fluidity of the self and definite 'not-me-ness' of 
all other people" (p. 175). 
There are antidotes to such perversions. First, let the 
theologian say how an abusive spirituality of the cross may be avoided. 
Beyond recourse to the critical function of the cross itself, mentioned 
above, there is a further remedy: tell the Story of the Cross within 
the Story of Creation and Incarnation--as John Shea does. These 
stories, as we have seen, are the celebration of God's delight--and 
ours--in the goodness of all there is, and its readiness to receive and 
bear God's presence. Such being the case, one can use the category of 
"dignity" as the means of regulating one's encounter with, and 
appreciation of, the whole of reality--which includes the person's own 
self. As I wrote earlier, 
dignity is the basis of meaning, which Shea proposes, is found when 
each person senses, and knows, that he or she is related to the 
larger context within which he or she moves. Once the meaning of 
one's life is grasped a deeper question emerges: "Do I have worth?" 
... God's sabbath presence speaks of that worth too. (pp. 66-67, 
above) 
222 
If a person inhabits this world shaped by the Story of the Cross within 
the Story of Creation and Incarnation, then his or her life is peopled 
by images which form attitudes, which in turn prompt concrete strategies 
in a lifestyle that is aptly characterized as one of "trust and 
freedom." When we try to interpret this in Object Relations terms, we 
are sent back to a suggestion that Rizzuto makes, which we dealt with in 
Chapter III. There we saw her looking to the characters, the heroes and 
heroines of the religious stories, as complementary or alternative 
models to one's family or friends (who, as we know are the source of our. 
object representations, and as such impact our self and God 
representations). These figures may become people with whom we wish to 
identify, and in the identification with them, have our worth validated. 
Moreover, as I have said elsewhere, the stories may function as 
transitional objects, facilitating transitional experience. In this 
case, the characters may function as a kind of "self-object" which holds 
the self, empowering it to face life's terror, and to achieve a sense of 
its own cohesiveness which experiences, simultaneously, both the fact of 
separation and secure attachment to another. When the self is in this 
situation, then it can reach out to others in radical self-giving and 
compassion. 
Self-Sacrifice and Egual Regard 
Self-sacrifice may well be something extremely unhealthy and 
anti-Christian--such is the position we have outlined above. Is there 
then, no place at all for self-sacrifice, in the world of the person 
with a cohesive self, who reads the stories of the Cross in a-healthy 
way? In the storied-world of creation-incarnation-cross, interpersonal 
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relationships are expressions of the equality, mutuality and liberating 
service to which one is committed. Spontaneously, we want to find a 
place for self-sacrifice in this world. Shea states it plainly: 
"Christian love demands a sacrifice" (1975, p. 172). He turns to the 
Christological Hymn of Phil. 2:5ff., and focuses in on the verse which 
reads: "Yet he did not cling to his equality with God." Thus, he 
concludes, the true nature of divinity is the outward movement towards 
all reality. A god who would stand on his privileges at all costs, is a 
false god. Such a god "has subordinated his true selfhood to his ego," 
which is the self determined to protect itself from suffering and 
anxiety. 
Only when the ego is dissolved can the self move outward in genuine 
presence to the other. With this understanding, kenosis, the self-
emptying of God, is also paradoxically his self-becoming. 
If the love of God dissolved the ego and expanded the self to 
include humankind, the Christian is urged to participate in the same 
dynamic. (p. 173) 
Shea has raised an important issue here, but I find his solution vague. 
The only thing to be sacrificed is the ego, the self in its fearful, 
protective aspects. I turn at this point to the work of Louis Janssens 
who has recovered an important part of the Christian tradition and who 
helps us deal more adequately with the issue of how we should consider 
self-sacrifice. For Janssens, self-sacrifice is not the ideal of the 
Christian life, as so much of the tradition would have it. Shea would 
have no disagreement with this. Next, Janssens launches a new line of 
reflection, as in this quotation: "In short, self-sacrifice is not the 
quintessence of love .... Self-sacrifice is justified derivatively 
from other-regard" (quoted by Browning, 1988, p. 152). By other-
regard, Janssens means a regard for the other that is rooted in the 
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dignity, equality, and mutuality that are part of the world, which in 
Shea's terms, is shaped by the story of the Cross told within the story 
of Creation and Incarnation. Then, continues Janssens: 
In accord with the impartiality of ~. we maintain that one is to 
have equal regard for self and others, since the reason for valuing 
the self are identical with those for valuing others, namely that 
everyone is a human being .... Valuing the self, as well as others 
remains a manifest obligation. (Quoted by Browning, p. 151) 
Commenting on Janssens, Browning goes on to conclude that we must regard 
and love the neighbor equally as ourselves, and we must do this, even if 
the neighbor does not reciprocate our regard and love, or actively works 
against us. When we do this, it is not because such loving is an end in 
itself, but because it is part of the fundamental obligation of 
mutuality and equal regard for the self and neighbor. 
As long as human beings live in a world of finitude and sin, perfect 
mutuality will not prevail within the context of human affairs. 
There will always be unbalance, inequality and injustice. The 
Christian concept of ~. does entail an active, self-giving, 
self-sacrificial effort to restore mutuality, when it has broken 
down .... Christians should do this [be self-sacrificing] not as 
an end in itself, but as a transition to the restoration and 
maintenance of true equal-regard and mutuality. (pp. 152-53) 
There is need to add a few clarifications to this. The impartiality of 
self-love and other regard demands that we must be quite clear on the 
distinction between meeting the other's needs and submitting to 
exploitation by the other. Exploitation is to be opposed because it 
turns a person into an object and robs him or her of dignity. Moreover 
we must resist exploitation not only in the name of our own dignity, but 
for the sake of the other as well (p. 153). 
We have seen how Object Relations Theorists have an interest in 
fragmentation of the self, and the conditions which result from this, 
which I have suggested are the psychological concomitants of the rather 
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sickly spirituality and theology of suffering that is sometimes peddled 
under the banner of "Christian." A world created in tune with the 
stories and images generated by the telling of the Crucifixion story 
within the context of the Creation and Incarnation, has many affinities 
with the world which clinicians, working out of Object Relations Theory, 
hope to encourage. In both these worlds, people interact with firm 
boundaries drawn around their own self, yet not inflexibly so. Neither 
the rugged individualist, nor the relentless altruist, is the most 
honored and welcomed citizen of this world--except insofar as they are 
invited to grow strong so that neither fear nor anxiety tears them 
apart. In both these worlds, it is the quality of the interpersonal, 
mutual relationships that provide the healing environment, wherein the 
fragmented self (Object Relations) or the rejected heart (Shea) can 
begin the process towards integration or healing. 
Depth Metaphors and Obli~ation 
Both as one reads, and talks with, John Shea, one is struck by 
his passion and concern for dealing with the present circumstances of 
the concrete, flesh and blood people who are part of his world. It is 
the successes and failures, the joys and anxieties, loves and fears of 
the present that are the raw data to which he brings the Stories, images 
and values of the Christian tradition, in order to create meaning and to 
empower people to transcend their present horizons. Yes, human beings 
can transcend the environments--of self, family, society, nature and 
cosmos--to which each person is so intim~tely related, and which, at the 
same time, powerfully shape the lives of every living, feeling and 
knowing human being. Out of this transcendence, flows a future for each 
226 
person, whose contours, as a result of the stories they tell, consists 
of trust, freedom, hope and justice. 
On the other hand, Object Relations Theorists, have a sensitive 
concern for the past, or better how the past, in the form of the living, 
emotionally charged representations of parents, early caregivers, 
siblings and of many significant childhood possessions, continues to 
survive, and exert influence in the present. 
I first became aware of these two perspectives while studying 
Shea's theology and Object Relations Theory. Later, I discovered that 
Don Browning generalizes this insight. He argues that it is the task of 
theology to look forward, to think "prospectively" and to outline life's 
goals. He sees the tasks of clinical psychology as very different. Its 
genius is to be able to think "retrospectively" and to help us 
understand the key connections between biology, familial and social 
influences, and the formation of the self 
Theology has few concepts to assist in this retrospective analysis. 
With the advent of the clinical psychologies with their special 
languages to accomplish this task, we have a remarkable opportunity 
to forge new disciplinary alliances which will help provide both 
powerful procedures for retrospective analysis and powerful 
normative and prospective images of human fulfillment. (1988, p. 
11) 
It is my hope that the present chapter has already illustrated how one 
particular modern psychology can reinforce and expand a modern 
theological enterprise. There is another set of questions that come to 
mind as we work with these two disciplines. Now it is time to put the 
shoe on the other foot, as it were, and to scrutinize the psychology in 
the light of the theology. There are questions that need to be asked of 
the psychology. Is it a pure science? Where does its metaphors of 
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ultimacy cross the boundaries of pure science? At what point does it 
stop being purely concerned with health issues and become prescriptive? 
Can we describe the characteristics of this ethical view, its ethical 
principles--its deontology--and its ideals of the virtuous life--its 
aretaic preferences? What has theology to say about this ethics and its 
funding depth metaphors which function as world creating images? 
Theology, which is self-reflectively the carrier of a particular 
world view and accompanying ethical values is entitled to engage 
psychology, which is much less aware of the ethical and/or "religious" 
(in the sense of ultimate, world-creating) b~ggage it implies. 
Psychologists have been known to protest their innocence of either the 
intention, or the fact, of crossing over the boundaries of "pure 
science" into the domains of ethics, religion and philosophy. Their 
protests are not always convincing. We turn now to the task of 
delimiting the ethics that may be carried by Object Relations Theory and 
practice. We will critique it with the ethics that we have seen are 
congenial to the theology of John Shea. 
It is fair to say that Object Relations Theory gives a clear 
view of what its practitioners think human fulfillment is. Fulfillment 
is found in healthy existence and living. Health is the fruit of the 
formation of an integrated or cohesive self. I follow the lead taken by 
Don Browning--speaking of Kohut--(1988; p. 221) and use an Eriksonian 
term, generativity, as a description of the meaning of health, for the 
Object Relations "school." For them, the basic crit~rion of health is 
"a relatively nonconflictual capacity to care for the succeeding 
generations" (p. 221). In Mahler, this criterion is met in the picture 
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she draws of the mother who enters the "species specific symbiosis" in 
order to provide for the survival of the child (1975, p. 77). The 
mother's capacities are fine-tuned to meet the deficits of the infant's 
own abilities. Winnicott's parental functions of holding, mirroring, 
and object realizing (cf. pp. 100, 128 above) are further aspects of 
this fit between mother and child, that is the sin gua non condition for 
health. Recall that the experiences generated in "good-enough-
mothering" influence the person, throughout the life-cycle, since they 
become part of the primary representations of self and object that for 
the person's core self. So we are talking here of health throughout the 
life-span and not merely in childhood. Object Relations practitioners 
have thus developed their criterion of health, and as such, observation 
and repeated testing can show whether this criterion is adequate or not. 
But the issue here for us, is whether these people move to making this 
health-criterion a statement of the goal of life, including its 
psychobiological dimensions. Do they move from the isness of health to 
the ou&htness of obligation? I suggest that Winnicott is certainly one 
who does. His view is that the phenomenon that he has called "primary 
maternal preoccupation" (p. 100, above) "gives the mother the ability to 
do the right thing. She knows what the baby could be feeling like. No 
one else does" (1960, p. 15). He wrote an article on Advisin~ Parents, 
and the message to doctors and nurses was "don't" or tread like angels 
if you do! It is much safer to rely on the mother's instincts as these 
come from her "primary maternal preoccupation." A clear statement of 
how the health criterion becomes an ethical statement. Without being 
able to prove conclusively that other Object Relations practitioners do 
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the same thing, I suspect they do. For instance their clinical goals of 
providing an empathic, caring environment, in order to provide the 
client with the opportunity to reexperience the early stages of 
development, and thus integrate the split or repressed parts of the ego, 
certainly points in this direction. 
We have used the Eriksonian word "generative" to describe what 
Object Relations Theorists propose as a criterion of health and as an 
ethical imperative. In its original context generative means, not 
simply the ability to create, but the capacity to care for what one· 
creates. Erikson's own words are that care "is the widening concern for 
what has been generated, by love necessity or accident; it overcomes the 
ambivalence adhering to irreversible obligation" (quoted by Browning, 
1988, p. 222). Showing his reluctance to depart from his Freudian 
psychobiological legacy, Erikson.maintains that there is an instinctual 
basis for generativity: "[Both animals and humans] instinctively 
encourage in their young what is ready for release" (quoted from 
Identity. Youth and Crisis, in Browning, 1988, p. 222). That is not the 
whole story, as Browning's amendment of Erikson states: 
Really mature forms of generativity entail a subtle synthesis of 
instinctual needs of various kinds, early ego-strengths and virtues, 
and an artful coordination of these accrued powers with the 
developmental needs of those for whom we have been assigned to care. 
(p. 222) 
Although I cannot remember meeting the term in the Object 
Relations literature, I do not think that we are doing such people as 
Winnicott and Mahler an injustice, by suggesting that they talk of a 
reality that is close to what Erikson conceptualizes as generativity. 
These authors, while welcoming many of Freud's insights, went beyond his 
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focus on the crises of the Oedipal Complex as the unique source of 
disturbed psychic functioning. We have seen how they adopted the 
insights he had developed around the formation of the Superego, to the 
development of the Ego, a term that for them, describes the processes 
through which the person relates and adapts to the environment. 
Attachment, affection, bonding, assertiveness and exploration are their 
favored concepts in describing the fundamental motivational directions 
of human beings, rather than libido, aggression, Eros or Thanatos, as 
was the case with Freud. Their changed perceptions of what human 
motivation consists in, gives birth to the criterion of human 
fulfillment that we have seen earlier: the capacity to care for 
succeeding generations. This criterion of fulfillment accords a vital 
role to the optimal parent, a role the parent must fulfill, if the child 
is to survive, or develop healthily, and if the parents, or at least the 
mother, is to achieve the fulfillment for which she has the innate 
potential. Thus while Object Relations Theorists have their roots 
firmly planted in Freudian soil, and make no pretense of shaking off all 
traces of a psychobiological view (excluding Fairbairn and Guntrip), 
they are not adverse to taking in nourishment from humanistic 
psychologists like Maslow, for whom self-actualization was the supreme 
aim of development, and the highest good. 
We need to examine further, the role accorded to the optimal 
parent if we are to understand the nature of the ethics carried by 
Object Relations Theory. Winnicott calls her the "good-enough-mother," 
a phrase taken up by Mahler. This parent knows not only when to 
satisfy, but is expert too, in optimally frustrating the child, for the 
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sake of development. Kohut catches the nature of the role of the 
optimal parent when he writes: 
Optimal parents--again I should rather say: optimally failing 
parents--are people who, despite their stimulation by and 
competition with the rising generation, are also sufficiently in 
touch with the pulse of life, accept themselves as transient 
participants in the on-going stream of life, to be able to 
experience the growth of the next generation with unforced, 
nondefensive joy. (Quoted from Tbe Restoration of the Self, p. 237, 
by Browning, 1988, p. 223) 
Although Kohut is a Self-Psychologist, there is nothing in this 
quotation which would be offensive to the position of the broad spectrum 
of Object Relations practitioners. For Mahler, no less than Kohut, the 
parent is "optimally failing," sufficiently in touch with her own 
feelings, and the baby's life, that she know when to support, and when 
to withdraw, when to envelop the next generation with affection, and 
when to separate. 
Ethically, what we have in this position is, according to 
Browning, a marriage of a theory of self-actualization and a theory of 
motivation that finds a place for limited altruism. There ia. motivation 
to offer care to the next generation, a biological motivation, and in 
offering care, the parent attains the heights of self-actualization. 
Self-actualization is the highest good towards which one may aspire. 
The roots of this good are found in the biological make-up of the 
mother, since it is her innate capacities, capacities triggered by cues 
from the child, that push her into that psychic space that Winnicott 
described as "primary maternal preoccupation." At this point, Object 
Relations Theorists join Erikson, and conflate self-actualization and 
the generative care of the succeeding generation, as the deepest and 
most significant of human motives. All of these clinicians then, find 
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themselves in the happy position that what they consider to be their 
principle of obligation--one must care for the succeeding generation--
is profoundly congruent with the deepest inclinations and motives of the 
human being. The highest good, self-actualization, is achieved by 
fulfilling the obligation, which simultaneously, is the basic natural 
instinct. 
The result of this is that one has a moral obligation to do that 
which deep down one wants to do. Or to say it differently, it is 
morally justifiable to do what one is inclined to do, because what 
one is inclined to do is moral. (Browning, 1988, p. 225) 
If we turn to Shea's theological perspective at this point, we 
can see that he would appreciate the notion of care for the next 
generation. In the world shaped by the Christian stories, people would 
indeed by available as soothing, empowering self-objects for others. In 
fact we have already seen how a solid cohesive self makes compassionate 
loving possible. However, Shea and the tradition of which he is a part 
would, I think, show reserve for the formulation of the fundamental· 
ethical principle of Object Relations Theory: one ought to care for the 
succeeding generations, and from its choice of the highest nonmoral 
good: self-actualization. They are too restrictive. The experience of 
life's giftedness, the sense of reconciliation with the cosmos, and with 
everyone and everything in it, are more likely candidates for that 
honor. Self-actualization might well figure on a list of the nonmoral 
goods available, but would not emerge on top. 
As I suggested earlier, the ethical principle that comfortably 
fits the theological outlook of John Shea is that enunciated by Janssens 
who claims that the fundamental ethical principle is "one ought have 
equal regard for others and for self." This is based on Mystery's on-
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going self-revelation within human experience, as this is interpreted in 
the light of the Incarnation-Creation stories. We also saw, at that 
point in our discussion, how this tradition makes place for the idea of 
self-sacrificing love, where this does not entail the loss of dignity or 
make room for exploitation. The overall judgment then, is that while 
the ethical positions are not incompatible with those of this 
theological tradition, they are narrower and less all-encompassing. 
Erikson, aware of the criticisms levelled against his position, 
has made some bold moves to interpret the notion of generativity, and 
hence the fundamental principle that goes with it, so that the latter is 
broadened and approaches the theological position that we have examined 
(cf. Browning, 1988, p. 227). Since we have seen that there is a near 
identity between the meaning of generativity in Object Relations circles 
and in Erikson, we can admit that the ethical principle of their 
position can be reinterpreted in the same direction as that of Erikson. 
In an article entitled Tbe Golden Rule in the Li~ht of New Insi~ht, he 
proposes a restatement of the golden rule in the light of his 
understanding of the kind of mutuality that occurs in instances of real 
generativity. Thus the scriptural "Do unto others as you would have 
them do unto you" becomes the Eriksonian "truly worthwhile acts enhance 
a mutuality between the doer and the other--a mutuality which 
strengthens the doer even as it strengthens the other" (1988, p. 227). 
Hence there is a major, rapprochement, but not an identity, between his 
position and that of Janssens. 
In his book on Ghandi, through a fresh interpretation of the 
theory of nonviolence, Erikson, not only extends his theory of 
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generativity, but also his interpretation of the golden rule, to include 
self-sacrifice. He takes his start from Ghandi's own position: "That 
line of action is alone just, which does not hurt either party to the 
dispute." Erikson interprets Ghandi as saying that this meant that 
truthful action (nonviolence) was governed by a readiness to get hurt 
oneself, but without hurting anyone else. 
Erikson sees this (i.e., Ghandi's position) as similar to his 
interpretation of the golden rule, even though the form of these 
statements evolves far more around not doing harm than it does 
around the more expansive mutual activation seen in his version of 
the golden rule. Nonetheless these statements build into his ethics 
of generative mutuality a place for self-sacrifice, that is, a 
readiness for getting hurt. (Browning, 1988, p. 228) 
"Getting hurt" is clearly something much more than what is involved in 
mutual relating. The person involved in nonviolent action, who seeks to 
help another change from nonviolent action to more just action, is 
willing to suffer himself, without hurting the other. At least, 
temporarily he is willing to go beyond an ethic of mutuality. In this 
he moves towards the position of Janssens, who sees a place for self-
sacrifice, as a "transitional strategy" designed to get a mutual 
relationship back in place, and to restore or establish for the first 
time, a regime of justice and equal regard. 
Metaphors of Ultimacy 
The fact that, as psychologists and disciples of a particular 
school of psychology, they may unwittingly buy into a particular form of 
ethics, may not be the only feature of their preferences to which 
clinicians may pay scant attention. Are they cognizant of the 
fundamental metaphors which fund these ethics? Which Metaphors do they 
prefer? As was the case with ethics, so in the case of depth metaphors: 
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theology has its preferences, and is self-conscious in its use of them--
after all its task is to talk of Mystery, the Transcendent, or God, and 
it must have recourse to metaphors to do so. Thus, it will be 
interested to dialogue with, and critique other methodologies which use 
metaphors of the ultimate, in order to test their adequacy, to learn 
from them, or reject their inadequacies, when and where it discovers 
them. 
We begin with John Shea's theology. Without justifying the 
claim made, I propose that there are eight basic metaphors, all drawn 
from the heart of the Christian theological tradition, especially in its 
Catholic form, underlying his theology, and which he uses to appropriate 
and make conscious the Mystery-human relationship and its consequences 
for the creation of a meaningful, human, world. The central metaphor, 
in my reading of Shea is that of ~. He repeatedly insists that 
Mystery is Graciousness, Grace is God's name. The graciousness of 
Mystery is revealed in our relationship to It. Shea uses the creation 
stories to celebrate the hospitality the whole of creation extends to 
the human species, and our status as Mystery's trusted friends in 
creation. Everything, of course, is not all right. Human freedom has 
given rise to the phenomenon of the panicked heart, or .§in. It is this 
which threatens, and is a source of destructiveness in everyone's life. 
There are however relationships which pulls us up short, maybe 
frequently in some cases, and encourage a change of heart, conversion. 
Other relationships and experiences may be cause for celebration, make 
life not only tolerable, but harmonious, and confirm that we are on 
track--Shea talks of Metaphors of rescue and redemption. We sell 
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ourselves short, if we focus our eyes uniquely on the present, because 
the present bears seeds that will flourish only in the future. We have 
hopes of fulfillment--and the metaphor of escatholo&y allows us to talk 
of them. None of us enjoy the present, hope for the future, suffer the 
ill effects of freedom badly used, experience the call to change, or 
rejoice in creation, all alone. There are others around us, with whom 
we may choose to form an authentic human community, hence the metaphor 
of church. The final metaphor that I see as playing a vital role in 
Shea's theology, is one that is different from the others, in that it is 
more philosophical, and that is the metaphor of the human person as 
guestioner. It is this metaphor which permits him to express the 
transcendental nature of the human person. 
Let us turn to the metaphors in Object Relations Theory, which 
according to Don Browning, function in a way that is analogous to the 
way metaphors operate in religious discourse. 
These deep metaphors give these psychologies their images of the 
fundamental possibilities of life. They convey a set of basic 
beliefs about what can be expected from life and hoped for in life. 
They do not necessarily dictate the content of their implicit 
ethics, but they set a context that supports or constrains what 
seems ethically possible or required. (Browning, 1988, p. 230) 
Since I am not proposing to do an in-depth analysis of the texts of the 
Object Relations Theorists, I tentatively suggest that a basic metaphor 
that guides their view of the world is that of harmony. The ultimate 
aim of life is for every person to attain the highest possible self-
integration possible, and through this process, an unfolding of their 
potential--biological as well as psychological--will occur. The 
unfolding of one person's potential will not interfere with that of 
another. In fact, the greater self-integration an individual achieves, 
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the more he or she will contribute to the integration of other selves. 
Hence harmony is promoted, when the processes of the psychological 
birthing of the human person are promoted. The ethical position which 
corresponds with this best is that of ethical egoism, which Frankenna 
describes in the following way: 
ethical egoism holds that one is always to do what will promote the 
greatest good--that an act is right if and only if it promotes at 
least as great a balance of good over evil for [a person] in the 
long run, as any alternative would. (1977, p. 15) 
The distance between this position and that of the ethical position 
compatible with Shea's theology is enough to show that if harmony were 
the only or even the principle metaphor guiding Object Relations Theory, 
there would be major irreconcilable differences between them. In the 
world of the ethical egoist, as Browning points out, where all 
potentialities complement, the need for mutuality as the core of 
morality is obscured. Reversible thinking--of putting oneself into 
another's shoes on moral issues--is not necessary. 
Because there can be no conflict between my potentialities and the 
potentialities of others, it is not necessary for me to reach out 
and imagine how the other person feels about something and to 
moderate my claims or restrict the actualization of my 
potentialities in such a way as to make it possible for others to 
meet their needs as well. (Browning, 1988, p. 139) 
However there is another aspect of Object Relations Theory that 
we need to look at. Winnicott is possibly the one we have seen, who 
most cl~arly typifies what I am getting at. At the birth of her child 
the mother enters into a state that he calls "primary maternal 
preoccupation" and in this state she can intuit the needs of her infant 
in a way no one else can. The state gradually diminishes, and at the 
appropriate time, the mother begins to optimally frustrate her child. 
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In Mahler's paradigm there is a "fit" between the developmental 
potential of the child .and her need, on the one hand, and the maternal 
potential for care. Some developmentalists have referred to this as 
co&wheelin& between mother and child. The potentialities which are 
referred to here, are psychobiological to a large degree, but 
nonetheless in the context of this psychology, this metaphor takes on 
the functions which in other systems would be attributed to God. 
Because of this cogwheeling the child is offered the opportunity to 
experience the world as basically trustworthy, and himself as 
fundamentally real--a sense of "that I am." This metaphor, is more 
basic than that of harmony. This metaphor creates the opportunity to 
introduce the notion of mutuality and equal regard. The mother mirrors 
the child, affirms him or her and in time, will recognize the look of 
recognition and response in her child's eye. The child's withdrawal 
from Autism, in Mahler's phrase, is a celebration of the mother's 
contribution to the child's development. Again, Winnicott's idea of 
"primary maternal preoccupation" refers to a phenomenon, that in 
theological circles might well be referred to as self-sacrifice. 
Winnicott says "there may be a willingness as well as an ability 
to drain interest from her own self onto the baby" (1960, p. 15). This 
metaphor then, promotes considerable opportunity for agreement, between 
Shea's theology and the psychology of Object Relations Theorists. 
By this brief consideration of the deep metaphors that govern 
both the theology and psychology we have worked with, we acknowledge the 
necessity of engaging these two disciplines, at this level. It in no 
way aspires to completeness. We see such an engagement as benefitting 
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the psychology in particular, and helping it to recognize where it 
leaves the frontiers of science behind, and tends to develop into a 
fully fledged weltanschauun&. 
Having identified the metaphor of "grace," which as I have 
suggested is Mystery's name, or in traditional language, God's name, as 
the central metaphor of Shea's theological efforts, I now turn to the 
task of uncovering the genesis of the corresponding God-representation 
which underlies it. 
CHAPTER V 
FALLING THROUGH DISENCHANTMENT--AND THE RETURN 
The reality is the speaker, not the 
spoken. 
--John Shea 
In this chapter I shall try to discern some characteristics of 
the dominant God-representations that play a role in funding John Shea's 
theology. The data with which I will work has been gathered, not only 
from the three books referred to in Chapter II, but also from a series 
of five interviews which John Shea consented to do with me, between 
April and August, 1991. Each interview lasted about one and one-half 
hours and was conducted in his apartment at Mundelein Seminary. 
There are severe handicaps in attempting to do this, First, the 
data from both these sources is not clinical data, nor have I been John 
Shea's counselor. Therefore this data is public by nature and is not 
likely to be, consistently, the most personal or dynamically significant 
material in this man's life. The second major limitation is that there 
is no possibility to lend the security of anonymity to the disclosures 
made in the interviews. This means that there is a deliberate censoring 
of material discussed in the interviews. Not only did John Shea make it 
clear that such would be the case in our initial interview, but I am 
satisfied that ethically, this is as it should be--his personal dignity 
and right to privacy demand it. The third limitation on the collection 
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of the data stems from the fact that it was not possible for John Shea 
to complete the God-questionnaire, developed by Rizzuto, in time for me 
to include the information on it here. This was due to illness. 
At the time of this study, Jack Shea if fifty years of age. He 
is at that stage in his life, which, according to the relevant 
literature, we can expect that some critical assessments of the course 
of his life, and its achievements will be in progress. Typically, the 
mid-life phase is experienced as a time when there is a growing 
awareness of one's finitude, accompanied by an inevitable regret for 
choices not made, or opportunities missed. It is a time when people 
discover an uncertainty and a danger in life, the likes of which has not 
been their.companion since adolescence. But it is a time of opportunity 
too, a time when questions of ultimacy, of what is the grounding of 
value, of knowing and of being, raise their heads; decisions about how 
one wants to live out one's remaining allotted time of "three score and 
ten" years (the psalmist says those who are lucky live this long) need 
to be made. Many people in this age bracket find that unresolved issues 
in identity may suddenly burst forth into consciousness, and insistently 
demand attention. The patterns of psychological cohesion and 
equilibrium which have been carefully established in the earlier life-
stages begin to shatter when faced with both the new circumstances that 
mid-life brings with it and the new possibilities with which one is 
faced. The way ahead often depends on how the person is open or not, to 
examine, and use the personal resources that he or she has developed up 
until now. 
We turn now to the case of John Shea, and attempt to trace, 
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albeit in a sketchy manner, one of the resources un undoubtedly brings 
with him in negotiating his journey into the future. 
Introduction 
At this time, John Shea is dealing with a painful and 
incapacitating back ailment, which has confined him to his apartment. 
One would never suspect now, he says, but he once was a very 
accomplished athlete, who was a skilled basketball player, and 
accomplished golfer, and who was always selected for the baseball team. 
This was so much the case that, as a seminarian, he was categorized as a 
"jock" and was the master of sports. John speaks about these things in 
a warm, humorous way, and I was struck by the straightforwardness and 
firmness of his manner of speaking. His self-presentation communicates 
an air of self-confidence coupled with a no-nonsense readiness to get 
things done. He strikes one as a man who knows how to work hard, but 
who enjoys life intensely, and who can throw back his head and laugh 
heartily at life's ups and downs. This sense of self-possession, takes 
on special significance against the background of a story that he tells 
about his seminary days. As we shall see, it is a story about 
disenchantment, of the cracking of protective casings, which often give 
rise to a complacency or even idolatry in a person's life. Once he had 
gone through this, he found an inner source of strength and resources 
which continue to lend a solidity and depth to his life. It is true to 
say, that it is this sense of solidity of his own self, that gives 
direction to his life, and which ground the three virtues of the 
creative person: courage, humility and the ability to laugh at oneself. 
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Childhood and Family Structure 
John Shea was born on Chicago's West side, in 1941, and lived 
there during all his childhood and adolescence. He is one of three 
children, having a sister who is eight years his senior and a second 
sister who is four years his junior. His family is solidly Catholic and 
Irish. This part of Chicago, at that time, was home to a community of 
people predominantly Catholic and Jewish. "I was twenty-eight," he 
says, "before I ever met a protestant." Though that is something of an 
exaggeration, there is a real truth to the claim. While the Austin area 
of Chicago was not exactly a Catholic "ghetto," there was a very 
powerful Catholic presence there. His family was a committed, church-
going family, who sent their children to Catholic school. His father 
was a member of the Chicago police force, whose earning power in the 
fifties ranged between $5,000 to $6,000, per annum and who provided well 
for his family. His mother was a homemaker. The Shea family lived in 
the typical "Chicago-two-flat" which was owned by the maternal 
grandparents, who rented the upper apartment of the building to their 
daughter and son-in-law. 
John used a striking metaphor to describe the relationship 
between himself and his parents. I think he uses it in a way that 
speaks volumes. 
They are significant to me in the way that someone who has a 
butterfly in their hands and who let the butterfly fly away, is 
significant. The hand doesn't make the butterfly, but it lets it 
go. The hand nurtures the butterfly ... may be that's the trick. 
He insists, time and time again, on how his parents gave him "tremendous 
freedom," for which he is grateful and which still prompts him-to love 
them. His father especially, encouraged independence. John has 
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recently seen a photograph of his father holding him, as a baby, on his 
knee. While he has placed his police cap on his he?d. His earliest 
memories of his father are from a later time. His father frequently 
took him to basketball games and these are perhaps the earliest memories 
he has of him. He can remember his father consoling him after he had 
played a match and things had gone wrong, or again, complementing him 
when things went well. When he did an imaginative re-creation of his 
home experience, he returned to a time when he was eight. In this 
"waking-dream," he came home at lunchtime. His mother was present, but 
his father was not there, which surprised him at first, until he 
remembered that it was lunchtime, and his father would have been working 
a nightshift, and was sleeping. His father was always present at 
dinnertime. Though these images were quite vivid, he did not have a 
conversation with his father. At one point he says: "remember this was 
the fifties." Balancing these remarks, one has the impression of a 
father to whom John was firmly attached, who comforted and encouraged 
his son well, but who, at the same time, was at a disadvantage, typical 
of the father of the fifties, when it came to emotionally relating to 
his son. At a point where I suggested that his father was a powerful, 
but distant, presence in his life, this is how he responded: 
I don't know if he was a powerful presence . in my memory. 
I don't know if he was powerful (then quickly) but he wasn't distant 
either though. Distance is not the word. The feeling was not 
distance. My father took me to trials for baseball ... we 
connected through athletics. To this day he is the very same. He 
encouraged you to do things . . . but it was . . . I never felt from 
him--or my mother--that they ever had a major agenda for me. 
His mother's presence was more immediate, constant, on-going and 
tender. I use the last adjective because it described the quality of 
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the earliest memory John has of his mother. As he remembers it, he was 
still in a crib, and therefore was under two. He recalls the details. 
His mother was going out somewhere and his grandmother was babysitting. 
His mother came into the room he was sharing with his sis~er. She stood 
at the crib and had to lean over it to kiss him. 
My mother had on perfume, and I remember smelling the perfume. It 
was the most wonderful smell. It was so wonderful. And I remember 
thinking how beautiful my mother was ... it is making me cry ... 
that is my earliest experience. 
It the same imaginative exercise that I mentioned in the last paragraph, 
when in his waking dream he returned home, at the age of eight, he came 
into the kitchen, where his mother was cooking. More precisely, she was 
baking waffles. John engages his mother in conversation. The image is 
one of nurturance, the mother's activity in the kitchen being the highly 
personal and caring one of feeding the family. Other memories, from a 
later time, all point to a continuing relationship of support and 
nurturance. 
One of the most significant dates, from the time when he was in 
eighth grade, towards the end of the year. It was a time when there was 
"endless preparation for processing in and out of church, and it was 
just 'U G H ... , " He returned home at lunchtime, and shared his 
frustration with his mother, who told him that he could take the 
afternoon off, and go golfing. Moreover, he and his mother frequently 
went golfing together, around this time. These are the kinds of 
memories he has of his mother--a woman who was attentive to his needs, 
took time to hear about them, and was sensitive in finding solutions. 
In fact, it is hard for her not to do that right now, when he is 
indisposed, even though she is eighty and he is fifty. John does not 
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want her to do these things at this stage, and pushes her away. 
The dominant early representations that John has of his parents, 
therefore, are positive. Here is a couple who welcomed their son, and 
who nurtured and cared for him, and who "gave advice in little proverbs, 
but who did not lecture." He was most intimate with his mother, whose 
image was-~and is--predominantly that of a caring, nurturing woman who 
is sensitive to her child's needs. The father, a working man of the 
fifties, related with his son through "doing" things with him and 
managed to comfort and encourage him in the doing. But even yet, there 
is a certain ambivalence, which centers around the fact that "my parents 
never had an agenda for me." He even toys with the idea of naming their 
"lack of agenda," "neglect," though he rejects that as an adequate 
description of what he feels. To illustrate what he means, he tells a 
story about his seminary days. It was a time when the young men at the 
seminary were under pressure from their parents to stay, even when they 
themselves felt they should leave. In their sessions together, the 
students would share what this pressure was like. When it came to his 
turn, the seminaries would say: "well what about you." 
Well my parents say the same thing they always say. And they 
(seminarians) would say "what's that?" "Well, do whatever you want 
to do." If you want to do this, that's fine. If you want to do 
that, that's fine. Just do whatever you want to do. 
As John tells of this incident, his speech quickens and his tone of 
voice is harder, tinged with regret. He continues by repeating a 
conversation, which dates from after ordination, with his mother, who 
tells him that if he wants to leave, he should, and not ever think that 
he must stay, because they want him to stay. John explains what this 
means for him by telling another story. It relates to an incident that 
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happened only a few years ago. One day John was contacted by an ex-
priest, who was doing research on men who had left priestly ministry. 
He wanted John's opinion on the difficulties of leaving ministry, 
particularly difficulties associated with negotiating with families 
afterwards. John's reply, spoken in the light of his own experience 
with his parents, infuriated the researcher, who accused him of being 
flippant, insensitive, and cavalier. 
He took me to task. Part of me was saying: "hey man, you're not 
me, this is your stuff." The other part of me was saying: "Jesus, 
maybe I do it all to cavalierly." Since then I have seen how 
disruptive these things are. He was more correct than I. But I was 
working out of my past. My parents would be disappointed, but it 
just wouldn't cause that much difficulty. 
Perhaps a way of interpreting all of this, is to say that John's early 
self-representation was one of being responsible for himself, of having 
to stand on his own two feet as soon as he was able, of being 
independent, and of using his own ability and judgment to get where he 
wanted. He developed his own ambitions rather than identified with 
parental ideals for him. The cherished virtues were independence and 
personal resourcefulness. While he experienced connection and 
closeness, especially to his mother, these realities were prized only in 
second place. This self-representation synchronizes with the object 
representation of his father as a man who was somewhat emotionally 
removed, but who nevertheless was available to do things which he liked, 
with him--such as basketball. It matches the maternal representation 
less, which was tender, nurturing, even indulgent, to the point of being 
over-indulgent. This interpretation fits in well with the metaphor of 
the butterfly that he used. While they certainly did "hold" him, the 
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ideal for him, on this evidence, was to be the butterfly which would fly 
away. 
John remembers the early manifestations of this independence, 
though throughout his childhood, they were things he took entirely for 
granted himself. Already, by the fifth grade, he would go to the Loop 
on his own, and see nothing extraordinary about it. It was only when he 
went to high school that he learned that other parents were not as 
willing as his own, to let their offspring into the city by themselves. 
However, his parents were much less permissive in the case of their 
daughters, and held a much tighter rein on them. 
In our review of Object Relations Theory, we have seen how all 
kinds of imaginative creations are part of a child's journey towards 
maturity and towards coming to terms with reality: there are ghosts and 
goblins, imaginary playmates, heroes and heroines, and then there is God 
of course. John and I conversed about his memories of these things. 
While there are not many such things that he can remember, there are a 
few. John has memories of his younger sister being attached to her 
blanket, but has no recollection that any such object played a part in 
his own life. He is unaware of any such stories as part of the family 
lore. Nor does he remember ever having the classical "imaginary chum." 
There is just one story that his mother tells, that points to psychic 
material, the function of which is similar to that of the "chum." One 
day, while she was on the porch of the "two-flat," overlooking the back 
yard and garage, which had two windows, 
I was in the back yard and I had a cowboy gun on. I picked up a 
rock from the garden area, and I threw the rock, right through the 
window of the garage. My mother came down and said to me "what did 
you do that for?" And I said to her "they had me surrounded and I 
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had to get out" [they being Indians]. I think it saved me from 
punishment. It was such a bizarre . . I must have been in some 
imaginative world, that I had to throw a rock through the window. 
Rizzuto's explanation of phenomena like this, is, as we saw 
(p. 165, above) that they are imaginative productions, exactly as the 
chum, the monster, the superhero, the devil, or God, are. All of these 
help the child tolerate his badness, rage impulses, frustrations and 
deceptions, and allow him to experience his grandiosity in controlling 
them. They help him negotiate the vital problems he faces in the task 
of becoming a self "that is both separate and securely related." 
John himself recalls two episodes of sleepless nights, one when 
he was in eighth grade, the other much earlier. In the later episode, 
he had a "tremendous anxiety attack" for about three nights in a row, 
during which he did not sleep. 
I remember thinking at that time, that I had had one when I was a 
lot younger. I had sleeplessness around the question of death. The 
younger one is very vague. But I remember the one in eighth grade, 
that's very clear. That was the first of existential crisis and 
questions and stuff like that happened in my life, when I was about 
thirteen. 
The circumstances which surrounded this sleeplessness are very ordinary. 
He was sleeping in his own room, the front bedroom, while his two 
sisters occupied the back bedroom. There was front porch on the house. 
Suddenly, he realized he was going to die. He was afraid of death. His 
fear was not associated with a fear of being punished, he adds, or a 
fear of hell, though he "was doing the usual thirteen year old boy 
things--girls and sexuality and all that." His fear, as he reports it, 
was centered on the fact that if he slept, he would not wake up. This 
lasted for two nights, after which he said to himself "what the hell!" 
and got back to sleep. John's interpretation of these events, that they 
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are his first acquaintance with the major existential dilemmas that face 
every human being. I do not dispute this. But my interest focuses on 
their psychological significance. I have not sufficient information to 
suggest what they might mean, in dynamic terms. 
An Early Interaction with God 
The earliest account of John's interaction with God, that I have 
access to comes from An Experience Named Spirit (1983, pp. 53ff.). It 
is the year 1954 and John Shea is an altar server, kneeling in adoration 
before the Blessed Sacrament, in a beautiful Gothic Church in Chicago. 
The location is important--a Gothic Church. I say it is important 
because of what he told me in one of our conversations. 
I come back to the things that were important to me, in my early 
childhood. The church building as being a very important spatial 
environment for me .... It was a place which was tall. It did 
what Gothic Architecture was supposed to do. It had high ceilings, 
so you had high understandings. 
Here, the Church functions as a transitional possession, which 
facilitate transitional experience. Notice the way in which he 
expresses the nature of the revelation he experiences, even as a child--
at least as he now expresses this revelation: "high understandings." 
The intellectual thrust of faith-revelation experience is to the fore. 
In our story, there are two other characters--his fellow altar 
server, a boy with big ears, and the Church, in the sense of the people. 
Significantly, John is not in an immediate intense personal relationship 
with either, though both are a familiar part of his life. He kneels, an 
individual, before the Host in the Monstrance. Then the Host "speaks" 
to him. He understands a message from the Host: "I'm not just a host, 
you know." Here is another "little proverb," not a long lecture, only 
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this time the teacher is not his parents, but The Lord in the Host. The 
"you know," tagged on to the end, was the part of the message that 
fascinated him the most. It echoed his father's mode of dealing with 
him, I suggest. Just as his father trusted him to use his resources in 
dealing with the difficulties of getting to the Loop, and praised his 
son's talents on the basketball pitch, so now the Lord who spoke to him, 
left him to his own resources to uncover just how his fellow alter 
server was more than just the boy, or the trees more than just the 
trees. The fact was that he did not know yet. The "you know" triggered 
the responsibility to see the "more," or the "depth" in the fellow-
altar-boy, the old ladies he met on the street, of the trees that lined 
the sidewalks. At the same time, the effort involved in doing this is 
not overburdening. The speaker of the "you know" is not really named in 
the story, he remains quite unknown, yet the "Voice" is trusted, is 
experienced as speaking the truth and reliable. The trust is 
reciprocated. The parallels between this God-representation and the 
paternal representation with its concomitant self-representation are 
striking. 
Adolescence and Early Adulthood: Social 
Commitments. Vocation. and the Burstin~ 
of the Shell 
The major themes that we have already uncovered in the childhood 
phase appear in unbroken line during his adolescent period. One of the 
more significant events that John recounted from this period, was told 
in the context of telling his childhood memories. When he was sixteen, 
he wanted to learn to drive a stick-shift car. It was Sunday· 
afternoon, and his father was watching a football game on TV and did not 
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want to leave the game to teach his son how to drive the stick-shift 
car. 
He didn't want to teach me, so he took a piece of paper and drew the 
shifts of the car on a piece of paper, and them M.C. (a friend) and 
I got into the car. My mother was mad, because she didn't think I 
should be driving in the car, with just instructions on a piece of 
paper. I was bouncing up and down the street, but I finally learned 
to drive the stick-shift car. 
John again recognizes the freedom he was given, and sees that freedom as 
completely "natural." 
We can see the confidence, the initiative, that he speaks about 
to me in the interviews, shining through in the story he tells, again in 
An Experience Named Spirit (1983, pp. 89ff.). The Story might be called 
"The Kid With No Light in His Eyes." The essence of this story is this. 
In the summer of sixty-one, just as he was about to begin this theology 
studies, John was Camp Counselor, at a summer camp for kids, run by some 
sisters. The principal character in the story is a young boy who has 
definite sociopathic tendencies. Not only does he steal and lie, he is 
not beyond sticking fishing hooks in other boys, at the first possible 
opportunity. The story centers around the relationship that develops 
between the young man with no light in his eyes, and an elderly sister 
who is the camp "handyperson." What interests us here however, is the 
storyteller himself, John Shea. In this perspective two circumstances 
stand out. 
The first circumstance emerges as John goes to the sister-in-
charge to tell her about the young man with no light in his eyes and his 
proclivities. 
"Before you tell me about it, Mr. Shea" [she was very formal], 
"I have a few problems I would like to discuss with you. About the 
record." 
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"Oh yes, the record," I smile. For you see I had been at many 
camps, but this was the most Catholic camp of them all. Lights went 
out at ten o'clock; and to waft the little darlings into dreamland, 
they played Schubert's Ave Maria over the loudspeaker. I thought 
this was a bit much. So on the second night of camp I substituted a 
popular camp parody of the time by Alan Sherman, "Hello Mother! 
Hello Father! Here I am at Camp Granada." 
The head sister wanted to know if perhaps I had acted rashly and 
introduced radical innovations into the life of the camp before I 
had sufficiently understood its spirit. I said that this was a 
possibility and that from now on I would consult her. This was good 
training for dealing with Bishops. 
The second event of interest to us, also involves sister-in-
charge, who always kept the keys of the camp truck close to her p~rson. 
She was not unjustifiably suspicious when camp counselors with a 
readiness to imbibe intoxicating beverages, asked her for the car keys. 
The sisters lived on the second floor of the building, in an area that 
was semi-cloistered. Access to the convent was by way of a rickety 
wooden stairs, which no one was permitted to climb. On the second day 
of camp John stood at the bottom of these stairs and shouted up that he 
wanted the keys. 
"I'll be right down, Mr. Shea." 
"That's O.K., sister, I'll come up and get them." 
"Don't come up here, Mr. Shea." 
"I'm coming sister." 
And then I stood at the bottom of the stairs and pounded my 
feet, producing the effect of climbing the stairs. 
"Mr. Shea, don't you dare come up here." 
And then she arrives at the top of the stairs, habit somewhat 
askew and car keys in her hand. She saw that I had not moved from 
the bottom step and she glowered. 
"You are a very cruel young man, Mr. Shea, a very.cruel young 
man." 
The self-representation that underlies all these events is one 
that empowers this young man to be self-assertive, initiative-taking, 
independent. It is the course of a high level of self-regard and self-
confidence. The story of how his father presumes his competence, and 
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simply takes his responsibility for granted underlies once again the 
nature of the object representation that John has internalized. 
The degree of John's internalization of his father is clear in a 
further story, which tells of an event that occurred when John was a 
senior in high school. It also illustrates, not only his father's 
confidence in him, but the direction of this young man's religious 
commitment, which, as is clear from the last story, has a distinctly 
social flavor. In 1959, the year he entered seminary, the box-office 
attraction was "Ben Hur," with Charlton Heston. The young Shea hit on a 
marvelous idea for a fundraiser for the missions. He and his classmates 
would hire The Michael Todd Theatre, which held 1,200 people, show the 
movie, and donate the proceeds to the charity of their choice. There 
was a major hitch, though. The downpayment for the hall was $600. 
Collectively, the class did not have access to resources of that 
magnitude. He went to his father and told him the problem. 
My father did not ask me one question. He just wrote the check 
... (pause, with tears) (laughs) ... and we made $2,000! .. 
Since then I have done that for other people. I always feel that 
that is something given to be given away. So I've written checks 
for other people for large amounts, without asking questions ... 
It is very moving for me to remember this. It just releases so 
much. Not the nostalgia. Just ... it is so close, symbolically, 
to what it is about. 
Listening to this, I was struck by the confidence and trust his father 
had in John, but striking also was the fact that there was no dialogue. 
It illustrates, perhaps, what we saw earlier: his father's gaucherie in 
affectively communication with his son. Clearly his representation of 
his father as a generous man, is ripe for assuming the dimensions of 
ultimacy. His choice of metaphor--Mystery as Graciousness--with its 
fundamental assumptions, is, psychologically speaking, closely bound up 
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with his appreciation of his father's generosity. Such would be my 
suggestion. It is useful to remind ourselves here that we are not 
saying, as Freud would, that the Ultimate is nothing but the transformed 
father. What we see is the coming to be of the psychological 
structures, which will be John Shea's resources for his faith journey. 
I am not postulating his internalization of his father, as the cause of 
faith. 
It if makes sense to see his representation of his father (this 
father is responsibility-evoking, emotionally maladroit in his dealings 
with his ~on--distant is not an adequate description--and yet generous) 
and a corresponding self-image, playing a major role in John Shea's 
developmental journey, then we can postulate, from Rizzuto's theory, 
that a parallel God representation will be involved. We can also 
expect, in terms of this theory, that as an individual faces the major 
life-decisions, as self-representations change, and adolescent self-
cohesion disintegrates, that old God-representations will come up for 
review and new ones be forged. When and how did such an upheaval occur 
in John Shea's life? 
A significant series of events were set in motion when he 
entered the seminary. By the time he reached the climax of these 
events, he was in his theological studies at Mundelein. On his arrival 
at the seminary, he made a startling discovery. The magnificence of the 
church buildings, which as we have seen was a powerful transitional 
object for him, left him cold. Moreover, he was put off by the monastic 
silence of the seminary, as well as by the monastic regimen of the 
institution. None of it mediated "the interior person at all." He felt 
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lonely, and for the first time in his life knew what it was to be 
homesick. After the Christmas break, he was sorely tempted not to 
return for the second term. By now, all the certitudes of his faith had 
all gone. He might have been physically present in the place, but that 
was all. He did not attend class, or even mass, which carried a double 
obligation on a Sunday. Since there were 600 seminarians in the place, 
he was never missed, though he adds, that he always turned up for exams, 
and was clever enough to do enough prescribed reading to carry him 
through. 
So it was a very strange situation, here I was living in the middle 
of a seminary, but I was not attending Mass, nor was I attending 
classes. But I was a sort of living in the middle of the place. I 
didn't feel I needed to rebel, nor was I feeling angry. I just 
needed to explore why all this had become so much nonsense to me. 
The theology was surely pathetic. It was the corrupt neo-
scholasticism that you read about and that Rabner attacks in his 
early writings, against the manualists and stuff like that. It was 
just terrible stuff. All the rules and the administration was 
terrible, it just seemed nonsense to me. It all broke down. 
There was another dimension to this breakdown, which came a little 
later, but which was associated with the personal breakdown of meaning 
that he had traditionally associated with Church. This second loss of 
structure in his life was associated with the· political fragmentation of 
American society, because of the Vietnam war. The pain of the memories 
associated with that is still enough to make him wince. 
Instead of attending class and embracing the manualists, John's 
intellectual diet now included Jean Paul Sartre, and "some theologians" 
but above all he read Kazanzakis and Flannery O'Connor. At this time, 
he took an extensive tour in Europe, putting some space between himself 
and the Seminary. "It was a very disconcerting time, because the 
scaffolding of my life fell apart. It was like as if I were falling--
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falling was my metaphor for it." It is helpful to recall the work that 
Erikson has done on .the Psychosocial Crisis typical of the young adult's 
life at this time: that of Individual Identity versus Identity 
Confusion (cf. Newman & Newman, 1987, p. 398). John has given us rather 
a good description of the drifting and breakdown that is associated with 
Identity Confusion. At this stage, John describes a situation where he 
cannot commit himself to a single view of himself; the roles he plays 
are unintegrated and disconnected; the value system of his seminary is 
light years removed from the value systems of a Sartre or a Kazanzakis 
or an O'Connor--nor are the value systems of these "masters" congruent 
among themselves either. In such a situation, meaningful decisions are 
hardly to be expected. John, like many of his contemporaries, was in a 
period of psychosocial moratorium. The story which he tells of his 
hitting the bottom, and which marked the end of his moratorium, bears 
telling at length. 
[The whole area of Mundelein] used to be lined with trees and they 
put big whitewashed signs, X's, on the trees and cut them all down. 
That's how I felt my life was. That someone had come along, and all 
these pillars that I had constructed, and put a big X on them, and 
chopped them all down.· 
The other thing was that the lake here was filled with fish. 
Carps. So the Illinois people decided to come and they would pay 
half the money and kill all the fish and restock the lake. The 
Seminary would pay the other half. And so, the whole student body--
they poisoned all the fish--and so the whole student body had to go 
out in row boats, and net all the fish and row them to shore, where 
we had dug massive holes to bury them in--graves for the fish. And 
we would shovel all the fish in and Oh! it was stinking. It stunk. 
It took about a week. May be even more. 
I was on the shore, shovelling the fish into the graves. And I 
look up and we had a priest here, called ... who was here for a 
[lifetime] ... and that was not too swift; that was a brick and 
oppressive too. He was standing out there in a rowboat, with his 
monsignorial cassock on, amid all these dead fish. And I'm 
shovelling away and I look up and see him. And it is late.in the 
afternoon. The sun is setting. Here is this guy standing in a 
rowboat, in monsignorial robes, in a sea of dead fish and I thought 
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"Shit, this is how this place is. This is just how I feel." It was 
a symbol of this sinking ... this disenchantment. I thought: 
"there it is. There is an external picture of my inside. Right 
there." That guy. If that is harsh on his memory I pray for him. 
Our focus is on John's internal representational system, at this point. 
It is not hard at all on the man, in the rowboat, in the monsignorial 
cassock. In a sense, it does not really concern him. The staff, some 
of whom were psychologists, and with whom John shared this, diagnosed 
his problem as difficulties in adjusting, or suggested that he had an 
authority problem, and was angry. He himself felt that such diagnoses 
were focusing on the symptoms rather than the cause. His plunge into 
Sartre, Camus, de Beauvoir and the rest, was an effort to find out what 
was going on. This was followed by an attempt to find religious authors 
who could make sense of what he was feeling. He played around with the 
idea that he was losing faith. "Then I realized, one day, that it was 
not my faith that was going, it was faith that was coming?" Or, in 
language that he used earlier, he had fallen--and had hit bottom. The 
bottom was Mystery. The Moratorium was ended at that point. A new 
identity was born--individual identity, in Erikson's phrase. 
In Stories of God (1978), John spends four pages, thirty-two to 
thirty-seven, plumbing the depths of the experience of disenchantment. 
In his conversation with me, he dwelled at length on the same thing. A 
comparison of the two is interesting. In Stories of God, he speaks from 
a theological point of view. 
Disenchantment is an experience of Mystery reasserting itself. 
Whenever a person mistakingly equates Mystery with a finite reality, 
he creates an idol. An idol is not a symbol of Mystery, but the 
pretension to be Mystery itself. It insinuates a total revelation 
and creates a false consciousness that Mystery has dissolved into 
total availability. In the idolatrous situation Mystery does not 
appear within finite reality, but is identified with some part of 
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it. In this setting, disenchantment is also a process of 
disengagement, a double freeing. Mystery is freed from the idol's 
exclusive hold, and the idol is freed from its false identity. 
Mystery is restored to its status as genuine Mystery, and finite 
reality, previously idolatrous, now has the possibility of being 
appropriated as a symbol, not as the usurper of the sacred but one 
of its mediators. (pp. 35-36) 
In his conversations with me, John was much more psychological in his 
formulations. 
[I am] pushed back, again and again into ultimate mystery, which you 
have to relate to, in terms of an existential act of trust, that you 
hand yourself over to. And this moment; when you are not holding on 
to yourself but giving yourself to this Mystery, has many 
consequences, when it is done again and again. It cannot be done 
once, at least I cannot do it once. I'm not like that. If you do 
it again and again and again, certain steady structures or 
perceptions begin to develop. One of which is "this is where it is 
at, so to speak." Everything else is stuff you relate to, not stuff 
you relate from .... You don't relate from your will, you relate 
to it. You are always relating to the world from some deeper 
cent~e. Therefore there is a certain freedom from external form . 
. . . But you cannot mistake the external forms for the self. That 
is not where person is at. Person is not capable of description. 
You cannot describe person. Person is known in action, not in 
description. . . . The consequences of the breakdown of my world 
... are permanently with me in ways that I don't know. As I said 
to (someone], I don't think you can be certain of anything, can you? 
. . . The only thing you have is that you are part of this immanent-
transcendent Mystery, which keeps throwing up life. You are one of 
the throw ups. 
When we try to pull all this together in terms of Object 
Relations Theory and its accompanying theory of religious experience, 
what fresh insights have we about John's development? We suggested 
earlier that as he approached the end of adolescence, John worked with a 
self-representation that was closely linked to the object representation 
he held of his father. Thus he viewed himself as someone who was 
competent, confident, able to use his talents, but who, perhaps, was 
somewhat restricted in his affective responses to the world around him. 
Knowing certainly featured in his experience to a much greater extent 
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than feeling. It is this form of relating to the world that goes into 
crisis as he enters young adulthood. The resources provided by the 
dominant internalizations of his father, the self-representation, and 
the God representation as then constituted, were unequal to the task of 
coping with the environment this young man found himself in. 
When he describes the aftermath of the crisis, there is a marked 
emphasis on the relational nature of human existence. The language that 
we might associate with self-representation aligned with a parental 
image that evokes independence, self-reliance and astute use of talent, 
has given way to a language of relationship, trusting others and of 
self-integrity. There is a sense of his having a more cohesive, 
integrated self than before, and one which prizes communion rather than 
independence. To account for this I suggest that the self-
representation, more closely linked to the maternal object relation was 
reawakened at the moment of the crisis. The mother-son bond was strong. 
Mother was less emotionally "maladroite" than father. John spoke of how 
he loved his mother as she bent over him, as a two-year-old; how they 
went golfing together; how she was attentive to his needs in time of 
anger or frustration. The words that best describe it are connection, 
mutuality and affection. It is precisely the resources which he had 
internalized, through the maternal relationship, that came to play a 
more active part in John's relationship with the world, after the 
crisis. Then priest, standing in the boat in his monsignoral robes, is 
a symbol, of what John found inadequate. He himself says that. It is a 
symbol of the inadequacy of the predominant paternal representation and 
all that went with it. Letting the butterfly fly free away, without 
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connection, support, ideals or direction, is not enough. 
Psychologically, the crisis was about installing affect as a mode of 
perception of, and communication with, all reality. It involved the 
fashioning of a self-representation that liberated the internalized 
energies of certain maternal representations. The crisis led to the 
evolution of a God-representation that encouraged a contemplative rather 
than a manipulative approach to all reality and that invited John to 
relate to God in an affective and passionate, rather than in an 
objective, rational manner. But maybe even more important than both of 
these was the way in which the new God-representation funded a vibrant 
sense, of self. 
[I am] pushed back, again and again into ultimate mystery, which you 
have to relate to, in terms of an existential act of trust, that you 
hand yourself over to, ... giving yourself to this mystery has 
many consequences ... one of which is "this is where it is at," so 
to speak .... You don't relate from your will, you relate to it. 
You are always relating to the world from some deeper centre. 
Funded from this deep center, John typically expresses insights like the 
one which I include at the head of this chapter: "The reality is the 
speaker, not the spoken," by which I understand that it is the 
existential knowledge of being real, of experiencing the world as real, 
and as the arena in which one may interact with others in a 
compassionate, mutual manner, surpasses immeasurably any ideas we may 
have, in importance. It is not clever phrases or ideas that are the 
evidence that point to the deep center, or the self. The experience of 
being a real self expresses itself most of all in action, in the kind of 
action that means "living creatively in a dangerous world." The prime 
example of one who did just that is Jesus of Nazareth. 
Again, it is not that this representation causes John's faith. 
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It becomes a resource which he can use, to respond, in his terms, to the 
approach of Mystery. The representation helps shape the way in which 
Mystery is appropriated, and at the same time it contributes to his 
ongoing personal task of developing an increasingly healthy, cohesive 
self. 
There are two dimensions of John Shea's theology which have 
always seemed to me to be in tension. On the one hand, there is the 
emphasis on faith-revelation as a knowing activity. On the other hand, 
there is the profound relational aspect of all existence. Time after 
time, he insists that relating is primary. In his conversation with me, 
he made what amounts to an outright attack on ideas and mind. 
More and more, I don't believe in the mind very much. If you give 
it rein, it objectifies everything and chops everything up, and then 
turns it into a puzzle .... You've got to keep the mind in its 
place, not by using it. That's the oldest trick in the world, to 
control the mind, with the mind. It is to dig deeper into the pit. 
You don't have to make it weaker. You've just got to make it serve. 
You make it serve the deeper stuff, the deeper signals that are sent 
out, and these signals that are sent out are like waves, and what 
the mind does is serve; what it does is like the surfer, it sits on 
the waves. But when the mind gets out of control and decides not to 
ride the waves, but to control them .... It has all sorts of 
tricks to do this. One of its tricks is to say "let's look at this 
and analyse it, then we'll know more about it. That the mind out of 
control. As I get older, I realize that the block to spiritual 
growth is in the mind and that original sin happens, and is 
reinforced, as the mind splits itself off from reality and tries to 
objectify, instead of living a freeflowing outpouring of life. And 
when life pours out, the idea is just to go with it. To me the 
quintessential story in the scripture about this, is the pouring of 
the perfume over Jesus and the disciples' [objection] "give it to 
the poor." There is nothing wrong with that, except that it just 
stops the flow. So when I feel this tremendous welling up in me, my 
question is not "why is it there?" or "where is it coming from?" but 
by question is "how do I ride it?" In other words, its truth is 
itself, it doesn't have to be validated by this mental thing. 
This reminds me a little of the sons, who in Freud's reconstruction of 
history, rise up against the Father and kill him. John's mind has 
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surely served him well--and the rest of us too. It is true that when 
its constructions are pushed to the limit--and that the limit had been 
passed was symbolized for John in the ridiculous situation of the fully-
vested priest in the rowboat--they end up being idolatrous. We may well 
have in the passion with which he speaks about the mind, the echoes of 
the struggle to modify self-representations influenced by paternal 
internalizations with those influenced by maternal ones. I would 
tentatively propose that the form of knowing, for which John so 
decisively opts, that of sacramental imagination, operates for him, 
psychologically as a bridge which spans the distance between the self-
representations that have been formed through the very different 
internalizations he made of both father and mother. Furthermore, the 
God representation that harmonizes with this self-representation is one 
that has two dimensions. On the one hand, it resonates with God as the 
ultimate relating Reality, who constantly invites human beings to 
intimacy--in accordance with the maternal representation--and on the 
other hand, it envisions God as ultimate graciousness that is to be 
known--the contribution of the paternal representation. 
CONCLUSION 
Michigan Avenue, Chicago--and countless everyday places like 
it--is the stage where the experiences of "exceeding darkness" alternate 
with moments of "undeserved light." The characters on this stage cry 
and laugh, fight and make up, mutually wound each other, and have the 
capacity to heal one another if they really want, despise as well as 
nurture one another, ignore as well as affirm each other's beauty and 
importance. They are actors and actresses in real-life productions of 
drama as well as tragedy, comedy no less than one-man shows. The plot, 
if John Shea is to be believed, is inescapably the story of Mystery's 
determination to surprise the actors and actresses as they b~~th their 
freedom through what they do, as they mourn their weakness, throw off 
the chains of oppression, recognize their meanness, or come face to face 
with their own beauty, the beauty of each other, and the delightfulness 
of their relationship to the whole of reality. When we ask the 
scriptwriters to step forward--another surprise! The scriptwriters are 
the actors and actresses. They are the producers and directors too. It 
is they who compose the melodies that are sung--and Mystery writes the 
harmony. They are the choreographers who plan the dances, and Mystery 
blends with their rhythm. There are no spectators before the stage of 
Michigan Avenue. We are all involved in the action as long as we are 
there. When the curtain falls on one act, we pass on, and become 
actors, actresses, scriptwriters, producers, directors, dancers and 
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singers, on another stage--and Mystery follows us. 
Staying within the world created by this metaphor, this essay 
has been an effort to become more attentive to the gifts, skills, 
techniques and processes that are involved in organizing the different 
acts and scenes of the human life-cycle. Having moved around 
"backstage," as it were, the intricacy and fine tuning of these 
processes arouse in us a sense of appreciation for what we find there. 
We have tried to describe these processes from two perspectives, a 
theological, and psychological, one. We have conceptualized these 
processes in terms such as symbiosis and separation, holding and 
mirroring, in the psychological register. In theological language we 
have spoken of story, image, values and behavior-strategies. Both these 
forms of discourse are metaphorical languages, which develop their 
insights in accordance with their fundamental metaphors. Two of the 
controlling images of Object Relations Theory, I have suggested are 
those of "cogwheeling" and "harmony." In John Shea's work, I have 
claimed, the axial image is that of "graciousness." As we have seen, 
these images create worlds that blend and overlap in significant ways. 
One of the reasons they do this, is that both of them carry a view of 
the human person and her world, that is fundamentally optimistic and 
hopeful. In the following paragraphs, in a series of propositions, we 
shall attempt to summarize the grounds for this optimism and 
hopefulness. 
The first proposition is that knowing is central in the process 
of meaning-making. In the introduction to this essay, we set out on an 
odyssey, with the objective of gaining an understanding of the process 
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through which human beings create meaning. At journey's end, we look 
back to review the terrain we have crossed and to highlight its major 
features. The beacon which casts its light on all the paths we have 
travelled, is the set of insights that center around the human capacity 
to know. In the work of both John Shea and Object Relations Theorists, 
the centrality of knowing stands out. Through the activity of knowing, 
human beings carve out for themselves, as it were, a meaningful 
existence, from the welter of sensory stimulation emitted by a cosmos, a 
society and a family that existed, long before they arrived on the 
scene. When we speak of knowing, we are .not primarily referring to an 
intellectual activity--and that is true for both Shea and Object 
Relations people. Undeniably, both these psychologists and this 
theologian approach knowing from their own perspectives. Object 
Relations Theorists are concerned, in the first place, to appreciate the 
primary and foundational forms of knowing, a knowing that is perhaps 
most adequately described as kinesthetic, in its earliest form. This 
phrase is meant to draw attention to knowing as something that is 
profoundly a body phenomenon, a knowing of oneself in one's skin. In 
Rizzuto's listing of the kinds of representation--visceral, 
sensorimotor, auditory, iconic and finally conceptual--we have an 
indication of just how corporeal the basis of knowing is. Knowing does 
become and increasingly rich phenomenon, as the developmental process 
unfolds and as memories and representations become increasingly complex. 
The context of this knowing is the mother-child dyad, where such 
processes as holding and mirroring, symbiosis and separation, occur. In 
this context too, the use of transitional objects gives birth to the 
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capacity for symbolic knowing, and hence to religious and cultural 
creations. Winnicott, Mahler, Rizzuto, and their colleagues, are not of 
course, interested in mental archaeology, when they return to the 
primitive origins of knowing. Their primary concern is to uncover how 
memories of past events, and the representations generated in earlier 
relationships are indeed immortal, and how they continue to exert 
influence in the present. John Shea's starting point is different. He 
is interested in how adults come to know and experience their 
relationship with Mystery. We saw how his insights are complemented and 
enlarged when we bring him into conversation with Object Relations 
Theorists. 
The second proposition affirms the value, the legitimacy and the 
inevitability of faith, as a meaning-making activity. John Shea's 
optimism and hopefulness are grounded in his appreciation for the human 
capacity to know in a sacramental manner. Object Relations Theory lends 
support to his confidence, from a psychological perspective. The first 
consequence of this complementarity, is that a major obstacle, well 
established since the days of Freud, to viewing faith as a normal part 
of human experience, can be demolished. Since the-beginning of this 
century, the claim that faith was a form of delusion and hallucination 
has been a kind of bogeyman for people whose experience led them to 
affirm a relationship with the Transcendent. John Shea's formulation of 
a faith perspective, is one that makes a consistent effort to take into 
account the contemporary secular experience of Western people. and to 
use a faith-language that they can understand. We have seen how his 
formulations are open to, and compatible with, the conceptualizations of 
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the Object Relations "school." They both agree that there is a special 
mode of experiencing, faith experience or transitional experience, which 
is neither totally objective or subjective. Certainly, this realm of 
experience is that of imagination, or in Pruyser's term, illusion, but 
far from being pejorative terms, they point to the creative sphere of 
human functioning, out of which has poured, not only the powerful 
rituals and stories of world religions, but also the great scientific 
theories of all ages, as well as the monuments of artistic and cultural 
genius. Time spent in this psychic space of illusion, far from 
destroying one's link with reality, enhances and promotes a person's 
connection and interaction with it. 
In the third proposition, the focus is on the potential of the 
Judea-Christian tradition as a resource in the process of personal 
development and meaning-making. Faith-revelation experiences carry 
certain ethical implications for the person's concrete situations. The 
stories of the Judea-Christian tradition offer a wealth of images which 
help determine the meaning of these experiences. These images provide a 
directionality for one's attitudes and values, which in turn prompts the 
concrete strategies one chooses., Shea describes this process as the 
faith-appropriation of Mystery's gracious approach. Object Relations 
sheds its light on this same pro-cess. The characters in these stories 
function in ways that are similar to the procession of imaginative 
companions that pass through a person's life--the "chum" for instance, 
or the "twin," or the guardian angel, Miss Liberty, Eros and the host of 
"fictive creations of the mind," whose praised were sung by Selma 
Fraiberg: 
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an integral part of being human ... [lies] in our capacity 
to create nonvisible but meaningful realities capable of containing 
our potential for imaginative expansion beyond the boundaries of the 
senses. Without these fictive realities human life becomes a dull 
animal existence. (Fraiberg, 1969, p. 25) 
The heroes and heroines of these stories function as figures with whom 
the reader or listener can identify and form object and self-
representations congruent with them. Moreover, a person who uses the 
stories and rituals of the Christian tradition as transitional objects, 
enters into a relationship with a reality that functions as a nurturing, 
holding, selfobject, who mirrors him or her. In this experience of 
mirroring the person's self-esteem and self-evaluation are strengthened. 
The expression of greater self-esteem and self-worth lies in the quality 
of an individual's relationship with external reality--in the ability to 
perceive whole, rather than split objects; in the less defended and more 
spontaneous matter of approaching others, and finally in the readiness 
to welcome greater and greater segments of reality into his or her life. 
Both Shea and Object Relations Theorists map out for us the process 
through which an individual builds up increasingly solid and satisfying 
connections with all that there is. It is this increasing capacity for 
connectedness that lies at the heart of a meaningful world. 
Experiencing oneself as solidly connected to, yet separate from, 
external reality is what is meant by meaning. 
A fourth point that is important for this conclusion, focuses on 
the God representation itself. Shea is clear that each person responds 
to Mystery's self-revelation, in a way that is personal and shaped by 
the concrete circumstance of that person's life. One person may 
experience the ultimate ground of reality as graciousness, for another, 
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Mystery's intentions are experienced as hostile, while for a third the 
Transcendent is indifferent to the human condition. Rizzuto's work 
translates this into a psychological register. She pinpoints the 
interpersonal source of the God representation and its origin, in the 
self and object representations of the person who carries it. As we 
tried to illustrate in the case of John Shea himself, the psychological 
resources he brings to his faith-journey are intimately colored by his 
relationship to his parents. Rizzuto accounts for the fact that the God 
representation that a person forms, while still in the cradle, may make 
it impossible for him or her to assume conscious, worked-out faith 
position, at the heart of the church to which his or her family belongs. 
Even when a person cannot express his faith in what is for him a 
traditional manner, he still maintains a "faith." The opposite is true 
too, of course. A person from an atheistic background may find it 
imperative to develop a conscious theistic stance in life. What is 
apparent is that one can no more shake off one's God representation, 
than one can lose one's self-representation. 
The fifth proposition is that the process of meaning-making 
implies a recognition of, and confrontation with, failure. In the 
course of our odyssey we have met many possible ways in which a person's 
developmental journey may become derailed. Principal among these 
possible failures that we have considered, are the following: 
(1) Sometimes, the mirroring process is unsatisfactory to a serious 
degree, and results in an inability to self--soothe, which gives 
rise to a situation where a person cannot tolerate solitude, and 
simultaneously fails in efforts towards intimacy. 
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(2) Others may experience a neurotic anxiety and fear of external 
reality, due to an unsatisfactory experience of support and 
security, with a resultant poor readiness to explore, and fall 
in love with, reality. 
(3) A third category of failures congregate around the issues of 
dependence and independence. Neither the rugged individualist 
nor the relentless altruist are healthy. Both bear the scars of 
battles fought and lost. 
(4) The categories found in Wolf help us name an array of 
developmental deficiencies--there are the failures associated 
with the Mirror Hungry Personality, the Ideal Hungry 
Personality, the Alter Ego Hungry Personality, the Merger Hungry 
Personality and the Contact Shunning Personality. 
The sixth proposition is that the spurs which entitle a person 
to create a humanly meaningful environment are won in the struggle to 
know oneself as integrating both "good" and "bad," to perceive oneself 
and others, as whole objects, rather than part objects. The outcome of 
this struggle, at least for the child is determined, to a large degree, 
by the welcome he or she gets from caregivers. If the support offered, 
and the frustration encountered, approaches the optimal levels, then the 
outcome is likely to be a happy one. In the case of the adult, Shea 
tells us, that there is always the threat of falling under the sway of 
the panicked heart, in one or other of its forms--either under the 
influence of the rejected hearted or the envious heart. The outcome is 
rarely decided once and for all, either in childhood or in adulthood. 
The sense of goodness, or of a balance of greater goodness over badness, 
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is a personal achievement, that needs to be repeatedly striven for, 
throughout the life cycle. 
The seventh proposition is that the fruit of facing failure, and 
of struggling to overcome ambivalence, is the capacity for compassionate 
service and mutuality in personal relationships. At those moments in a 
person's life, when service is genuinely compassionate and personal 
relationships are mutual, then he or she experiences the depth 
experience of living in a meaningful, human world. 
An appropriate commentary on these propositions comes in the 
form of a story from a tribal tradition, in Kenya. It is a story of the 
heroine's journey. 
Long, long ago, in a certain village, there was a tradition that 
at the time of High Summer, all the girls who were of marriageable age 
would make a necklace. The girl who made the finest necklace, the most 
beautiful necklace was the person who could choose to marry the most 
attractive and eligible young man, for that year. In this particular 
year, one necklace, made by Ngethe, stood out as the finest, the most 
elegant necklace of all. Everyone agreed about this. Her companions 
were filled with rage and jealousy. So they hit on a plan. 
In the morning it was the custom that the girls would go to the 
Nuke, the local river, to bathe. It was an important time of the day 
for these girls. They loved to play, to frolic on the bank of the 
river. On the second day of the week, while they were at the river, one 
of her companions, Mwaura, asked Ngethe to take off her necklace so that 
she could examine it, and admire its beauty. Ngethe complied with the 
request, but no sooner had Mwaura the necklace in her hand than she 
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threw it away, far out into the deep river. In consternation, Ngethe 
jumped into the water. She swam out, far into the river and deep, deep, 
down into its depths. She could see her precious necklace nowhere. She 
swam, deeper and deeper, and then she noticed something strange. Deep 
below her, she could see the entrance to a cavern. Bright light shone 
from the inside. She swam toward the light and entered the cavern. 
When she entered, she was surprised to find that there was no water. 
But the place was flooded with light instead. As her eyes adjusted to 
the bright light, she perceived the outline of a human form. When she 
could see better, the sight that greeted her eyes, turned her stomach. 
Seated in the middle of this cavern was the ugliest looking hag she had 
ever seen. It seemed she was wounded all over. She had sores which 
were ages old, all oozing with pus. Ngethe recoiled, and wished she 
could escape the cavern. Then the old hag addressed her, as she 
extended her hand, her putrid hand, in Ngethe's direction. "Come, girl, 
and kiss my hand," the hag said. Ngethe could feel her stomach heave, 
but as she looked the old woman in the eye, she felt compassion sweep 
through her mind and body, and slowly she made her way towards the 
seated hag, with the outstretched putrid hand. She took the hand in 
hers, raised it to her mouth, and taking a deep breath, she kissed it. 
Suddenly, the hag was no longer a hag, but a beautiful woman, regal, 
stately, kindly, and attractive. She smiled at Ngethe, and enfolded her 
in a sisterly embrace. As she stepped back, she said "Because you have 
had the courage to kiss my wounds, I will give you a new necklace, more 
beautiful, more exquisite, than the one you lost." At that, there was a 
terrible bellowing noise, and a fierce dragon appeared at the entrance 
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to the cavern. The beautiful woman told Ngethe not to be afraid, 
because she would cast a spell on her which would make her invisible to 
the dragon. As Ngethe watched, the dragon searched for her, but because 
of the spell, it could not find her, and after a while, it gave up the 
search, and left. Taking a necklace of indescribable beauty from her 
pocket, the beautiful lady embraced Ngethe once more, and told her to 
return to her companions. On the bank of the Nuka, when her companions 
saw her new necklace, they were green-eyed with envy, and asked her for 
the secret of her find. She told them of the cavern, of the beautiful 
lady and of her gift of the necklace. On hearing this part of the story 
and without waiting for Ngethe to finish the story, they dived into the 
water. They swam far out, to the middle of the river. Then they 
plunged deep, deep,· into the depths. They saw the light from the 
cavern. They swam towards it, and entered the cavern. They saw the old 
hag. They experienced the revolting feelings. They heard the hag 
invite them to come, and kiss her hand. Then, they began to curse her, 
and curse their luck. They abused her, shouted at her, swore at her. 
Just then, the dragon roared. It approached them. They were naked, 
unprotected. On the river bank, Ngethe waited for her companions to 
rejoin her--they never came. 
The story's meaning is tropic--it has no one meaning. The 
context of its recounting informs its meaning. Here we are using it as 
an allegory of the heroine's journey. The young woman is an image of 
the adult who is graced with a theistic faith. Such a faith, as Shea 
told us, does not solve the problems of pain suffering and 
disenchantment for us, rather it puts us in a position to begin to deal 
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with these. This young woman has grown up, and achieved a sense of her 
own identity, within her cultural milieu. The necklace she has made 
represents that achievement. Part of that achievement, in this context, 
is that she has learned to creatively use the cultural legacy she had 
inherited--we would want to include Christian stories and rituals as 
part of the legacy. Through the use of the necklace, the girl enters, 
in Pruyser's word, the "illusionistic realm." In Shea's understanding, 
the use of the necklace becomes for her a moment of knowing, through 
sacramental imagination. Then the necklace is gone. Its importance 
recedes, once its function to draw her into a relationship with Mystery 
has been achieved. Mystery appears in the initial moment, as an old 
hag. Mystery, in other words becomes the recipient of all the girl's 
projections. The sores and pus are an image of the girl's own 
narcissistic wounds, which prompt her to split her objects into the 
"good" and the "bad"--and correspondingly, to experience herself as "all 
good" or as "all bad." The companions are a figure of this girl's 
selfobjects, whose failures towards the girl have been serious, but not 
mortal. At the crucial moment, the girl sees something in the old hag's 
eyes that draw her up sharply. Looked at from another perspective, the 
story is speaking about Mystery's determination to pursue a person no 
matter how objectionable or complete the negative projections are. 
Mystery's pursuit of us, is stronger than our projections. In the look 
she perceives in the hag's eyes, lies a call to her to engage her 
freedom, the call to balance the "bad" and the "good." The moment of 
the kiss is crucial. Psychologically, it is the moment when the self 
achieves integration and cohesiveness. It is the moment when the God 
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representation she is in the process of creating, becomes adequate to 
the task of welcoming Mystery's approach into her life. The girl's 
compassionate behavior--and she is really being compassionate to 
herself, first, since the sores with which the hag is infected are 
actually the projections of her own wounds--is the expression of her 
"wholeness," of being able to bring the "good" and the "bad" together, 
and to withdraw her "part" projections. 
She returns from the encounter with Mystery to her companions--
the encounter with Mystery always invites closer connection with other 
people. They are in awe at her new "necklace," a symbol of her whole 
demeanor and lifestyle with them. They are inflamed with a passion to 
be like her--but alas, when they meet the old hag, they cannot withdraw 
their projections from her, and founder in their own misery. The girl 
cannot complete the journey for the others. Each one has to do it for 
herself. The dragon represents the experience of Mystery as 
indifferent, hostile and life-threatening. Mystery is incapable of 
offering Itself as gracious, unless a person is willing to receive the 
offer as friendly. It is not that Mystery abandons such a person--
rather Mystery's solidarity with the sufferer is most complete at that 
moment--such is the lesson of the Cross. A theology of the Cross takes 
Mystery's powerlessness seriously. 
To complete this chapter, we now turn to the Pastoral Counselor, 
the context of his or her encounter with clients, and the situation of 
the clients themselves in interaction with the Pastoral Counselor. How 
can we interpret what goes on in the light of our conclusion in this 
chapter, and in the context of the "heroine's journey"? 
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Pastoral Counseling--A Ministry in 
the Service of Faith 
The Counseling Act 
Have people who have launched themselves, or who are about to 
launch themselves on the hero's journey, any need for a companion who 
would nurture or sustain them on their pilgrimage? The answer to that 
question is in the positive. The question we now attempt to answer is: 
"what is the nature of the help that such a companion would offer the 
pilgrim?" 
From the point of view of Object Relations Theory, we can expect 
that the counseling act will involve an encounter where the most salient 
characteristic is the empathy that underlines every interaction that 
occurs between the counselor and client. Such empathy not only implies 
a clear understanding of th.e· client's predicament, as she experiences 
it, but it insists on a non-judgmental attitude, coupled with a behavior 
pattern designed to accept, and frustrate the client in as optimal a 
manner as possible--in a manner which approximates the attitude of the 
"good-enough-mother." The encounter is an activity in the present, for 
the sake of the present and the future. What is central, is the 
relationship between the counselor and the client, at the present 
moment, so that deficits in self-structure, the result of poor 
selfobject relationships in the past~ maybe remedied. Looked at from 
the theological perspective of John Shea, the counseling act is an 
instance of a person entering a situation with genuine compassion, 
equipped to be self-sacrificing, in order to support the client in her 
efforts to develop behavior patterns that are compassionate and which 
invite mutuality and respect. 
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Pastoral Counseling, as I have said, involves an encounter, of 
two (or more) people, each one with a particular life-story. These two 
life-stories interweave, for the duration of the encounter. This is not 
just any encounter. It is rather, an intentionally organized encounter. 
It has a purpose: that the destructive images that guide the client's 
life and her self-conversations, which in turn give rise to her 
destructive behavior patterns, be changed, transformed, or replaced, 
with healthy images, which will breed new, liberating attitudes, and 
beget new, freer, behavior patterns. The stories of these two 
individuals are engaged at different points in the process of their 
unfolding. In terms of our earlier story, the counselor has returned 
from the cavern and is on the bank of the river, with the client, and is 
prepared, if necessary, to leap into the muddy waters of the river, with 
him or her. The client has not yet plunged into the water or is still 
struggling with the horror of the old hag's sores. The counseling act 
in this context, is a multifaceted reality which constantly changes in 
response to the needs of the client's "descent" or "return" from the 
cavern. We might compare it to a dance routine where one partner is so 
attuned to the other's body movement, that no matter how he moves, she 
moves in tempo, and in step with him. What goes into the counseling act 
includes rapport building, teaching the client to use talk as a tool for 
growth, contracting with the client, giving permission to feel, entering 
with the client into the whole range of his feelings, and receiving from 
the client whatever projections he or she may unload onto the counselor, 
without retaliation. But no matter what the activity is, it has the 
underlying qualities of empathy and solidarity, qualities supplied to 
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the act by the counselor, who has returned herself from the cavern, in 
possession of the beautiful necklace--who has the capacity to mirror and 
affirm others. 
The Counselor and Faith 
It is rather artificial to treat the counselor, and the 
counseling act separately, because the person, and what she does are so 
intimately linked. But for the sake of completeness and clarity I do 
so. From what I have said, it is clear that to be a counselor, one must 
have at least begun the heroine's journey oneself. This is necessary, 
because without having faced one's own failures, without having named 
them, experienced the sadness, the anxiety and fear that go hand in hand 
with these failures, and without having uncovered the defenses that one 
uses to protect oneself from these failures, great segments of 
experience must be denied, repressed or deleted from awareness. John 
Shea spoke of falling, falling and hitting the bottom, at the time when 
he was burying the dead fish. That is a good illustration of the hero's 
journey. Disenchantment was his name for the required shattering of 
delusion. He met Mystery at the bottom of his fall. Object Relations 
Theorists speak of the healing of the narcissistic split, and the 
emergence of an integrated self as the term of this process. 
To the degree that a counselor has not undertaken the process of 
healing her own self, to that degree is it impossible for her to enter, 
empathically into the world of the client. Few, if any counselors can 
be expected to ever achieve the capacity to complete empathy--and since, 
on the "good-enough-mothering" model, optimal frustration of the client 
is desirable, maybe total empathy might hinder the healing process, 
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anyway. That said however, if a significant number of the counselor's 
responses are made out of her own need, or stem from the over-determined 
nature of her own motivations, then the healing, empathetic, and 
welcoming environment, which is the primary requisite, if the client is 
to undertake the process of restructuring the self, is missing. The 
condition of possibility of the counselor becoming the supportive, 
nurturing selfobject which the client is in search of, as a part of the 
journey to wholeness, is precisely, empathic, and supportive 
understanding. 
In the previous paragraph, the ideal of optimal frustration was 
mentioned. Perhaps a little more needs to be said about the issues that 
cluster around it. Situations may arise where a client is unable or 
unwilling to assume self-responsibility. The temptation is for the 
therapist to take charge of the client's life. A therapist somewhere 
commented to fellow-therapists that while it is noble to assist a 
stricken elephant while it is rising, it is foolhardy to try to catch 
him while he is falling. In terms that we have used in this essay, what 
is important is that counselors maintain their own personal boundaries 
and the integrity.of their own self. At times this may involve 
challenging the client, maybe even being impolite--but never without 
empathy. Looked at from the point of view of the client, he needs to 
experience the counselor as a separate, differentiated, person. 
There are serious ethical issues raised, when we talk of a 
counselor bringing his or her faith commitments to a counseling 
situation. There are ways of bringing one's faith to bear on the 
counseling act, which are unethical--the attempt to impose one's own 
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theological viewpoint on a client is one such case. But, there is 
another sense in.. which one cannot escape the influence of one's faith in 
the counseling session--as is the case for every other activity one 
might undertake. We have defined faith in terms of a human knowing, 
basic to the creation of a meaningful human environment, and which finds 
its fulfillment in a growing capacity for self-giving and service. If 
this definition of faith is acceptable, then it is hard to see how it 
cannot influence what goes on in the counselling session. The basic 
images which structure the counselor's world, which are the "rooms" 
which contain the "furniture" of his thinking and feeling, and which 
give directionality to his concrete strategies, are the essential 
elements of his faith. Moreover, the counselor is there as a helper, 
precisely in order to give expression to the outpouring of the fullness 
of her inner life, to fulfill the sense of an inner imperative to share 
the goodness, wisdom and healing that she herself has already 
experienced. The counselor's faith provides the structure by which the 
meaning of the client's story is understood and reflected. To ask him 
to leave his faith at the door of his office, is like asking him to come 
without his skin. The issue for the counselor is not "Do I have a 
faith?" but "What kind of faith do I have?" The aims and values of 
counseling, as these have been enunciated by the major counseling and 
psychological associations (cf. for example, the AAPC Code of Ethics, 
Principle I), seem to be congruent with this definition of faith. Maybe 
they even imply it. 
The Client and Faith 
Just as the counselor arrives at the session as the subject of a 
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living faith, so does the client. She comes for counseling either 
because her world is upside down, and therefore meaningless, or because 
there are some areas in her functioning, which are distressful, and 
therefore need to be cared for. In the optimal case, the client enters 
a situation where the client and counselor together form a very special 
kind of world. The counselor offers empathy and solidarity, which is 
the fruit of her own maturity and faith-experience. The client is 
invited to experience this, and responds with his story. In the optimal 
circumstance, the client is testing the images, thoughts, feelings and 
strategies that he has evolved, against the images, thoughts, feelings 
and strategies of the counselor, within the context of a safe, holding 
environment, for whose maintenance, responsibility rests with the 
counselor. Certainly, it is never a matter of the counselor trying to 
replace the beliefs of the client--even if he considers them unhealthy--
with his own. As Shea pointed out, the beliefs a person develops are 
only the conceptualizations of more fundamental experiences, and remain 
a mystery to another who has not had the opportunity to be privy to the 
process through which the conceptualization took place. Even where the 
focus of attention is the client's unhealthy beliefs, as in R.E.T., the 
effort is directed to help the client substitute new, more healthy 
beliefs, of his own choosing and formulation, for the old, crippling 
ones. But with a therapy which sees faith as a fundamental aspect of 
human living, it is not beliefs which hold the center stage. Much more 
fundamental is the relationship of the counselor and the client, and the 
breakthrough of Mystery to the client, in and through the relationship. 
This is Shea's formulation of the situation, and we have already spelled 
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out the psychological concomitants of this experience. In intimate, 
holding, mirroring relating, experience is generated which becomes the 
raw material for new, "whole" images of self, of others and ultimately 
of God. It is from these that healthy thinking, feeling, and behavior 
patterns will flow. 
A Final Word 
The end is a beginning. We have written at length about how 
human beings create meaning. The time for writing is now over. It is 
time to live, and simply appreciate the experience of meaningful contact 
with others. There is an important lesson in the following story, which 
I heard a long time ago: 
A young man became obsessed with a passion for Truth, so he took 
leave of his family and friends and set off iri search of it. He 
travelled over many lands, sailed across the oceans, climbed many 
mountains, and, all in all, went through a great deal of hardship 
and suffering. One day he awoke to find that he was seventy-five 
years old and had not still found the truth he had been searching 
for. So he decided, sadly, that he would give up the search and go 
home. 
It took him months and months to return to his hometown, for he 
was an old man now. Once home, he opened the door of his house--
and there he found Truth that had been waiting patiently for him all 
these years. 
The writing of an essay like this will never hand us truth or meaning, 
ready-made. But there is reason to hope that the struggle to write it, 
will prepare us to recognize and appreciate them when they happen for 
us. 
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